Governance of IT sourcing relationships : an empirical investigation of the influence of contract mechanisms and behavior by Ravndal, Bjarte
  
 
Governance of IT Sourcing Relationships: 
An Empirical Investigation of the Influence of Contract 
Mechanisms on Contract Behavior  
 
 
Bjarte Ravndal 
 
   
 1 
   
ABSTRACT 
This work is an empirical investigation of IT sourcing contracts and relationships, and on a 
general level, it is about the relationship between formal contract governance and relational 
governance of business relationships. It is a study of ‘the nature of contract’, with an emphasis 
on how elements of the contract influence on co-operation in business relationships (IT 
sourcing relationships).   
We employed a cross-sectional design, with data on IT contracts and relationships between a 
Norwegian industrial buyer and its suppliers of IT products and services. Our results suggest 
that it is relevant to focus on micro analytic elements of formal contracts, here expressed as 
contract mechanisms. The contract mechanisms show different effect on contract behavior. 
Detailed requirement specifications and penalty mechanisms seem to drive competition 
between the parties. They are extremely powerful discrete mechanisms that could be used in 
more certain sourcing situations. If, however, the sourcing situation at hand is more complex, 
then the parties should be very cautious. Measurement and specificity are so powerful that the 
combination might restrict co-operation. On the other hand, co-operative behavior seems to be 
promoted by the use of detailed requirement specifications, and by working together in lasting 
relationships.  
Finally, we found that environmental and behavioral uncertainty should be treated differently. 
Environmental uncertainty promotes competition and discrete contract behavior, while 
behavioral uncertainty seems to promote lasting and co-operative relationships. 
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1. 
INTRODUCTION 
“The firm is defined by its contracts and relationships. Added value is created by its success in putting these 
contracts and relationships together, so it is the quality and distinctiveness of these contracts that promote 
added value” (Kay 1993:63) 
 
The objective of this study is to examine how contract mechanisms can function as tools to 
develop (promote) co-operative IT sourcing relationships.  
This introductory chapter provides a background for the study and presents the research 
question. It further outlines the rest of the dissertation.  
 
 1 
   
1.1 Background 
In his resent book “The World is Flat”, Thomas L. Friedman describes the globalization of the 
world economy (Friedman 2005). He argues that Information Technology (IT), outsourcing, 
and insourcing are some of the key ‘flatteners’. “Now the real IT revolution is about to begin, 
as all the complementarities between these tools start to really work together to level the 
playing field” (Friedman 2005:200). 
IT will be used to support, and possibly transform, every aspect of business. At the same time, 
work will more and more be managed through contracts. Companies in India, China and 
Russia are already parts of this massive ‘sourcing-movement’, and this development is 
enabled due to the global IT infrastructure. 
To succeed in this ‘flat world’, every company has to utilize the global market for IT products 
and services. Hence, IT Sourcing, which is the organizational arrangement instituted for 
obtaining IT products and services (Hirschheim and Dibbern 2002), is increasingly important 
for organizations. 
Extant research within IT sourcing reflects this importance, and so does the change in 
emphasis from the decision and viability of outsourcing, into a focus on contracting and 
management of IT sourcing relationships (Lee et al. 2002). Early models to analyse the 
decision (see deLoof 1995), have been replaced (at least updated) with several attempts to 
understand the complete IT sourcing process (Hui and Beath 2001; Kern and Willcocks 2001; 
Lacity and Willcocks 2001; Hirschheim and Dibbern 2002; Alborz et al 2004; Cullen and 
Seddon 2004; Cullen et al. 2005). 
 2 
   
There is one striking common factor in all these models: They define the contract as the 
foundation for a relationship. It is assumed that the contract is an artifact that will influence 
the subsequent behavior in the relationship (Hui and Beath 2001). 
This is our point of departure; contracts are important for the creation and functioning of the 
IT sourcing relationship.  However, contracts do not deliver; people do. Contracts can only 
provide a framework. The critical issue is how people involved in each IT sourcing 
relationship actually behave.  
Consider a large-scale Enterprise Resource Planning project as an example: The complete 
system is an integration of software from SAP and Oracle, runs on servers from IBM or HP, 
using PCs from Dell as clients, and the network is a complex infrastructure with technology 
from Cisco and the global PTTs. The integration efforts, and the tuning of business processes 
and implementation at large, involve personnel from the focal company and IT suppliers such 
as the worlds Accentures. The implementation project itself takes several years, and finally, 
the business value depends on even more years of organized use of the new system. To 
complicate matters even more, such projects are often combined with outsourcing, where one 
or more suppliers take over management responsibility for the delivery of a set of services to 
the client company.  
This IT sourcing process is quite typical. Business value is created in a complex process 
where complementary resources, external forces and IT resources interact (Melville et al. 
2004). There is no single supplier that control all the technology involved, and therefore the 
sourcing process will involve several contracts and relationships between the buying 
company and the suppliers. 
The relationships can be classified according to contract behavior through an analysis of the 
manifestation of the common contract norms. I.e. contract behavior in a relationship is 
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anchored between co-operative (relational) or competitive (as-if-discrete), based on the 
manifestation of contract norms (Vincent-Jones 2001).  
If the parties adopt co-operative contract behavior, they are inclined to work together to find 
mutual solutions for unforeseen problems. Co-operative behavior accepts that all parties must 
create value for themselves, but possible long-term business value from an on-going business 
relationship is valued higher than the short-term optimization of each individual transaction. 
The parties view the contract as a framework, and they co-operate to increase the size of the 
pie. 
Alternatively, if the parties adopt competitive contract behavior, they are more inclined to 
treat each individual transaction as a ‘zero-sum-contest’. The contract is a specific fact to be 
satisfied, and what one party gains, the other party loose (Gadde and Håkansson 2001). 
Competitive behavior is legitimate and commonly used in competitive bidding, where 
suppliers are invited to compete for delivery of certain services according to predetermined 
plans for as little in return as possible. 
The challenge is to decide what type of contract relationship and what contract behavior is 
appropriate, and then to stimulate to actual contract behavior according to this decision. For 
that task, IT managers routinely use formal contracts. However, studies of the influence of 
contract on contract behavior are few and far between. Knowledge on how contracts influence 
contract behavior is still meager.  
The dissertation proceeds along these lines of thought; co-operative contract behavior is 
(more often than not) necessary for value creation in IT sourcing relationships. Contracts 
should be used deliberately to promote such co-operation, and therefore, managers need to 
know how different contract mechanisms influence on contract behavior. 
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1.2 Research Question 
Contract behavior is manifested through the contract norms (Macneil 1974, 1978, 1980). 
These norms are "setting the boundaries within which legitimate negotiation and competition 
are allowed. Any legitimate competition is bounded by an integral acceptance of co-operation 
as operative within the contract” (Campbell 2001:16). Thus, the manifestation of contract 
norms in the IT sourcing relationship indicates whether contract behavior is co-operative or 
competitive. 
However, contract norms are informal mechanisms, and cannot be directly manipulated. We 
can only manipulate and change the formal mechanisms, such as contracts, at will (Zenger et 
al. 2002). Hence, one way to develop these co-operative IT sourcing relationships is through 
deliberate use of formal contracts. They routinely specify the length of the contract, the 
requirements and the performance to be met, and the price to be paid for the contracted IT 
products and services. We denote these micro-analytic elements as contract mechanisms, and 
they are often specified in several exhibits to the legal contract (Sourcing Interests Group 
2002). 
We regard the IT sourcing relationship as conscious, deliberate, and purposeful co-operation 
between two or more parties. The IT sourcing relationship (society) is structured by the 
contract (formal organization), and the functioning of the IT sourcing relationship (society) 
depends on the attitudes, habits and social norms (the informal organization) (adapted from 
Barnard 1968).   
Our approach is to look at contracts as intentional mechanisms of co-operation: “Contracts 
are fundamentally mechanisms of cooperation, and only mechanisms of conflict when things 
have gone wrong. Thus, law is not what contract is all about; contracts are about getting 
things done in the real world” (adapted from Macneil 1969,1980). 
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Our current knowledge on whether - and if so - how the contract function as a tool to establish 
co-operative IT sourcing relationships is rather meager. How the contract affects contract 
behavior, remains partly unresolved (Poppo and Zenger 2002). To further our knowledge, we 
raise the following research question: “what is the impact of contract mechanisms on 
contract behavior in IT sourcing relationships?”  
 
1.3 Intended Contribution 
Our main intention is to investigate how contract mechanisms influence actual contract 
behavior in IT sourcing relationships. Theoretically, this will also contribute to further 
knowledge on the interrelationship between formal and informal governance mechanisms in 
general. Through our micro-analytic approach, we investigate the effect of contract 
mechanisms on contract relationships as manifested by the co-operative norms. Hence, we 
will add to current contracting research represented by Poppo and Zenger (2002), and Zenger 
et al. (2002), as well as IT sourcing research represented by Kern and Willcocks (2001), and 
Lacity and Willcocks (2001). 
Further, in circumstances where co-operative relationships are necessary either to mitigate 
risk, or to ensure proper economic value, managers need to understand the impact of choosing 
between available contract mechanisms. They need to understand the effect of using complex 
and detailed specifications of requirements and performance measures. They need to know the 
effect of tying performance back to economic consequences. In short, they need to know how 
the contract impacts on co-operation in the IT sourcing relationship. With such knowledge, 
managers might stimulate to valuable instead of dysfunctional and counter-productive 
relationships. 
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The contribution is achieved through an empirical study where we used a sample of IT 
contracts between a focal industrial buyer and its suppliers. We associated each of the IT 
contracts with a unique IT sourcing relationship, and we included different kinds of IT 
contracts to ensure proper variation in the use of contract mechanisms. Therefore, we also 
included different kinds of IT suppliers, from the independent IT consultant to the 
international corporations.   
 
1.4 Organization of the Dissertation 
The dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter two and three are devoted to a review of the 
theoretical foundation and development of research hypotheses. Two theories on contracting 
and governance mechanisms are central to our study, transaction cost economics (Williamson 
1975, 1979, 1985, 1996) and relational contract theory (Macneil 1974, 1978, 1980).  This is 
further ‘blended’ with research on IT sourcing, and the research model contains constructs 
that are critical and observable in the IT sourcing context. 
Chapter four is devoted to the research design and measurements that are used to test the 
research hypotheses, and chapter five contains a multivariate examination and validation of 
the data based on Principal Component Analysis and reliability measures. Chapter six follows 
this multivariate approach with hypotheses testing based on multiple regression analysis, and 
then we round off the dissertation with a discussion of the impacts and limitations in chapter 
seven. 
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2. 
THEORY AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
In the previous chapter we provided a background for an investigation of the impact of 
contract mechanisms on contract behavior in IT sourcing relationships. The purpose of this 
chapter is to build a theoretical foundation suitable for such an empirical investigation.   
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2.1 Theoretical Foundation  
We are specifically interested in contracts and relationships, and therefore we decided to 
apply Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) and Relational Contract Theory (RCT). These two 
contracting theories are occupied with ‘contracting in its entirety’ (adapted from Williamson 
2002), and both focus on ‘contracts as framework for the play of the game’ in on-going 
contractual relations. However, they provide different perspectives that augment each other. 
While TCE gives normative prescriptions on how to choose the most efficient governance 
structure for different transactions, it does not provide a tool to analyze how these governance 
structures actually work. Therefore, we use RCT to analyze whether contract behavior (actual 
governance) in a relationship, is co-operative (relational) or competitive (as-if-discrete), based 
on the manifestation of contract norms. 
The two next sections will give a review of the two theories, and we will round off the chapter 
with a search for commonly used contract mechanisms in the IT sourcing literature. This is 
the contextual guide that enables our relational analysis with focus on the common contract 
norms in IT sourcing relationships.  
 
2.2 Transaction Cost Economics 
Transaction Cost Economics is a theory of the firm as a governance structure. “Any issue that 
arises as or can be reformulated as a contracting problem is usefully examined through the 
lens of transaction cost economizing” (Williamson 1998:23). TCE as we know it has been 
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developed and extended through the last 30 years. Williamson (1975, 1979, 1983, 1985, 1996, 
1998, 2000, 2002) is the key contributor and the one who have made it operational. 
TCE takes its place alongside other - partly rival, partly complementary – perspectives of firm 
and market organization. It is a combination of economics, organization and law, with 
economics as the first among equals. The general problem of economy is to adapt to uncertain 
future situations, and the TCE’s tenet is to economize on bounded rationality while 
safeguarding against possible opportunistic behavior. This is best done through farsighted 
contracting using credible commitments. “The wise Prince both gives and accepts credible 
commitments” (Williamson 1983, 1985, 1996, 1998).  
“Transaction cost economics concurs with Friedrich Hayek (1945) and Chester Barnard 
(1938) that adaptation is the central problem of economic organization.” (Williamson 
1998:32). Adaptation according to Hayek should be autonomous and regulated through a well 
functioning price system, while Barnard’s form of adaptation is cooperative through 
administration within the firm. High performing systems need adaptive capacity of both kinds 
(Williamson 1998).   
 
2.2.1 Human Attributes 
The normative predictions of TCE are based on two human behavioral attributes. First, the 
cognitive capacity of human beings is limited. We are bounded rational; behavior is 
intendedly rational but only limitedly so. No matter how we try, we will not be able to foresee 
all future contingencies. Nor will we be able to express this in a proper way. Thus all complex 
contracts are unavoidably incomplete. They will be subject to interpretation based on tacit 
assumptions and expectations (Milgrom and Roberts 1992; Williamson 1996, 2002). 
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Second, the theory argues that all human beings can behave opportunistic or self-interest 
seeking with guile. All of us can behave strategically, and we can take advantage of a situation 
to promote our self-interest on the expense of the mutual interests. We can, and (often) will, if 
circumstances allow, behave individualistic instead of altruistic. The contracting problem 
occurs because we cannot know in advance who will behave opportunistic. The sum of these 
two human characteristics is that contracting does introduce hazards. An incomplete contract 
contains gaps, errors and omissions due to bounded rationality, and contractual promises are 
not self-enforcing due to opportunism.  
A third characteristic, not always included in the basic human assumptions of TCE, is the 
ability to behave farsighted. We can, and will do our best to anticipate and plan for the future, 
and this directs our attention to governance. We can do our best to mitigate the ex post 
hazards of opportunism through the ex ante choice of governance. 
 
2.2.2 The Transaction and its Attributes 
“The ultimate unit of activity … must contain in itself the three principles of conflict, 
mutuality and order. This unit is the transaction” (Williamson 1998:36). This moves the study 
of economic institutions towards the study of contract, and it depends on the ability to 
distinguish transactions based on critical attributes. TCE advances the frequency with which 
transactions recur, the uncertainty (disturbances) to which they are subject, and the condition 
of asset specificity to be the critical attributes.  
Asset specificity, which is idiosyncratic investments that loose value outside the transaction, 
gives rise to bilateral dependency. A large numbers supply gets transformed into a small 
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numbers exchange relation.  Asset specificity is the prime condition for safeguarding. Without 
specific assets at stake, there would be no need for hazard mitigation and safeguarding. 
 
2.2.3 Governance 
“The concept of governance is precisely responsive to the triple to which Commons referred: 
governance is the means by which order is accomplished in a relation in which potential 
conflict threatens to undo or upset opportunities to realize mutual gains (Williamson 
1998:36). 
The governance choice for a single industrial actor is ‘make – or buy’? A transaction could be 
brought under unified governance within the firm, but in this study we focus on transactions 
that are governed through contracts between legally independent firms. However, it is 
instructive to look at the differences between the alternative modes of governance.  
The general assumption in TCE is that he parties have to choose between feasible and 
available governance mechanisms that differ in cost and competencies, and some of the 
important differences are (Williamson 1991, 1996, 1998): 
1) Incentive intensity; high powered incentives in markets, low powered in firms 
2) Administrative controls; firms are supported by a more extensive array of 
administrative rules and procedures 
3) Adaptation; markets can effect autonomous adaptation through the price system; while 
firms are better when cooperative adaptation and planned co-operation is needed.  
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4) Contract law; markets relies on court ordering whereas firms use private ordering and 
settles dispute by fiat 
Between the two poles of market and hierarchical governance, we find hybrid governance that 
has an average score on all these dimensions. It is a blend of market and hierarchy, and the 
contract mechanisms are choice variables that can be used to move the governance more 
towards one of the poles (Williamson 1979, 1996, 2002).   
Hazards accrue, and a contract problem occurs when bounded rationality, opportunism and 
asset specificity are combined. Without bounded rationality, we could work out all 
contingencies and arrive at several complete contingency contracts expressing everything. 
Without opportunism, we could rely on promise and expect that all problems would be 
worked out. And finally, without specific assets, we would not have anything at stake. There 
would be no significant hazards left for safeguarding. 
Efficient governance is to align transactions that differ in their attributes, with governance 
mechanisms that differ in their cost and competence (Williamson 1985, 1996, 2002). With no 
specific assets at stake, it will always be most efficient to rely on market governance. There 
will always be alternative sources available, and we have nothing to loose. 
With specific assets employed, there is a contractual hazard and a need to safeguard. This can 
be achieved in either of two ways, through the use of contracts or through internal 
organization. Due to the loss of incentive intensity and other bureaucratic costs, the firm is 
normally the choice of last resort. First, try markets, then safeguard through contracting, then 
if nothing else function use internal organization (Williamson 1985, 1991, 1996, 1998). 
In this study, we only investigate transactions that are governed through contracts, either of a 
market kind, or a hybrid kind. Market contracts are often taken to be equivalent with 
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Macneil’s discrete contracts that are ‘short in, short out’, and hybrid contracts resemble 
relational contracts. This is illustrated with the following figure from Williamson (1985): 
 
Investments Characteristics  
Nonspecific Mixed Idiosyncratic 
Occasional Trilateral governance 
(Neoclassical contract) 
 
Frequency of 
transaction 
Recurrent 
 
Market governance 
(Classical contract) Bilateral or Unified governance 
(Relational contract) 
Figure 2.1: Efficient Governance 
 
Here, we see that long-term or recurrent transactions where there are (highly) idiosyncratic 
investments, probably should be governed through the hierarchy. Coordinated adaptive 
capacity within the firm is normally better than between legally independent parties.  
However, the focus in this study is on contracts between independent firms. We do not focus 
on market governance (classical or discrete contracts) versus bilateral governance (relational 
contract). We focus on how actual contracts between independent firms (in a market) function 
as tools to promote proper contract behavior. Hence, this scheme should therefore instruct us 
on conditions for efficient contracting.  
An initial interpretation is: long-term (recurrent) transactions with idiosyncratic investments 
will demand adaptive actions and will not be efficiently governed through market contracts. 
Market contracts have to be precise and discrete, and will not provide a tool to promote co-
operative contract behavior.  
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2.2.4 Environmental and Behavioral Uncertainty 
“As Hayek maintained, interesting problems of economic organization arise only in 
conjunction with uncertainty” (Williamson 1985: 57). Uncertainty will influence efficient 
governance, and it will render any contract to be more or less incomplete. As uncertainty 
accrue, market governance will not function, and hybrid governance will take over. However, 
with substantial uncertainty, the efforts to align contracts between two independent parties 
will be extremely costly. Therefore, contracts will tend to flee to one of the extremes. Either 
choose to rely on less advanced technology without idiosyncratic investments, and thus use 
market governance, or move the transaction under internal management altogether 
(Williamson 1985, 1991, 1996).  
TCE treats uncertainty, or disturbances, as originating from different sources. Environmental 
uncertainty refers to “unanticipated changes in circumstances surrounding an exchange” 
(Noordewier et al. 1990: 82). This variable has been conceptualized in different ways 
(Rindfleisch and Heide 1997), and we focus on unpredictability associated with the supply 
market. This includes factors such as rapidly changing technology, frequent price changes, 
and fluctuations in product availability (Cannon and Perrault 1999; Cannon et al. 2000). It is 
also argued that availability of alternative suppliers should be viewed as a source of 
uncertainty (Cannon and Perrault 1999). 
One way to mitigate hazards due to environmental uncertainty, is avoiding, i.e. buyers should 
not go into situations where they are dependent on specific supplies. Hence, we would expect 
highly dynamic and unpredictable transactions to be associated with market governance 
(Rindfleish and Heide 1997). Buyers should try to mitigate hazards due to dynamic and 
uncertain price structure by keeping ‘a way out’. This is to rely on autonomous adaptation 
through the price system.  
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Even if a close relationship might help safeguard, there will be limits to suppliers’ (or clients’ 
for that matter) willingness to give ‘more than the market demands’. Because price change is 
a ‘zero-sum-game’, the parties will be inclined to keep as much as possible for themselves 
(Williamson 1985). Dynamic markets should be treated with alternative sources so that 
dependence is reduced, and this is also the common advice for IT sourcing (Lacity and 
Willcocks 2001). 
Behavioral uncertainty is associated with measurement and performance ambiguity, it occurs 
when it is complex and difficult to describe and understand ‘how things work’. It will render 
strategic behavior (Williamson 1985), and it creates asymmetric information where one of the 
parties necessarily knows more about the goods and services than the other. “Several studies 
conceptualize behavioral uncertainty as fundamentally an issue of performance assessment” 
(Rindfleish and Heide 1997: 43). 
Greater complexity of supply increases purchase decision ambiguity and risk, and a buying 
firm is likely to seek closer relationships that help reduce this (Cannon and Perrault 1999). 
When it is difficult to express exact requirements in a contract, cooperative adaptation and 
planned co-operation is needed. This should lead to closer relationships. 
Such behavior should be associated with complex IT outsourcing that takes months and years 
to implement properly. If there are substantial problems associated with specification of IT 
products and services, and verification of the deliveries, then the associated IT contracts are 
unavoidably incomplete (Willcocks et al. 1997; Kern and Willcocks 2001). Hence, the parties 
will be confronted with the need to adapt to unanticipated disturbances due to gaps, errors, 
and omissions in the original contract. Costly contractual breakdowns (refusals of 
cooperation, mal-adaptation, demands for renegotiation) may be posed, and the parties need to 
develop a relationship (Williamson 2002). 
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2.3 Relational Contract Theory 
“By contract I mean no more and no less than the relations among parties to the process of projecting exchange 
into the future” Macneil (1980: 5). 
Relational Contract Theory is closely linked to the work of Ian Macneil, and “in 30 or so of 
the more than 50 books and articles he has published since 1960 he has set out the principal 
formulation of what has come to be known as ‘the relational theory’ of the law of contract” 
(Campbell 2001:4).  “There is a sharp contrast between the profundity of Macneil’s work and 
the, as he himself recognizes, still disappointing reception of that work. So far as this is an 
intellectual matter, it can largely be put down to the widespread interpretation of Macneil that 
he claims there is a separate ‘relational’ category of contracts. This is, at best, thought to be a 
claim about a perhaps interesting but certainly marginal category of contracts other than 
classical or discrete contracts… the main intended thrust of his work is not so much to 
distinguish the relational from the discrete contract but to reveal the relational constitution of 
all contracts” (Campbell 2001:5).   
The strength of this work is the depth of the descriptions of efficient contract behavior and 
values. It informs us on the way exchange are embedded in the society, how exchange in 
practice is conducted, and on the inevitable incompleteness of real life contracts. However, 
the strength is also its weakness. Macneil’s work is so rich and complex, that it can easily be 
misinterpreted. To avoid some of the most common misinterpretations, Macneil has given the 
following summary of the essential elements of relational contract theory (Macneil 1987): 
• The world encompassed by relational contract theory is the world of contract, defined 
as relations among people who have exchanged, are exchanging, or expect to be 
exchanging in the future. 
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• All exchange occurs in relations. 
• A number of categories of behavior are required for such relations to exist, two of 
which, maintaining reciprocity and solidarity, are first among equals. 
• The behavior pattern give rise to norms, a case of an “is” creating an “ought”. 
•  Underlying this structure … is the proposition that man is both an entirely selfish and 
an entirely social creature… Reciprocity and solidarity are two principles of behavior 
that are essential for the survival of such a creature.  
• Exchange occurs in various patterns along a spectrum ranging from highly discrete to 
highly relational. 
In this dissertation, we follow the recommendation to use relational contract theory as a 
methodology focusing on the common contract norms (Vincent-Jones 2001). Thus, we 
analyze whether the IT sourcing relationship (exchange) is competitive (discrete) or co-
operative (relational) based on the manifestation of the contract norms.  
 
2.3.1 Contracts as Co-operative Social Behavior 
Macneil began to develop his rival account of contract around ‘co-operation’, and this has 
remained central to his work: “The first thing to note about contract is the fact that it concerns 
social behavior… The next thing to note is that this kind of social behavior involved is co-
operative social behavior; behavior characterized by a willingness and ability to work with 
others… contract involves people affirmatively working together (Macneil 1968:14)” 
(Campbell 2001:9-10). 
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Co-operation is further advanced as the most important common characteristic, one of the 
‘five basic elements’: “There are … five basic elements of contracts: 1) co-operation; 2) 
economic exchange; 3) planning for the future; 4) potential external sanctions; and 5) social 
control and manipulation” (Macneil 1969:407)”  (Campbell 2001:10). These common 
characteristics have been treated as four ‘primal roots’ (Macneil 1974, 1980), and as ‘contract 
essence’ (Macneil 2000):  
1) Contracts are based on society. It is not possible to understand contract without looking 
into the particular society where the contract resides. The IT sourcing relationship is our 
particular society. 2) Contract is a result of specialization of labor and exchange. The contract 
is a result of the contractor’s ability to specialize on some services. 3) There is a sense of 
choice. The parties are free to choose among several alternative behaviors, they are free to 
contract, and they are free to choose with whom to contract. The client (often) has a choice 
between internal production and external sourcing (make-or-buy), and he deliberately chooses 
the external option. The parties are also free to choose the form of contract, and like Macaulay 
(1963) showed, the parties are free to use “non-contracting” practices. 4) There is an 
awareness of the future. If contract is to specify future exchange, than the parties will have to 
anticipate this future. They must know what they want to achieve in the exchange process. 
As a result, the parties enter a contract and creates an IT sourcing relationship because the 
supplier specializes in the required services, and the client expect to create more value by 
entering a contract than by producing the services internally. Both parties have a choice to 
enter or not, and both parties have an awareness of the future. This is what they will try to 
specify in the contract documents. 
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2.3.2 Contract Norms as Manifestation of Contract Behavior 
Co-operation and co-operative contract behavior will be manifested through the social norms 
that operate in contracts. A norm is “a principle of right action binding upon the members of a 
group and serving to guide, control, or regulate proper and acceptable behavior” (Macneil 
1980:38). Thus: “ in the process of projecting exchange into the future … people specialize 
and exchange, exercise choice, plan to exercise power, and fit all these things together in the 
society of which they are members. This behavior gives rise to prescriptive norms, to 
standards of proper conduct” (Macneil 1980:36).  
Complex contracts can only be governed efficiently if the parties adopt a consciously co-
operative attitude manifested through these contract norms (Campbell 2001:16). “Relatively 
discrete and relatively relational forms of contract can be devised within the common contract 
norms in particular contracts. Discrete contract emphasizes the common contract norm of a 
competitive character (Macneil 1983: 360), such as the attempt closely to specify (and impose 
strict liability for) performance, which Macneil calls the ‘implementation of planning’. 
Relational contract emphasizes the common contract norms of a co-operative character 
(Macneil 1983:363-4), such as preservation of the relation in ‘contractual solidarity’ (even to 
the point of adjusting obligations and waiving strict liabilities)” (Campbell 2001:21, emphasis 
added). 
It is important to realize that both competition and co-operation, both discrete and relational 
contracts, have a coherent place within Macneil’s theory. A competitive approach based on 
competitive bidding makes sense in some circumstances, but the parties need to choose 
carefully when the circumstances demand a more co-operative approach. “Macneil offers an 
account of contract which allow us to place the various forms of contract action, ranging from 
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the highly competitive to the highly co-operative, within one integrated framework based on 
the common contract norms” (Campbell 2001:26, emphasis added). 
At one end of the continuum is the discrete transaction, where the future exchange is brought 
completely into the present through perfect specification of terms and contingencies. There is 
no relationship between the parties beyond that expressed in the agreement (Kaufmann 1987). 
A discrete exchange will be a ‘zero-sum-game’, where one party loose what the other party 
gains. We denote this as a competitive relationship. 
At the other end of the continuum is the pure relational exchange, where the individual 
transactions hold no real importance compared to the overall relationship. The marriage is 
normally used as an example (Kaufmann 1987). While exhibiting a constant flow of 
individual negotiations and transactions, the marriage relationship is not merely the sum of 
these parts. Rather, it is a highly complex, constantly changing, overriding commitment in 
which each individual transaction is only a minor event. We denote this as a co-operative 
relationship. 
Although both of these extremes are abstractions, the essential point of Macneil’s work is that 
relations underpin all exchanges.  
 
2.3.3 Relational Analysis Based on Contract Norms 
“According to Macneil, any adequate relational analysis must be founded on an understanding 
of the ways in which social exchange behavior both give rise to and is supported by the ten 
‘common contract norms’…   These basic patterns of behavior and associated contract norms 
supply the framework for relational analysis of transactions in the context of all their essential 
elements and enveloping relations” (Vincent-Jones 2001: 67-8). 
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Macneil’s relational theory implies analysis based on the common contract norms in 
conjunction with the spectrum of discrete and relational contracts: “The common contract 
behavior and norms are the end of neither the descriptive nor the theoretical story. I also 
combined these behavioral patterns with something else, namely the idea of the two polar 
types of contracts, discrete and relational (Macneil 2000:894)” (Vincent-Jones 2001: 72). 
Macneil envisages these analytical elements working in conjunction, rather than one being 
subordinated to the other. Thus, the common contract norms should be used as a ‘checklist’ to 
analyze whether a particular contract relationship is discrete (competitive) or relational (co-
operative) (Vincent-Jones 2001:75). 
Macneil first defined 5 norms (1978), then 9 (1980) and finally 10 (1983): “Macneil describes 
ten common contract norms which underpin all contracting by generating a (to various 
degrees) co-operative attitude which respects ‘solidarity and reciprocity’ (Macneil 1983:348): 
1) role integrity, 2) reciprocity (simply stated as the principle of getting something back for 
something given), 3) implementation of planning, 4) effectuation of consent, 5) flexibility, 6) 
contractual solidarity, 7) the restitution, reliance and expectation interests (the ‘linking 
norms’), 8) creation and restraint of power,  9) propriety of means, and 10) harmonization 
with the social matrix” (Campbell 2001:15, emphasis added). 
Unfortunately, Macneil has not developed his methodology into an empirical tool. Instead we 
have to rely on empirical studies, such as Kaufmann and Stern (1988), Kaufmann and Dant 
(1992), Heide and John (1990), Heide (1994), Rokkan (1995), Rokkan and Haugland (2002), 
Gundlach and Achrol (1993), Cannon et al. (2000) and Paulin et al. (1997). It is a particular 
challenge that the empirical studies have been selective in the use of contract norms. There is 
no agreement upon the norms to include, nor how the included norms should be measured 
(Blois and Ivens 2004). 
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Some researchers have used multiple items that are intended to tap the ‘relational syndrome’ 
directly into one construct, while others have preferred to measure individual contract norms 
that are expected to originate from one common second order factor. Although we are 
primarily interested in the relational syndrome, we decided to base our classification of 
contract behavior on the seven dimensions specified by Kaufmann and Dant (1992):  
Relational focus reflects the extent to which the exchange relationship is perceived as 
relatively more important to the parties than the individual transactions. 
Solidarity refers to the process by which an exchange relationship is created and sustained. In 
the more discrete forms of governance, the parties rely on arms-length bargaining and legal 
enforcement to create and sustain each transaction. More complex and indefinite contractual 
relations are based on trust and other internal processes. 
Mutuality implies the requirement of a positive incentive to exchange for both parties. Under 
discrete governance, the parties require positive outcomes from each discrete transaction. 
They monitor each transaction as if it were the last and the only event. Under relational 
exchange, the parties expect generalized reciprocity. 
Flexibility: If change is to incur in contracts so that they conform to changes in the 
environment, it must either be envisioned and permitted within the exchange relationship 
(relational exchange) or it must be possible for the outdated transactional specifications to be 
terminated and new, appropriate ones created (discrete transacting). 
Role integrity: To provide the necessary predictability for contracting relationships, the roles 
of the parties must remain relatively stable. The more discrete the transaction, the more 
simplistic becomes the roles maintained by the parties. By contrast, relational exchange 
requires the parties to maintain highly complex and multi-dimensional roles. 
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Restraint of power: Contracts can be seen as mutual creation of rights and obligations limited 
only by their specification. Under discrete governance structures those rights will be exercised 
subject only to limitation by the law. This is the natural corollary to the arms-length 
bargaining that produce those rights. While recognizing that such legitimate power exists, 
more relational governance structures create expectations that its use will be voluntarily 
limited. This dimension reflects the degree to which the parties restrain their use of power. 
Conflict resolution: Contracts reflect the social context in which they are created and 
executed. The more relational exchange becomes, the more separate and distinct social order 
is created within the relationship itself. In discrete exchange, conflict resolution is a formal 
external process of litigation. In relational exchange, conflict resolution is informal and 
internal.  
The dimensions have been summarized as follows by Rokkan and Haugland (2002): 
Table 2.1: Co-operative and competitive relationships 
Dimension Competitive relationship (Discrete 
exchange) 
Co-operative relationship (Relational 
exchange) 
Focus Individual transaction Ongoing exchange relationship 
Solidarity Arm’s length bargaining and legal 
enforcement 
Trust and related social mechanisms 
Mutuality Positive outcome from each discrete 
transaction 
Positive outcome from the exchange relation over 
time 
Flexibility By the (potential) use of “exit” By renegotiations and the use of “voice” 
Role integrity / 
complexity 
Clearly separated and defined 
divisions of functions and tasks 
Overlapping roles; each party may be responsible 
for functions traditionally undertaken by the other 
party 
Restraint of power Individual rights exercised only 
subject to limitations by the law 
The parties voluntarily restrain their use of power 
Conflict resolution Formal, external processes (e.g. 
litigation) 
Informal and internal processes 
Adapted from Rokkan and Haugland (2002) 
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In our further treatment, a competitive relationship denotes an exchange relationship based on 
discrete contract norms, while a co-operative relationship denotes an exchange relationship 
based on relational contract norms. Hence, we have added competitive and co-operative 
relationship as our labels in table 2.1, while the characteristics remain the same as in Rokkan 
and Haugland (2002).  
Remember that one of the key insights in relational contract theory is that all relationships 
will show both relational and discrete properties. They will only differ in degree, where one 
relationship could be relatively relational while another could be relatively discrete. 
Therefore, we do not expect to find pure competitive or pure co-operative IT sourcing 
relationships, but we will use this classification to analyze the extent of co-operative or 
competitive contract behavior in the IT sourcing relationships.    
 
2.4  IT Sourcing 
Our research context is IT sourcing relationships, and the previous sections provide the 
theoretical lenses to analyze ‘how contract mechanisms influence contract behavior in IT 
sourcing relationships’. However, we need a contextual guide, and we need to focus our 
attention on contracts and IT sourcing relationships. This section will provide such a 
contextual guide, and we start by a brief overview of research on the IT sourcing process (see 
also introduction in section 1.1). 
Most IT sourcing research to date has focused on the sourcing decision, and several efforts 
have been made to develop a framework for IT sourcing (Ang 1994; Aubert et al. 1996; 
Cheon et al. 1995; Clark et al. 1995; Cronk and Sharp 1995; deLoof 1995; Lacity and 
Willcocks 1995, 2001; Lacity et al. 1996; Willcocks et al. 1997). 
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The interest has gradually shifted from the decision and viability of outsourcing, into a focus 
on contracting and management of the IT sourcing relationship (Lee et al. 2002). The models 
to analyse the decision has been replaced (at least updated) with several attempts to 
understand the complete IT sourcing process (Hui and Beath 2001; Kern and Willcocks 2001; 
Lacity and Willcocks 2001; Hirschheim and Dibbern 2002; Alborz et al 2004; Cullen and 
Seddon 2004; Cullen et al. 2005). 
Hui and Beath (2001) propose a framework for research on the IT sourcing process. This 
contains decision, negotiation and contract-execution processes. These processes are separate 
from the contract itself, which is defined as an artifact. The contract is directly linked with 
behavior in the contract management and service delivery processes. 
The framework proposed by Kern and Willcocks (2001) is built around configuration and 
process, with contract, structure, interactions and behavior as critical elements.  
Cullen and Seddon (2004) have introduced seven key attributes of IT outsourcing 
configurations: scope grouping, supplier grouping, financial scale, pricing framework, 
duration, resource ownership, and commercial relationship. The same researchers have 
recently published a life cycle approach based on nine building blocks (Cullen et al. 2005). 
Two of the central elements are the contract as a result of negotiation, and management of the 
relationship.   
These elements are also part of the model proposed by Alborz et al. (2003), but the process is 
depicted in three stages: pre-contract, contract, and post-contract. The contract stage is 
concentrated on contract development, while post-contract includes governance, performance 
management, contract management, working relationship management, and knowledge 
management. 
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Finally, a basic IS outsourcing life cycle model with three phases is presented by Hirschheim 
and Dibbern (2002). They include outsourcing decision, outsourcing relationship, and 
outsourcing experiences and outcome. Outsourcing relationship has a focus on the 
arrangement and management.  
There is one striking common factor in all these models: They all define the contract as the 
foundation for a relationship. The contract is an artifact that will influence the subsequent 
behavior in the relationship (Hui and Beath 2001). 
Although there has been a shift in research interest, from sourcing decision to ongoing co-
operative IT sourcing relationships, the lack of research on contract and relationships (Kern 
and Willcocks 2001) is striking. Hence, we will add to the growing interest in management 
(governance) of the IT sourcing relationship (Kern 1997, Kern and Willcocks 1999, 2000, 
2001, 2002).  
The essence in this research is that the relationship is based on contract, and we need to 
understand the dimensions or the Gestalt of the relationship. “The Gestalt consists of two key 
parts: the contract and its operationalization” (Kern 1997). The relationship operates within 
the “spirit of the contract”. The relationship consists of exchange episodes, and it “depends 
largely on the initial contractual stage, since it greatly influences the quality of the 
relationship” (Kern 1997). 
The remaining part of this section on IT sourcing will be used specifically to identify 
important contract mechanisms. Hence, we commence our search for contract mechanisms 
with two practical descriptions of IT sourcing contracts: 1) “The contract and the integrated 
service level agreements specify in detail the exchanges of services and/or products, financial 
matters, service enforcement and monitoring methods, communication and/or information 
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exchanges, and key personnel and dispute resolution procedures“ (Kern and Willcocks 2000; 
Halvey and Melby-Murphy 1996).  
2) Key contract documents are: The legal agreement specifying contract length and 
termination, and so forth; the services exhibit describing the services to be delivered; the 
pricing exhibit describing what the customer will pay; and the Service Level Agreement that 
defines measurement and reporting obligations that bridges the services and the pricing 
exhibits (Sourcing Interests Group 2002). 
We define contract mechanisms as the ‘nuts and bolts, cogs and wheels’ that are used to 
express a contract between the two parties (adopted from Elster 1989). Hence, it includes the 
written terms, clauses and descriptions found in the formal contract and contract exhibits.  
 
2.4.1 Contracts and Relationships 
Different types of outsourcing contracts were studied and classified by Lacity and Willcocks 
(2001). 116 IT sourcing decisions made in 76 organizations were investigated, classified and 
evaluated as successes or failures. 85 outsourcing contracts were categorized:  
• Fee-for service contract (81 of 85): A customer pays a fee to a supplier in exchange 
for the management and delivery of specified IT products or services. These contracts 
were further categorized as standard contracts (4), detailed contracts (60), loose 
contracts (7) or mixed contracts (11).  
• Strategic alliance (4 of 85): Collaborative inter-organizational relationships created to 
maximize joint value.  
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• Buy-in contract (0 of 85): A customer buys in supplier resources to supplement in-
house capabilities, kept under in-house business and IT management. This does not 
give management responsibility to the supplier, and it is classified as insourcing.  
Detailed Fee-for service contracts of short duration achieved expectations with greater relative 
frequency (75%) than other types of contract, and the parties spent significant time on 
negotiating details. Loose contracts were “disasters”, and management often mislabeled them 
as strategic alliance contracts. Loose contracts created conflicting goals. 
Fee-for service contracts should be detailed contracts that fully specify the requirements, 
service levels, performance metrics, penalties for non-performance and price. They should be 
short-term, with a duration for which requirements are known. Poorly defined service levels 
drove contract disputes. 
Fee-for service contracts were not suited for IT activities in which the technology was ill 
defined, immature or unstable. Several fee-for service contracts were signed but mislabeled as 
strategic alliances. Buy-in contracts are best suited for the development of applications 
dependent upon new technologies. In these cases the client whished to access the supplier’s 
technical expertise but could neither negotiate a detailed contract nor afford to miss a learning 
opportunity. 
Another study of contracts and relationship is Fitzgerald and Willcocks (1994). 226 contracts 
in the UK were classified according to the pricing mechanisms (descriptions added by 
deLoof, 1995): 
• Time and materials: Payment is based on the actual use of personnel and materials. 
• Fixed fee: Payment is based on a lump sum for a defined workload or service. 
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• Fixed fee plus variable elements: Payment is based on predicted changes in workload 
or business circumstances. 
• Cost plus management fee: Payment is based on the real cost incurred by the vendor 
plus a percentage. 
• Fee plus incentive scheme: Payment is based on some benefits that accrue to the client 
company or performance over and above an agreed baseline. 
• Share of risk and reward: Payment is based on how well the client company or a joint 
venture performs. 
The categories were not found to be mutually exclusive and were often combined. The 
contracts were mostly short-term, with a vast majority less than five years and nearly half less 
than two years. IT sourcing was found to be a dynamic process, and several contracts were 
terminated. Tightly defined service contracts were mostly used, and if partnerships were 
sought, they were based on a formal contract. The study revealed a clear move away from 
partnership-based relationships toward contractually based relationships. Further, it was a 
clear trend toward more tightly defined contracts, rigorously defined and specified, and of 
short-term duration. 
 
2.4.2 Specificity, Measurement Systems, and Flexibility 
Tightly specified contracts are further highlighted in Saunders et al. (1997). They found 
strong correlation between the use of tight contracts and success. The measures were based on 
the 14 recommended practices and clauses from Lacity and Hirschheim (1993a,b), and there 
were high correlation between inclusions of these clauses and the perceived completeness of 
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contract. Tight contracts were an important ingredient for outsourcing success, and even if full 
specification is elusive, every effort should be made to develop a complete contract. 
Further, it is contended that – “if a contract is to be the dominant form of governance, than 
service requirements must be clearly understood and explicitly specified in measurable form” 
(Clark et al. 1995). 
The 14 contract clauses and negotiation practices have also been used to define building 
blocks for a measurement system (Willcocks et al. 1995; Kern and Willcocks 2001): 
• Measure everything during the baseline period: The customer’s current IT services are 
documented during the baseline period, and this becomes the yardstick for the services 
delivered by the supplier. A six months baseline period is recommended, and it should 
not be neglected.   
• Develop service level measures: For every service the supplier is expected to provide, 
a service level measure should unequivocally express the level of required service.   
• Develop service level reports: Service level reports should document the agreed-on 
service level, the service performance for the current time period, exception reporting 
for missed measures, and a trend analysis of the performance from previous reporting 
periods. 
• Specify escalation procedures: For critical services, the customer may require 
immediate reporting, problem resolution within a specified period of time, and 
perhaps a cash penalty. 
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• Include cash penalties for nonperformance: In case of severe service degradation, the 
customer may insist on cash compensation. The purpose of penalty clauses is to ensure 
that the supplier’s senior management will attend to service level problems. 
• Determine growth rates: The costs of IT units decrease every year, and the customer 
should share the benefits of price performance improvements. The supplier may 
underestimate growth so that it can charge excess fees in the future.  
• Adjust charges to changes in business: How to handle severe volume fluctuations 
should be described in the contract. 
A total of 40 contracts were studied in the USA and UK (Willcocks et al. 1995). It is claimed 
that the contract should be used to create the necessary measurement system to monitor the 
supplier’s performance. It was found that even if these aspects are brought into the contracts, 
there are specific challenges to address. The parties need to develop proper and productive 
measures, the user involvement is particularly important, and it may require a culture change 
to measurement. Wrong measures might drive the attention and service in a completely 
unproductive direction. 
However, the very same studies also argue for the need to be flexible. It is necessary to build a 
renegotiation option into the contract (Saunders et al. 1997), and flexibility is key to a 
successful vendor relationship (Clark et al 1995). 
 
2.4.3 Contract as Control Mechanism 
One interesting study on contract and contract enforcement, is reported in Kern and Willcocks 
(1999).  IT contracts are viewed necessary to secure the client control over the IT supplier’s 
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behavior and performance, and they studied contracts and control mechanisms in several 
cases in the UK. Seven precedent contract elements where identified:  
• Service exchanges are described and specified. This is the most important part of the 
sourcing contract, and the service requirements have to be as detailed as possible, and 
are normally described in a series of exhibits and schedules.  
• Service enforcement and monitoring according to performance standards and service 
levels have to be established and agreed for each service, often in a Service Level 
Agreement (SLA). The vendors’ non-performance of service levels is often directly 
tied to liquidate damage provisions.  
• Financial exchanges for the provision of services according to the agreement are often 
based on a base fee. Any additional services will be charged according to agreed price 
rates.  
• Financial control and monitoring are established to ensure the client some level of 
control over the costs, and appropriate means to monitor the fees charged by the 
vendor need to be agreed.  
• Key Vendor Personnel are specified to secure the client. The precedent contracts 
suggest that the key vendor employees will be explicitly listed in the contract.  
• Dispute Resolution mechanisms should be described in the contract.  
• Change Control and Management procedures should be described to ensure that the 
contract allows for flexibility. 
The study suggested that post-contract management concerned with enforcing the contract 
and achieving the stipulated terms, normally has focus on five contractual dimensions: 
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Financial control and monitoring, Penalty payments, Monitoring of service levels and/or 
products, Performance measures, and Interface and/or contact points. Further, it is argued that 
contracts were used as ‘bare bones’ and that post-contract management was the starting point 
of the relationship.  
With enforcement, a number of control issues arise, and it was found that these control 
concerns pervaded the management agenda, and that these control dimensions defined 
enforcement of the contract. This seems to encourage a transactional focus, not a relational 
focus. However, the study does not test for specific effects, but they remark: “the use of 
mechanisms like penalty payments is found to damage the relationship” (Kern and Willcocks 
1999). 
 
2.4.4 Hierarchical Elements 
Market contracts are often signed for complex and uncertain transactions, which according to 
a transaction cost analysis should have been brought under hierarchical management 
(Williamson 1985, 1996; see also section 2.2.3). These transactions could survive if the 
parties plan more flexibility into the contracts by incorporating elements common to 
hierarchical governance (Stinchcombe 1985). These hierarchical elements are often used in 
software contracts, and Ang and Beath (1993) conceptualized them based on six contracts in 
two firms. Ang and Toh (1998) have further used the framework to analyze a failing contract 
relation. The hierarchical elements with examples are: 
• Command structures and authority systems: The contract contains clauses that 
authorize certain parties (usually the client) to the contract the right to issue orders or 
to demand performance, the right to audit work-in-progress, to choose and change 
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contractor personnel, and to change project scope or to cancel the project at pre-
specified points. 
• Rule-based incentive systems: This refers to systems of reward and punishments tied 
to behavior or outcomes and not to the market. If timely delivery is important, 
penalties for delay in delivery and rewards for early completion can be incorporated. 
• Standard operating procedures: This refers to routines describing specific well-
understood actions to be followed. SOP’s constrain opportunistic behavior, and 
facilitate monitoring. Formal progress reports and regular meetings with client 
management could be prescribed. 
• Non-market based pricing systems: This works on the principle of cost-recovery or a 
combination of cost-recovery and market prices. When development cost is difficult to 
estimate, a cost recovery system removes risks of uncertainty from the contractor. 
Clauses that mix fixed pricing together with cost recovery attempt to strike a 
reasonable balance between the price risk for the client and compensation risk for the 
contractor. 
• Informal or alternative dispute resolution mechanisms: This refers to procedures used 
in resolving conflicts without having recourse to direct court sanctions. This usually 
involves escalation procedures in which higher management of either parties or a third 
party tries to resolve the dispute. 
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2.4.5 Uncertainty 
Uncertainty is the key antecedent condition for efficient IT sourcing and contracting. The 
degree, to which the requirements of the client can be fully defined and specified, was found 
to be the most important antecedent criteria for sound contracts (Fitzgerald and Willcocks 
1994). In case of uncertainty, standard fixed fee contracts are problematic, and the parties 
should use a contract that shares the risk and rewards arising from uncertainty. A tight 
contract may constrain the vendor and is likely to be counter-productive. In situations of 
relative certainty, very tightly defined contracts should be used for best results (Fitzgerald and 
Willcocks 1994). 
Uncertainty introduces a risk, and the risk should be minimized by the use of risk/reward type 
of contractual arrangement. In situations of increasing uncertainty, companies should not 
strive for tighter and tighter contractual and service level definitions, as this is unrealistic. To 
minimize the risk, they should construct their contracts in a way that addresses uncertainty. 
That means to build in some flexibility, which might imply a basic fee plus incentive scheme, 
or in situations of high uncertainty, a full risk/reward-sharing contract. 
Uncertainty and asset specificity also had a high influence on the variations in software 
contracts, and as relationships evolve one should expect corresponding changes in the contract 
(Ang and Beath 1993). Contract failure in complex sourcing can be attributed to lack of 
attention to hierarchical elements (Ang and Toh 1998). Particularly important was lack of 
authority over sanctioning changes, lack of client authority for selection and changes in 
personnel, lack of punitive sanctions for delay, lack of communication of SOP’s importance, 
and unrealistic market-based pricing.    
The theoretical reasoning in section 2.2.4 anticipated different effects of environmental 
uncertainty such as market dynamism, and behavioral uncertainty such as measurement 
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problems. This is also supported in the IT sourcing literature. Difficulty in measuring 
performance gives the parties two alternatives: They can realize lower performance, or they 
can spend more resources to improve performance measurement (Poppo and Lacity 2002). 
The latter can be achieved by more complex contracts that specify delivered service levels or 
monitoring. It is expected that as measurement becomes more difficult, managers will develop 
more relational contracts.  
However, the market better handles external uncertainty, because “markets marvel at 
autonomous adaptation, in which price serves as sufficient statistic” (Williamson 1991:287; 
Poppo and Lacity 2002:257). 
The IT sourcing literature is replete with practical advice on contracting, and many of those 
turn on interpretation of uncertainty. It is argued that short-term contracts realize expectations 
more frequently than long-term contracts. They involve less uncertainty because requirements 
are stable, and the market prices do not change dramatically during the course of the contract 
(Lacity and Willcocks 2001). The common advice for specific and detailed contracts could 
also be interpreted the same way. Unless they are ill specified, they would obviously help 
reduce uncertainty. The critical question though, is under what conditions is it possible to use 
such specific and detailed contracts. 
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2.4.6 Contract Mechanisms Identified in the IT Sourcing Literature 
We can now summarize the identified contract mechanisms and antecedents as follows: 
Table 2.2: Contract mechanisms and antecedents in the IT sourcing literature 
Identified Contract mechanisms 
and antecedents 
Representative literature 
Contract length: short-term vs. 
long-term 
Lacity and Willcocks (2001), Fitzgerald and Willcocks (1994), Domberger 
et al. (2000) 
Specification of IT services and 
products: loosely and flexible vs. 
tightly and specific  
Lacity and Willcocks (2001), Fitzgerald and Willcocks (1994), Lacity and 
Hirschheim (1993), Saunders et al. (1997), Clark et al. (1995), Willcocks 
et al. (1995), Kern and Willcocks (2001), Kern and Willcocks (1999) 
Measurement and monitoring: 
Service Level Agreements, tied to 
penalty clauses, reporting 
Lacity and Hirschheim (1993), Willcocks et al. (1995), Kern and 
Willcocks (2001), Kern and Willcocks (1999), Poppo and Lacity (2002) 
Pricing: risk allocation, shared 
risk/reward 
Lacity and Willcocks (2001), Fitzgerald and Willcocks (1994), Willcocks 
et al. (1995), Kern and Willcocks (2001),  
Hierarchical elements: 
Command structures and authority 
systems, Key people provisions 
Standard Operating Procedures 
 
Dispute resolution mechanisms, 
escalation procedures 
 
Kern and Willcocks (1999), Ang and Beath (1993), Ang and Toh (1998) 
 
Willcocks et al. (1995), Kern and Willcocks (2001), Ang and Beath 
(1993), Ang and Toh (1998) 
Kern and Willcocks (1999), Ang and Beath (1993), Ang and Toh (1998) 
Change control and management, 
flexibility, resilience to change 
Fitzgerald and Willcocks (1994), Lacity and Hirschheim (1993), Saunders 
et al. (1997), Clark et al. (1995), Willcocks et al. (1995), Kern and 
Willcocks (2001), Kern and Willcocks (1999), DiRomualdo and 
Gurbaxani (1998) 
Uncertainty, Transaction Specific 
Investments 
Lacity and Willcocks (2001), Fitzgerald and Willcocks (1994), Ang and 
Beath (1993), Ang and Toh (1998), Poppo and Lacity (2002) 
 
Table 2.2 provide a summary of the identified contract mechanisms according to our 
definition of contract mechanisms as the ‘nuts and bolts, cogs and wheels’ that can be used to 
express a contract between the two parties. It further includes antecedents such as uncertainty, 
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and examples of IT sourcing literature that have used the constructs are listed as 
representative.  
The next chapter will continue with a research model based on the highlighted (italic) contract 
mechanisms, and we will make hypotheses on the effect of each on contract behavior. We 
decided to focus on contract length, requirement specifications, performance specifications, 
and pricing. These mechanisms are choice variables that have to be specified in all IT 
contracts.  
Because uncertainty has played such an important role in other studies, we also decided to 
investigate both direct effects, and the possible effect of uncertainty as moderator for the 
effect of contract mechanisms on contract behavior. 
Some of the other available mechanisms and antecedents are used as control variables or 
included as part of our measurements.  
While earlier research has identified various mechanisms and advanced the contract as one of 
the most important issues, there are few to none empirical tests of the impact of contract 
mechanisms on the contract relationship. Therefore, this study should be able to fill a gap in 
the literature.  I.e. the effect of our study should be that we further our knowledge on how 
contract mechanisms actually work. 
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3. 
RESEARCH MODEL AND HYPOTHESES 
In the previous chapter we presented the theoretical foundation and identified elements to be 
included in a research model. This chapter will develop the research model further with a 
focus on testable hypotheses for the impact of contract mechanisms and uncertainty on 
contract behavior. 
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3.1 The Research Model 
The main premise of our study is that actual contract behavior is manifested through norms 
and attitudes. These are informal mechanisms that cannot be directly manipulated, but they 
can be stimulated by deliberate choice of formal contract mechanisms. Hence, we formulated 
the research question as: “what is the impact of contract mechanisms on contract behavior in 
IT sourcing relationships?”  
In addition to the contract mechanisms, we have also identified uncertainty as the prime 
antecedent for ‘contracts and relationships’. Although specific assets are regarded as the key 
parameter for choice of governance structures (Williamson 1985, 1996), our review showed 
that uncertainty is the key factor to consider in our context. Hence, we have the following 
model: 
IT sourcing relationship 
 
 
 
  
Contract Mechanisms 
- Contract length 
- Requirement Specifications 
- Performance Specifications 
- Pricing 
Contract behavior 
Co-operative or competitive as 
manifested through the contract 
norms 
Uncertainty 
Figure 3.1 The Research Model 
The model reflects an anticipated functional relationship that can be expressed as: Contract 
behavior in the IT sourcing relationship = f (contract mechanisms and uncertainty).  
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The parties will naturally seek to enhance their individual value, and contract behavior should 
be stimulated to contribute to value creation for both parties to a contract. In most complex 
sourcing processes this should be co-operative, but in some cases competitive contract 
behavior is legitimate. However, the challenge is to stimulate to proper contract behavior. 
Hence, contract behavior should be the result, the effect, of ‘something’. Contract behavior is 
a dependent variable. 
Even though ‘something’ could be nearly impossible to delimit, we have identified contracts 
and contract mechanisms as necessary elements. They are choice variables that are readily 
observable through written documents. In this study we will not include relationships without 
a written contract. Hence, we are expressively concerned about the effects these contract 
mechanisms have on contract behavior in IT sourcing relationships. 
While contract mechanisms are formal, contract behavior is based on informal governance 
mechanisms and implicit understandings, such as attitudes and norms (adapted from Zenger et 
al. 2002). These attitudes and norms are taken as manifestation of contract behavior.  
Highly co-operative IT sourcing relationships will manifest relatively high levels of co-
operative (relational) contract norms, while highly competitive IT sourcing relationships will 
manifest relatively low levels of co-operative contract norms.  
Our approach is to combine a relational analysis of contractual behavior with transaction cost 
reasoning. We analyze the configuration of the common contractual norms (manifested 
contract behavior) in the IT sourcing relationship (our particular research context), where we 
treat the (micro analytic) contract mechanisms as independent choice variables.  
Now, let us take each contract mechanism in turn, and derive at the research hypotheses. We 
focus our attention on the identified contract mechanisms from table 2.2, however, with 
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slightly adjusted wordings: contract length (agreed contract duration), requirement 
specifications, performance specifications, and pricing. These four contract mechanisms 
correspond to the key areas in the two practical contract frameworks and will show variations 
in real life IT sourcing.  
We will also introduce specific hypotheses for the effect of uncertainty, both direct and 
moderating effects. 
 
3.2 Contract Length 
Contract length (agreed contract duration) is one of the obvious choices the parties have to 
take. On a macro level, the length of the contract identifies stability. A long contract period 
will indicate an intention for a stable relationship, while a shorter contract period might 
indicate less priority on the relation (Kern and Willcocks 2001). 
Further, it is generally agreed that expectation and commitment are two key elements in 
building a relation. If the parties commit resources and if they expect the relation to continue 
into the future, we will observe a “shadow of the future” effect (Heide and Miner 1992; 
Axelrod 1984). This will normally lead to a long-term focus on the relation instead of a short-
term focus on the current transaction. The contract length will signal intentions to sustain the 
relationship, and could also signal an initial level of commitment.  
If the parties expect the relation to go on “forever”, they are inclined to make relation specific 
investments (Joskow 1987), and particularly balanced investments will promote co-operation 
and trust. It has also been shown that in short-term relations, the effect of relation specific 
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investments are less likely to promote the relational level (Lambe et al. 2000). Both parties 
will invest less if the time allowed to recover investments is considered to be too short.  
The duration of safeguards, and the volume of transactions are important (Dyer and Singh 
1998). Longer duration and more transactions will lead to more interactions and a willingness 
to invest in relation-specific assets. Further, it is claimed that a reasonable contract length is 
necessary for the supplier to gain experience in servicing the client (Domberger et al. 2000). 
Relationships and contract behavior is defined and created by people working together; 
relationships are created through human interactions. In a short-term relation the number of 
people involved is less and the level or intensity of interaction is less than in a long-term 
relation. Even if time does not ensure relationship building interactions, “it does limit, or 
bound, the number of interactions that can occur” (Lambe et al. 2000:213).  
Now, there is obviously a critical distinction between agreed contract length, and the actual 
duration of the relationship. Because relationships are created (partly) by human interactions, 
the actual duration is probably most important. However, we will expect the specified length 
of the contract to indicate the level of commitment, to promote expectations and a possible 
“shadow of the future”, to promote relation specific investments, and to promote human 
interactions. 
And, more importantly for the study, contract length is a choice variable to be determined and 
specified in the contract. The parties should choose such variables for a purpose, and hence, it 
is important to investigate whether it matters for the creation of a co-operative relationship. 
In summary, we assume that a short-term contract will promote competition in a ‘zero-sum-
contest’, while a long-term contract will promote co-operation to ‘increase the size of the pie’.  
A discrete competitive contract is ‘short-in-short-out’ (Macneil 1974, 1980, 1981). Thus: 
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H1:  There is a positive correlation between contract length (agreed contract duration) and 
co-operative contract behavior in IT sourcing relationships. 
 
3.3 Requirement Specifications 
The parties have to specify what service or products to contract for. We denote this contract 
mechanism as Requirement Specifications. The reviewed literature had a focus on the 
specification level of the whole contract. Contracts were either loose or tight (Fitzgerald and 
Willcocks 1994; Saunders et al. 1997; Lacity and Willcocks 2001). “A loose contract is one 
where only the fundamental elements of the service requirements are outlined in the contract, 
and where other elements such as what happens when circumstances change, are absent or not 
fully defined. A tight contract is the opposite where all aspects of the service requirements are 
very specifically defined in considerable detail. Somewhere in the middle are contracts which 
are relatively well defined but also address aspects concerned with flexibility and changing 
business and technical circumstances” (Fitzgerald and Willcocks 1994). 
We analyse contracts with a more micro-analytic lens on contract mechanisms. This 
prescribes to the transaction cost focus on ‘the critical details’ (Williamson 1996, 2002). 
Thus, we will use the distinction between loose and tight with regards the specifications, not 
the whole contract. We will also touch upon this distinction in the next section on 
performance specification. 
The primary purpose of a contract is to plan and organize an exchange of goods and services. 
This planning should be mutual, where both parties have to agree specified plans and actions. 
The result is a specification of what and potentially how the service provider shall deliver to 
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the client organizations. This is normally documented in a ‘Services exhibit, which describes 
the services to be delivered’ (Sourcing Interests Group 2002). 
There are different ways to describe the services. A functional description is to concentrate on 
the ‘what’ aspects. Here the client describes in business terms what the sought result of the 
services should be. Alternatively, a technical description could be used. This focuses on the 
‘how’ aspect, i.e. the exact procedures and techniques used to produce the result. 
Managing sourcing relationships means managing the ‘what’, while managing internal staff 
means managing the ‘how’ (Sourcing Interests Group 2002). When a company decides to 
source externally, it should restrict itself to express the required results. It should focus on the 
‘what’, and let the provider take care of ‘how’ to produce these results. If the client expresses 
technical requirements, it may restrict the provider from using their best processes and their 
best products.  
According to Aalders (2001), the parties must toe a line between overly specific contracts and 
contracts that allow for flexibility. “An outsourcing contract that is a technical specification is 
doomed to failure” (Aalders 2001:142). Put differently, overly use of technical specification 
on ‘how’ the contracted IT services should be produced will indicate distrust, and it can 
decrease flexibility and hamper co-operation. 
Kern And Willcocks (1999) found that it was nearly impossible to ‘presentiate’ future 
requirements due to the volatility of IT and likely changes in user requirements. To strive for 
tighter and tighter contractual and service level definitions is regarded as unrealistic 
(Fitzgerald and Willcocks 1994). However, a detailed specification will demand that the 
parties spend a considerable time to negotiate and agree. This can lead to the necessary ‘gap-
filling’ and can initiate a good relationship (Lacity and Willcocks 2001). 
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On the other hand, we found that loose contracts created conflicting goals, and they where 
claimed to be ‘disasters’ (Lacity and Willcocks 2001). This indicates that there are risks 
attached to both strategies. If the specifications are too loose, it might be undetermined and 
‘flimsy’. Both parties would need to interpret according to their own internal norms and 
beliefs. Consider a buyer entering a car shop giving the salesperson 1.000.000 NOK with the 
‘purchase order’: “give me the best car you’ve got”. The following day he enters the car shop 
and is shown the new ‘mini’. “This is the best car that money can buy”, says the car seller. “It 
is economic, it drives as fast as the speed limit, and it is safe”. Obviously, the buyer would 
react. He knew that there are many more expensive and ‘better’ cars in the shop. But he did 
not express any requirements at all. It is a risky business not to specify any requirements. 
The other alternative is to express everything in such details that there might be no alternative 
solutions at all. In our car example, this could lead to an impossible delivery. All available 
cars could have some ‘flaws’, not having the right color or missing one horsepower. In our 
context, there might come new products on the market, and there might be alternative 
procedures that are better for both parties. If the requirements were too tight, it would not be 
possible to take advantage of this.   
Even if we have identified tight and specific contracts as better than loose and flimsy, there is 
also a clear need for flexibility. If the parties in a complex and incomplete setting fix the 
specifications too tight, as if the future were certain, we expect a competition to arise. Instead 
of a mutual adaptation, the parties will be inclined to point at the other as responsible for 
corrective actions. On the other hand, the parties should not leave the contract too loose, 
because that would lead to conflicting goals. 
It is difficult to draw this line between proper flexibility and adaptability on the one hand, and 
detailed specifications on the other. We are somehow left with two alternatives. However, the 
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two are mutually exclusive; detailed requirement specifications may have a positive or a 
negative effect on the co-operative contract relationship. 
Because requirement specifications outline the intention and purpose of the contract, we feel 
confident to envisage a positive effect of this activity.  It should lay the foundation for co-
operation, and thus:   
H2: There is a positive correlation between detailed requirement specifications and co-
operative contract behavior in IT sourcing relationships. 
 
3.4 Performance Specifications 
It was found that a measurement system and monitoring procedures were critical to success, 
and even the need to measure everything was argued for (Lacity and Hirschheim 1993; 
Willcocks et al. 1995; Kern and Willcocks 2001). However, a measurement scheme with too 
much emphasis on control and penalty for non-performance was found to influence the 
relationship adversarial by Kern and Willcocks (1999).  
Therefore, the parties should carefully select what to measure and how to monitor. This could 
be described in a Service Level Agreement (SLA), which “defines measurement and reporting 
obligations, describes the minimum and expected performance levels, and establishes 
financial consequences for actual performance levels” (Sourcing Interests Group 2002).  The 
Service Level Agreement bridges the services and pricing exhibits, and it is a targeted way to 
communicate priorities and align incentives.  
Monitoring tied back to payments demands the use of detailed specifications and metrics, 
which are supported by tailored reporting systems. It is argued that which performance 
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measures are actually used, matters less than how they are deployed. Frequently, performance 
measures are used in an adversarial fashion in a cat-and-mouse game: the client in pursuit, the 
contractor trying to avoid being caught (Domberger 1998). Macneil also argues that 
specificity and measurement together promotes discrete norms (Macneil 1981). 
The SLA supplements specifications and contains hard measures on performance. It should be 
detailed and specified in advance, but often the parties allow for an initial period where the 
measures are detailed (Lacity and Willcocks 2001). Reporting requirements are a part of this, 
and there is a trade-off between details and key performance indicators (KPIs). Too much 
focus on detailed service measures creates both a monitoring problem and could drive 
behavior in a bad direction (Willcocks et al. 1995). If it is difficult to deliver what the contract 
specifies, i.e. difficult to operationalize the contract, an adversarial relationship could be the 
result (Kern and Willcocks 2001). An overly detailed SLA would be very difficult to satisfy. 
Measurement should work for, rather than against, the creation of a good relationship. Aalders 
(2001) argues that the focus on SLA should be on measuring a few essential business outputs, 
i.e. “the 7+/- 2 things that matter the most”. This could be achieved and supported through 
techniques such as the balanced scorecard. 
Kern and Willcocks (1999) found that hard measures should be accompanied by soft 
measures. Particularly user satisfaction and business impact are advanced as good overall 
measures. It is further argued that benchmarking and trend reporting could supplement the 
more regular, normally monthly, reports. Regular discussions and adjustments are also found 
to be ‘good practices’ (Lacity and Willcocks 2001). 
The service provider should report regularly, and scheduled meetings between key personnel 
from both parties should discuss these reports. If the client takes a too critical and aggressive 
approach to remedial actions for non-performance, he could push the service provider into a 
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low-risk corner (Aalders 2001). This could be handled more co-operatively if the performance 
measures are based on trends and accumulations over time. It could also include credits.  
Too much detail will drive behavior in a cat-and-mouse-game. Too loose performance 
measurements will leave the parties in an undetermined position. The balance between the 
two alternatives is not a clear and easy cut, and we have two alternative and mutual exclusive 
hypotheses here as well. However, we feel quite confident to go for the blunt version 
formulated by Macneil (1981) “specificity and measurement together promotes discrete 
norms”.  Thus: 
H3: There is a negative correlation between detailed performance specifications and co-
operative contract behavior in IT sourcing relationships. 
 
3.5 Pricing 
In any contractual relationship, the first, and central, issue is the contract price. But contracts 
are not simply zero sum games, in which one party gains what the other loses. A contract is 
made to add value, and the design of the contract will influence the amount of value it adds 
(Kay 1993). 
In addition to the obvious purpose of sharing value between the contract parties, price also has 
a purpose of placing risk. The principal risk in a contract is non-performance, and therefore 
the client is inclined to put this risk on the suppliers’ table. If the contractor does not deliver 
according to the requirements, the client could suffer a loss, and this loss is priced as 
incentives for superior performance, or penalties for poor performance. 
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However, it is a mistake to suppose that performance risk stems entirely from the supply side. 
If the specification are poorly developed and understood, the client will be at least partly 
responsible. This illustrates that allocating risk is difficult. Generally, more of the risk should 
be borne by the party that has greater control over it, and more of the risk should be allocated 
to the party that has the greater capacity to bear it. However, both parties are normally risk 
averse. Thus, the use of penalties would have a stronger effect on behavior than incentives. 
We will do more to avoid a loss than to make something extra. However, the use of penalties 
might create an adversarial climate.  
In the purchasing literature, we find a number of different price mechanisms. In principle they 
are either fixed-price contracts or cost-type contracts (Monczka et al. 1998; van Weele 2002).  
Fixed Price Contracts are based on a principle where the payment (fee) for the delivery is 
preset according to specifications. Unless the transaction is immediate and simple, the 
uncertainty attached to specifications is substantial. Hence, to price the delivery is equally 
uncertain. In principle, the supplier takes all the risk. 
Fixed price contracts are best suited for well defined and specified deliveries. They introduce 
quite strong incentives because the supplier may create a better result if he finishes earlier or 
with less effort. These contracts are normally short-term, and would probably introduce a 
competitive attitude.  
Cost-type Contracts are based on cost-calculations done by the supplier. The client will have 
to pay a fee according to incurred resource factors based on preset rates. Because the total 
price is a (often linear) function of volume, the client will take most of the risk. 
This contract type is often called cost-reimbursable, cost-plus, or time and material (T&M). 
Because the risk is less for the supplier, given sound estimation of unit prices, the contract 
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type may promote co-operation. It is also recommended to use this price mechanism if trust is 
high and there is substantial uncertainty associated with the delivery.   
Permutations of both these contract types exist, and the key differentiator for our study is how 
these price mechanisms allocate risk between the parties. Risk is mitigated if escalation 
clauses, renegotiation, incentives and penalties, and elaborate cost sharing mechanisms are 
introduced. Here are two examples:  
Cost plus incentive fee; the client pays a defined fee to cover the incurred cost, and there are a 
proportion of the payment that are tied to performance.  
Price schemes that share risk and reward; a price target is set according to estimates. If the 
real cost is less or higher, the parties will share the difference according to a preset key. Both 
these mechanisms will allocate risk more evenly between the client and supplier. 
It has been found that T&M contracts are mostly used for IT projects that are complex and 
difficult to specify and estimate (Kalnins and Mayer 2004). They use low-powered incentives, 
and although the clients are most exposed for risk, T&M contracts distribute risk more evenly 
than fixed-fee contracts. 
Kalnins and Mayer (2004) also found that a relationship between the two parties does more to 
overcome the limitations of T&M contracts than fixed-fee contracts. They argue that the 
frequent disturbances in the IT industry make adjustments of fixed-fee contracts difficult, and 
that closer relationships may help introduce more incentives into a T&M contract. 
These results concur with the advice that contracts without sharing risk and rewards does not 
promote partnerships (Lacity and Willcocks 2001). It is further argued that penalties enforced 
unilaterally will damage the overall relationship (Kern and Willcocks 1999). It is necessary to 
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discuss the reasons, and how to avoid reoccurrence, to promote change in behavior. 
Otherwise, inflexible pricing can promote unnecessary conflicts (Kern and Willcocks 2001).  
Further, one of the primary relational characteristics is that the parties share risk and rewards, 
respecting reciprocity and solidarity (Macneil 1981). Thus: 
H4: There is a positive correlation between risk sharing price mechanisms and co-operative 
contract behavior in IT sourcing relationships. 
H5: There is a negative correlation between penalty mechanisms and co-operative contract 
behavior in IT sourcing relationships. 
 
3.6 Environmental and Behavioral Uncertainty  
Environmental and behavioral uncertainty was identified as the most interesting and 
challenging antecedent condition for contracts and relationships (see sections 2.2.4 and 2.4.5). 
We have also touched upon uncertainty in connection with most of the contract mechanisms 
throughout this chapter. Hence, we will first of all look at uncertainty as a moderator on the 
effect of contract mechanisms on contract behavior. 
However, we have seen that uncertainty is a rather complex construct, and we assume that 
there are different effects of the various types of uncertainty. Therefore, we will treat 
environmental uncertainty and behavioral uncertainty differently. 
Environmental uncertainty is most often associated with external dynamism such as rapid 
technology shifts, rapid price changes, and other unanticipated changes in the market. Such 
dynamism is best handled through autonomous adaptation through the market (Poppo and 
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Lacity 2002). The parties in a dynamic market will probably not develop close and co-
operative relationships (Cannon et al. 2000). This is also in line with the predictions in the IT 
sourcing literature (Lacity and Willcocks 2001, Poppo and Lacity 2002). Thus: 
H6: There is a negative correlation between market dynamism and co-operative contract 
behavior in IT sourcing relationships. 
Behavioral uncertainty has more to do with internal complexity and measurement problems. 
This type of uncertainty will render strategic behavior and can lead to opportunism 
(Williamson 1985). The contracted IT services may become difficult to understand, and it is 
equally difficult to specify exact requirements and performance measures. 
Generally, complex conditions call for coordinated adaptation that is best secured in a 
relationship (Williamson 1985). Further, the effort to craft complex contracts may be turned 
into a common experience where the parties interact and learn. This will mitigate the hazards 
that are associated with asymmetric information (Kern and Willcocks 2001). 
We assume that complexity will lead to more focus on close and co-operative relationships, 
and thus: 
H7: There is a positive correlation between complexity and co-operative contract behavior in 
IT sourcing relationships. 
Looking now on the possible interactions, it is obvious that all types of uncertainty will work 
in conjunction with the contract mechanisms. However, we consider behavioral uncertainty to 
be of most interest. First of all, the empirical evidence from earlier research on IT sourcing is 
quite clear. Dynamic markets are best handled through short-term and specific contracts 
(Lacity and Willcocks 2001, Poppo and Lacity 2002). Such contracts will by design be 
positioned towards competitive (as-if-discrete) contract behavior. 
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On the other hand, behavioral uncertainty is best handled through coordinated adaptability. 
The extreme case is unified governance through the hierarchy. Since this condition is not 
viable when companies actually use contracts between legally independent parties, it is 
important to investigate how the contract mechanisms function under various levels of 
behavioral uncertainty (complexity).  
Since we have a model with five different contract mechanisms, we also have five possible 
interactions between these and complexity. However, we consider the price model to be of 
only modest interest here. First, most of the problems associated with price are connected 
with market dynamism, and second, the remaining problems are more associated with 
specifications. It turns on ‘what is included?’ Once that is established, the price is a result of 
‘easy’ calculations. This leaves us with three remaining interactions, and now we treat each in 
turn. 
First, complexity and contract length (agreed contract duration) should combine into closer 
co-operation. To cope with complex sourcing, the parties have to understand that they need to 
work together. They have to learn and adapt, they have to develop proper conduct together. 
To commit to such learning, that also demands relation specific investments, should be 
considered positive for the relationship (Lambe et al. 2000). Thus: 
H8: Increasing levels of complexity will enhance the positive correlation between contract 
length (agreed contract duration) and co-operative contract behavior in IT sourcing 
relationships. 
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Second, complexity makes it even more paramount to mitigate hazards. If this is better done 
under internal governance, all efforts to express requirements such that ambiguities are 
reduced, should also lead to more co-operation. Hence:  
H9: Increasing levels of complexity will enhance the positive correlation between detailed 
requirement specifications and co-operative contract behavior in IT sourcing relationships. 
Finally, performance specifications cannot be ambiguous. They have to be precise and 
measurable, or else there will be fighting between the parties. Complexity will make this more 
and more impossible, and hence we advance: 
H10: Increasing levels of complexity will enhance the negative correlation between detailed 
performance specifications and co-operative contract behavior in IT sourcing relationships. 
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4. 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
In the previous chapter we advanced a research model with testable hypotheses for the effect 
of contract mechanisms and uncertainty on contract behavior in IT sourcing relationships. In 
this chapter we describe the research design, the research context, the data collection 
procedures, the development of our survey instrument, and the measures used for the 
theoretical constructs.  
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4.1 Research Design 
All our hypotheses are framed as correlations, and the research design is a detailed plan and 
procedure for an empirical test of these. We need to assign data to our theoretical constructs, 
and we need to control for spurious effects so that we isolate the effects of each of the 
included constructs.  
We have a focus on real life contracts and relationships, which cannot be manipulated. 
Therefore, we have to rely on ‘passive-observational studies’. Nor do we have time or 
resources to do a time serious study. Therefore, we decided to use a cross-sectional survey 
(Cook and Campbell 1979; Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 1996). 
A cross-sectional design allows us to test the hypotheses through establishing correlations 
between the variables and controlling for spurious effects. The latter is achieved through 
statistical techniques combined with the use of control variables. 
Internal validity will be weaker than in experimental or quasi-experimental studies that are 
based on controlled manipulations. However, the study will be effectuated as a field study in 
natural settings. The ‘realism of context’ is high, and we do not sensitize or manipulate the 
subjects. Both of these aspects are usually considered to enhance the external validity (Cook 
and Campbell 1979).  
 
4.2 Empirical Setting 
The choice of an appropriate research context is a trade-off. 1) We must obtain sufficient 
variation with respect to the independent variables in the research model, and 2) we must 
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control for irrelevant (spurious) sources of variation (Cook and Campbell 1979). A 
completely random sample from all IT sourcing contracts in Norway would probably provide 
both of these goals. However, we did not consider this a viable option. Our study concerns 
current contracts between business parties, and most organizations view their contracts and 
business relationships as highly strategic and confidential.  
Therefore, we chose to get access to a focal industrial buyer where we were allowed to 
observe both contracts and contract behavior over an extended period. As a consequence, we 
had to let go of the possibility to randomize. Instead we used a deliberate sampling for 
heterogeneity to get the necessary variation of contracts and contract relationships. Thus, we 
included different kinds of IT sourcing contracts, from the simplest to the most complex. This 
should increase the external validity (Cook and Campbell 1979). 
With one large industrial buyer as a focal point, we also control for some extraneous 
organizational and industrial factors. These are held constant, and this should reduce the 
amount of error variance. Hence, both internal and statistical conclusion validity should be 
enhanced.  
We chose to include IT sourcing contracts into our deliberate convenience sample based on 
the following characteristics: 
• The contract should be active 
• The contract should have an associated Purchaser, Owner and Sales Representative 
• The key informants should be accessible and willing to participate 
• There should be variance in the key constructs 
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Quite early, we decided to work closely with the IT Purchasing Unit. They are the link 
between the internal and the external market, and the individual purchaser is the best-
informed source on our unit of analysis. Therefore we spent time with each in turn to identify 
contracts to include in our sample. 
By including different kinds of IT contracts, we were quite certain that there were variance, 
and this was confirmed by our initial observations and pilot study. The final sample included 
74 contracts and contract relationships, ranging from easy IT commodities to complex 
systems integration, outsourcing and strategic partnerships. It also included small and 
independent consultants as well as the large international IT corporations. 
This setting should be sufficient to test our general theory on the interrelationship between 
formal contract mechanisms and contract behavior in IT sourcing relationships. A theory 
claimed to be general can be rejected if it is falsified for any subgroup (Calder et al. 1981), 
but if the theory stands the test, it is only ‘not yet falsified’ (Meehl 1990). Thus, to generalize 
a theory we need to do several studies.  
 
4.3 Data Collection 
All our hypotheses are framed as correlations between aspects concerning the contract, and 
contract behavior. I.e. for each contract, we have to measure some elements of the written 
contract (contract mechanisms) and the antecedent conditions (environmental and behavioral 
uncertainty). We also have to measure behavior associated with that very same contract 
(contract behavior), and map all these constructs in one unit of analysis. This is the IT 
sourcing relationship.  
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Contract mechanisms are written documents, but most relationship constructs are only present 
as sentiments and perceptions. They are in the ‘eye of the beholder’ (Heide and John 1995). 
We also chose to treat the contract mechanisms accordingly, because all the ‘nuts and bolts, 
cogs and wheels’ described in contracts, are subject upon the parties’ interpretations and 
perceptions. Our target is to study contract behavior, and therefore we focus on how the 
involved parties interpret and frame contracts. 
To sum up the 'eyes of the beholder’, we can measure the constructs on an individual level 
and then aggregate into the interorganizational level, or we can measure the relationship 
properties directly  (Heide and John 1995). Because the first approach is inherently difficult, 
and there are no theoretical arguments for continuity across levels of the construct in question, 
we decided to use the latter.  
Hence, we chose to use a standard key-informant approach, where we measured the constructs 
through a number of knowledgeable individuals. Here we are in good company, because this 
is by far the most common approach in studies of inter-firm relationships (Heide and John 
1995).  
Now, the challenge is to decide on the best possible ‘source’ or the most suitable key-
informants. The contracts in question involve two legal parties, and two different 
organizational units represent the client organization. First, the IT sourcing need and strategy 
is defined within the IT department. For critical relationships, they appoint one responsible 
for the relationship (relationship owner) and one responsible for the agreement (contract 
owner).  
Second, the IT Purchasing Unit does the actual purchase and contract negotiations. This unit 
appoints one IT Purchaser as responsible. The co-operation between these units can be 
intricate, but there is a common process. The IT Department is responsible for the supply, and 
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they issue a request to the IT Purchasing Unit. Then it is this unit’s responsibility to scan the 
market and do the purchase and negotiation. Thereafter, the IT Department takes on 
responsibility for the relationship.  
On the supplier side, the picture is quite similar. A sales unit does the contract negotiations 
and owns the contract until it is finalized. Thereafter, some organizations transfer the contract 
to operational units, while others keep the responsibility within sales. However, in complex 
operations, there will be a complex web of interests within and between the organizations. 
Key informants are deliberately chosen because of their knowledge about the phenomena 
under study (Heide and John 1995; Kumar et al. 1993). Having these alternative key 
informants, the question is whether to rely on several informants or a ‘bare minimum’? 
We decided to rely on the IT Purchasing Unit as our informants. The measures are on the 
organizational level, there is no reason to expect a complete consensus between different 
informants, and the purchaser is regarded as most knowledgeable of both the contract and the 
contract relationship. It is their sole responsibility and their purpose within the organization to 
know what is going on between the two parties, and they are involved in many of these 
relationships (Cannon et al. 2000). 
So, our data set is the client’s perception of the contract and the contract relationship, as seen 
through the lens of the IT purchasing unit. All measurements are through the questionnaire 
instrument reported next. 
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4.4 Measurements 
We followed the procedure recommended by Churchill (1979), and started with a 
comprehensive literature review. At first, the emphasis was on complex IT outsourcing and 
inter-organizational literature on contracting and institutional theories. A pilot study was 
initiated in the target company, supplemented with discussions with colleagues and industry 
experts. We relied on informal observations in meetings and normal working environment, 
discussions and examinations of written contracts as well as information databases about 
contracts.  
This led to a change in emphasis, from IT outsourcing relationships to IT sourcing 
relationships in general. The pilot study was completed with a semi-structured interview 
covering two IT sourcing relations. The cases were selected to reflect variance in contract 
mechanisms and (hopefully) contract behavior in the IT sourcing relationship. The interviews 
were recorded and a protocol was written on each. This led to a first revision of the model, 
and some of the theoretical elements were skipped because they would not show enough 
variation.  
The first versions of questionnaire in both English and Norwegian were written, and the gross 
content was checked against industry expertise in a Norwegian seminar on IT contracts 
August 2003. Based on the presentations and informal discussions, the research model was 
assessed to fit the purpose. No modifications were deemed necessary at this point. 
We designed the Norwegian version of the questionnaire to be used by both buyers and 
sellers, and we ran a test on two key account managers in the IT industry. Some modifications 
and clarifications seemed appropriate.  
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Then, we tested a revised version on two actual dyads. We discovered some problems 
concerning the use of a similar questionnaire for both buyer and seller, i.e. some combined 
phrases like ‘supplier/customer’ were unnatural for the informant. Therefore, we decided to 
make a specific version for both roles.  
However, the test verified that the questionnaire and research model was suitable for our 
purpose, and the vast majority of questions had identical wording for all roles (only seven 
questions are tailored to the role).  
The actual questionnaire was tested on real industry cases not involved in the final survey. 
Thus, we had all reasons to believe that the questionnaire would be understandable and tap the 
most important dimensions, without sensitizing the key informants. However, due to the 
limited sample, we could not use any statistical analysis at this stage.  
The final data collection commenced in January 2004, and by the end of March we had 
covered 74 cases from the IT Purchasing Unit. 
 
4.4.1 General Design Criteria for the Survey Instrument 
We based our instrument on previously used and validated scales for all but the contract 
mechanisms. We used reflective seven-point scales with multiple items framed as statements 
anchored between 1-very bad description, and 7-very good description. 
To make it possible to distinguish between formal contract mechanisms and the informal 
contract behavior, we used specific wordings such as IT contract and contract relationship. 
We also used an introductory text where we highlighted this IT contract and this contract 
relationship. Thus, we did our utmost to enable the distinction between several different 
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contract relationships, each associated with one contract. To our knowledge, this has not been 
done before. 
 
4.4.2 Contract Behavior 
Contract behavior in the IT sourcing relationship is the dependent variable, and it was 
measured through the manifested contract norms. We based our instrument on the industry 
non-specific scales proposed by Kaufmann and Dant (1992), and later modified to a 
Norwegian context by Rokkan (1985) (see also Rokkan and Haugland (2002)).  
This instrument is an application and operationalization of the contract norms developed by 
Macneil (1974, 1978, 1980), and it is built on a common understanding of relational exchange 
as a higher order construct that is reflected in seven dimensions: relational focus, solidarity, 
mutuality, flexibility, role integrity, restraint of power, and conflict resolution. 
All our items were based on the wordings made by Rokkan (1985), but we tailored the 
questions to our IT sourcing context. We used a total of 36 items to measure the contract 
behavior, and all details and items are reported in appendix 1. The Norwegian questionnaire is 
included in appendix 2 (see also section 2.3.3 for more information about the choice of 
instrument).  
Now, we provide a short description of each of the seven dimensions, and we include two 
sample items from each. All items are measured with a seven-point scale anchored from very 
bad (1) to very good (7) description. A co-operative IT sourcing relationship should manifest 
itself through relatively high score on this scale, while low values should indicate competitive 
relationships. 
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Focus in the contract relationship (relational focus) 
“The commercial exchange process is comprised of both the individual discrete transactions 
and the relationship which encompasses them. Relational focus reflects the extent to which 
the exchange relationship is perceived as relatively more important to the parties than the 
individual transactions“ (Kaufmann and Dant, 1992). 
If the score is high, then the parties put relatively more focus on the long-term relationship as 
opposed to the individual transaction. Hence, we interpret this as a relatively more co-
operative contract relationship. We used seven items, two of which read:   
Focus_1 The contract relationship itself is more important than the individual 
transactions (the individual buy and sell operations) 
Focus_2 The outcome of individual transactions is less important than the contract 
relationship itself 
 
 
Solidarity in the contract relationship  
“Solidarity refers to the process by which an exchange relationship (as distinct from a series 
of discrete transactions) is created and sustained. In the more discrete forms of governance, 
the parties rely on arms-length bargaining and legal enforcement to create and sustain each 
transaction. To accommodate more complex and indefinite relational forms, the parties rely 
on trust and other informal processes” (Kaufmann and Dant 1992). 
If the score is high, then the parties have relatively more focus on trust and co-operation as 
opposed to competition and short-term bargaining for individual gains. We used five items, 
two of which read:   
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Solidarity_2 Expectations of behavior reflect the strong spirit of fairness that exists in 
this contract relationship 
Solidarity_3 An important feature of this contract relationship is that neither party would 
do something damaging to the other party. 
 
Mutuality in the contract relationship  
“Mutuality implies the requirement of a positive incentive to exchange for both parties. Under 
discrete governance, the parties require positive outcomes from each discrete transaction and 
envision the monitoring of each transaction as if it were the last, and therefore, the only 
capable of delivering the desired outcomes. Under relational exchange, the parties expect 
generalized reciprocity emanating from ongoing and indeterminate relationships” 
(Kaufmann and Dant 1992). 
A high score indicates a long-term interest in the relationship and corresponds with a co-
operative contract relationship. We used four items, two of which read:   
Mutuality_1 Each transaction is expected to be reconciled completely and individually 
(Reverse scored) 
Mutuality_2 Our organization assures itself that the other party is acting as we expect by 
precisely monitoring its performance on a transaction-by-transaction basis 
(Reverse scored) 
 
Flexibility in the contract relationship  
“If change is to occur in the contracts between parties so that they conform to changes in the 
environment, it must be envisaged and permitted within the existing relationship (relational 
exchange) or it must be possible for the outdated transactional specifications to be terminated 
and new, appropriate ones created (discrete transaction)” Kaufmann and Dant 1992). 
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This construct denotes the extent to which flexibility is secured through a potential use of 
‘exit’, or through renegotiations and the use of ‘voice’.  A high score indicates a focus on 
flexible interpretations and corresponds with a co-operative contract relationship. We used 
five items, two of which read: 
Flexibility_1 The terms of an ongoing transaction are not renegotiable under any 
circumstances (Reverse scored) 
Flexibility_2 It is expected that changes in the terms of ongoing transactions would be 
allowed, if unanticipated events occur. 
 
Roles in the contract relationship (role integrity)  
“To provide the necessary predictability for contracting relationships, the roles of the parties 
must remain relatively stable. The more discrete the transaction, the more simplistic become 
the roles maintained by the parties. By contrast, relational exchange requires the parties to 
maintain highly complex and multi-dimensional roles” (Kaufmann and Dant 1992). 
This construct denotes the extent to which the parties’ roles are clearly separated, or complex 
and overlapping. A high value indicates complex roles that should be associated with a co-
operative contract relationship. We used seven items, two of which read:   
Role_integr_1 There are many expectations in this contract relationship that goes beyond 
the mere buying and selling of products. 
Role_integr_3 This contract relationship creates a complex web of expectations between us 
over all kinds of issues  
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Use of power in the contract relationship (restraint of power)  
“Contracts can be seen as the mutual creation of rights and obligations limited only by their 
specification. Under discrete governance structures those rights will be exercised subject only 
to limitation by the law. This is the natural corollary to the arms-length bargaining, which 
produces those rights. While recognizing that such legitimate power exists, more relational 
governance structures create expectations that its use will be voluntarily limited. This 
dimension reflects the degree to which the parties restrain their use of legitimate power” 
(Kaufmann and Dant 1992).  
This construct denotes the extent to which individual rights are unilaterally exercised or 
voluntarily restrained. A high score indicates voluntary restraints that should be associated 
with a co-operative contract relationship. We used four items, two of which read:   
Restraint_1 It is expected that the more powerful party in this contract relationship 
should use whatever means necessary to get its own way (Reverse scored) 
Restraint_3 It is expected that each party in this contract relationship should limit the 
use of power they have over the other party. 
 
Handling of conflict in the contract relationship (conflict resolution)  
“Contracts reflect the social context in which they are created and executed. The more 
relational an exchange becomes, the more a separate and distinct social order is created 
within the relationship itself. In discrete transacting, conflict resolution is a formal external 
process (e.g. litigation). In relational exchange, conflict resolution is informal and internal” 
(Kaufmann and Dant 1992).  
This construct denotes the extent to which conflicts are resolved through formal external 
processes, or through informal and internal processes. A high score indicates informal and 
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internal processes and should be associated with a co-operative contract relationship. We used 
four items, two of which read:   
Conflict_res_1 Our organization's procedures for dealing with disputes with the 
supplier/customer are formalized, and it is expected that they should be 
followed rigidly (Reverse scored, specific wording to distinguish between 
supplier and customer) 
Conflict_res_2 The supplier’s/customer’s procedures for dealing with disputes with us are 
formalized, and it is expected that they should be followed rigidly (Reverse 
scored, specific wording to distinguish between supplier and customer) 
 
For some of the items that are used in the questionnaire, a high score will indicate low levels 
of co-operative behavior. These items are marked reversed score, and they were recoded 
before the statistical analysis.   
 
4.4.3 Contract Mechanisms and Uncertainty 
Our main hypotheses are framed as correlations between formal contract mechanisms and co-
operative behavior in IT sourcing relationships. However, the model also includes 
uncertainty, and we derived hypotheses for both direct and moderating effects of uncertainty. 
Thus, we treat contract mechanisms that are defined as the ‘nuts and bolts’ expressed in the 
written contract with exhibits, and uncertainty as a set of independent variables.  
We are particularly occupied with the contract as a planning document and a foundation for 
the co-operation in the exchange. Therefore, we do focus on the specification of a few 
selected areas necessary to plan and deliver the contracted products and services. 
Contract length is defined as the specified duration for the contract. It was measured as the 
actual contracted time in number of years, and we did the same for contracted optional 
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periods. Thus, we have a continuous measure of total contracted time in years. As part of our 
analyses we combined these two items into a contract length including optional periods. 
Requirement specifications are defined as ‘the specifications of requirements to be satisfied 
by the contracted IT products and services’. We had to develop items specifically for this 
study. There are no agreed and previously used scales for such purpose, and most of the 
referenced sources normally treat ‘the contract’ as a whole. We used a more micro-analytic 
approach where we look at various aspects of the contract normally described in different 
exhibits. 
 Marcolin (2002) measured the contractual definition as the contract’s degree of detail within 
each clause, the number of clauses and the length (in pages) of the contract. Poppo and 
Zenger (2002) measured the degree of formalization as the degree of customization and legal 
work required. Fitzgerald and Willcocks (1994) measured loose contracts as only specifying 
vaguely the core exchange and not regulating change. They measured tight contracts as the 
opposite, specifying everything in considerable detail, and well-defined contracts as 
somewhere in between. The last type included clauses and procedures for handling change. 
Lacity and Willcocks (2001) used a similar approach. 
The general purchasing literature distinguishes between the ‘what’ and the ‘how’. The ‘what’ 
could be expressed as a functional specification - this describes the functionality that the 
product must have for the user. The ‘how’ could be described as a technical specification – 
this describes the technical properties and characteristics of the products as well as the 
activities to be performed by the supplier (van Weele 2002).    
We decided to combine these aspects and made seven items following the general criteria 
described in section 4.4.1. Details are reported in appendix 1 and 2, while we only provide 
two sample items here: 
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Requirement_3 The contract specifies functional requirements, with a focus on which 
results the customer wants to achieve by the delivery. 
Requirement_5 The contract specifies requirements for the products and services to be 
delivered, in great details  
 
A high score on the seven-point scale for these items would indicate a complex and 
comprehensive requirement specification (scope of work). 
  
Performance specifications are defined as ‘specifications of measurable performance to be 
met by the contracted IT products and services’. We also had to develop a specific scale for 
this study. This construct denotes how the parties specify measurement systems and metrics. 
This will normally be specified in a Service Level Agreement, although not all contracts will 
include this. Drawing on the same sources as above, we developed nine items. Here we 
provide two samples:  
Performance_3 The contract specifies performance measures in great details, through a 
Service Level Agreement (SLA).  
Performance_6 The contract specifies reporting procedures and procedures for monitoring 
of the contract. 
 
A high score on the seven-point scale for these items would indicate a complex and 
comprehensive performance specification. 
Pricing is defined as ‘specified price mechanisms for the contracted IT products and 
services’. We measured this with items combining different theoretical price models (van 
Weele 2002, Monczka et al. 1998) and the reviewed IT sourcing literature to generate 
statements about different pricing methods. Here we provide two sample items: 
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Price_1 The contract specifies that the products and services are to be delivered 
according to a fixed price, independent of actual time and materials. 
Price_2 The contract specifies that the products and services are to be delivered 
according to fixed unit prices, so that the total price for the contract depends 
on actual time and materials”.
 
A high score on the seven-point scale for these items would indicate the use of a clear pricing 
model with a clear distribution of risk. The first will allocate risk to the supplier, while the 
second allocate most of the risk to the buyer. Normally, these two pricing mechanisms are 
mutually exclusive, and we made a new item calculated as the difference between the two 
(Price_1 – Price_2). The result is an item that denotes the extent of fixed price, ranging from   
-6 to +6. 
 
 Uncertainty expressed as Market Dynamics and Complexity   
Contracts are agreed and implemented under influence of external conditions in the market, 
and the technology involved can be more or less complex. This might lead to dynamic and 
uncertain conditions where there is substantial risk associated with the contract. Uncertainty 
includes both environmental uncertainty and behavioral uncertainty, and it is one of the key 
antecedents to the choice of proper safeguards (Williamson 1979, 1985, 1996; see also section 
2.2.4).  
We decided to conceptualize environmental uncertainty as market dynamism, and behavioral 
uncertainty as complexity. Both variables can influence the choice of contract mechanisms 
and the development of the co-operative relationship.  
Market dynamism reflects to what extent the market surrounding the particular contract is 
subject to rapidly changing technology, frequent price changes or fluctuations in product 
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availability. Complexity (Cannon and Perrault 1999), or task ambiguity (Cannon et al. 2000) 
reflects to what extent it is difficult to describe requirements or performance measures 
associated with the product. 
Our items are based on scales and wordings used by Cannon and Perreault (1999), Cannon et 
al. (2000), Poppo and Zenger (1998, 2002), Fitzgerald and Willcocks (1994), and Buvik 
(1995). We used four items to measure market dynamism and four to measure complexity. 
Here we provide two sample items: 
Dynamism_1 Market prices for this type of IT products and services changes rapidly.  
Complexity_2 It is very difficult to specify exact requirements for this type of IT products 
and services.  
 
4.4.4 Control Variables 
Although we advanced a research model with contract behavior as dependent variable, and 
contract mechanisms and uncertainty as independent variables, there are several other factors 
that will influence both contract behavior and the choice of contract mechanisms. We have to 
control for such factors. These variables will be included in the analysis to achieve statistical 
control.  
Due to the fact that we have a sample that originates from one single industrial buyer, we hold 
some extraneous variables constant. However, we do not use a controlled experiment with 
manipulated treatments. Nor do we use randomization. Therefore we rely on statistical 
controls based on a set of additional variables to be used in our regression models. This will 
enable us to partial out the individual contribution for each in turn, because the regression 
analyses hold each other variables constant while the regression coefficients are calculated 
(Hair et al. 1998, Lewis-Beck 1980). 
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The candidates for such variables are: 1) variables likely to be correlated with both the 
independent and dependent variables, and 2) variables that are other likely causes of the 
dependent variable but not correlated with the independent variables.  
 
Specific investments in the contract relationship 
TCE argues that specific investments, i.e. investments of time and efforts (including money), 
that loose their value outside the relation (transaction) is the key variable in the choice of 
governance mechanisms. Especially when combined with high uncertainty, the parties should 
develop complex governance structures to mitigate contractual hazards (Williamson 1979, 
1985, 1996; see also section 2.2).  
Complex governance structures can involve both complex formal contracts and relational 
governance (Poppo and Zenger 2002). Further, if specific investments are used as deliberate 
governance mechanisms, or pledges (Anderson and Weitz 1992), this should be decided at the 
time of contract development (Williamson 2002). Because the parties are farsighted, they will 
assess the contractual hazards when they choose between feasible governance structures. This 
will be a concerted decision that influence both the ex ante contract and the ex post 
relationship (Williamson 2002).  
Thus, we expect specific investments to be correlated with both the independent and the 
dependent variables. 
We adapted the scale and items used by Anderson and Weitz (1992), with a few adjustments 
made by Buvik (1995). We used nine items, and here we provide two sample items:  
RSI_1 If we end this contract relationship, we would lose a lot of the investments 
we have made specifically for this contract. 
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RSI_2 It would be difficult for us to recoup investments made specifically for this 
contract, if we end this contract relationship. 
 
Contract importance and availability of alternatives  
In addition to supply market dynamisms and complexity as sources of uncertainty, it is argued 
that alternatives of supply sources also lead to uncertainty (Cannon and Perrault 1999; 
Cannon et al. 2000). They also argue that important supplies should be treated different than 
less important ones. These two conditions also give rise to dependence, and the farsighted 
buyer should consider dependence at the outset and not get taken by surprise (Williamson 
1985, 1996). 
Therefore, the two conditions can influence both the choice of legal bonds (formal contract) 
and co-operative norms (Cannon and Perrault 1999; Cannon et al. 2000). These two 
constructs are thus included in our research model, because they can influence both the 
independent and the dependent variables.  
The scale for contract importance is adapted from Cannon and Perreault (1999) and is made 
of four items.  The scale and items for availability of alternatives were also adapted from 
Cannon and Perreault (1999). It is made of another five items, and here we provide some 
samples for these two kinds of items: 
Importance_1 This is a very important IT contract for our company.  
Alternatives_1 The supply market for this type of IT products and services is very 
competitive.  
Alternatives_2 There are several other suppliers that could deliver this type of IT products 
and services.  
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Stability and history of the contract relationship expressed through the contract age 
Relational contract theory argues that contract norms are developed over time as a result of 
learning and interactions (Macneil 1980). Hence, the informal mechanisms are developing as 
the cooperation enfolds, and this development requires a history of interactions and personal 
ties between the parties (Dyer and Singh 1998).  
Key personnel on both sides of a contract relationship matters (Macneil 1980; Kern and 
Willcocks 2001). “A key factor often noted as destabilizing operations and relations was the 
changes in key managers on either side (Kern and Willcocks 2001). Hence, we argue that both 
parties’ key personnel actually frame the relationship, and a change in key personnel can alter 
the attitude in the relation. 
Contract age as such does not account for what really happens, but we interpret the actual 
contract age (duration) as a proxy measurement of stability and history. As discussed in 
section 3.2, the actual duration is probably more important than the agreed contract length. 
Therefore, we decided to calculate an item for contract age as the time between 
commencement of the contract and the time for our data collection.  
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5. 
DATA EXAMINATION AND MEASURE VALIDATION 
In this chapter we present assessments of data quality. We cover the sample and descriptive 
statistics, we do an assessment of missing data, and we describe the procedures used to 
validate the measurements of the theoretical constructs. 
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5.1 Sample Description 
We used a convenience sample of contracts and contract relationships, deliberately chosen for 
heterogeneity. This should secure necessary variations and increase the external validity 
(Cook and Campbell 1979). The sample consists of a representative mix of all kinds of IT 
sourcing contracts within our focal organization, and it is based on agreements and 
discussions with the 11 key-informants.  
First, we assessed informant quality by a simple mean comparison between the informant 
tenure and the contract age. On average the tenure was longer than the contract age, with 2.87 
vs. 2.45. This implies that, on average, the informants have been working with the contracts 
and relationships from early negotiations and into the contract operations. This was confirmed 
by the fact that less than 15% of the cases have a negative difference between the informant 
tenure and contract age of more than one year.     
The quality of the informants was again confirmed in the final sample selection. Initially, we 
identified 85 contracts to be analyzed, and we received a total of 74. On average we ‘lost’ one 
contract from each informant. In a few cases, we found that the informant was not properly 
knowledgeable about all aspects of the contracts and relationships. These contracts were not 
included in the sample. 
Further, there had been changes in the contract portfolio between the initial identification and 
the actual data collection. The final reason for ‘missing’ cases were due to the heavy burden it 
is to set aside time to answer surveys like this. 
However, before any of the contracts were excluded from the survey, we had a chance to 
discuss this with the informant. Obviously, there is a real danger that these exclusions 
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decrease the variations, and as such, that the statistical conclusion validity is decreased. 
However, the descriptive statistics reported in appendix 3 confirms that we have a reasonable 
variation on all our focal constructs, and we deem the material to be fit for our purposes. 
Second, we assessed item non-response by missing value analysis on the complete data set 
(N=74). This revealed nine cases with missing values. Only four cases had non-response on 
six items or more, with a ‘worst case’ missing nine items. This is less than 10% (8.6%), and 
we saw no need to exclude cases (Hair et al. 1998). 
Further, one of the items used to measure relation specific investments (RSI_8) is missing in 
six of the 74 cases, which give a maximum item non-response of 8.11%. As it turned out, this 
item was excluded in the further validation process, and none of the other items showed a 
non-response rate above 5%. Due to our limited sample and the relatively low item non-
response rates, we consider this to be more than acceptable, and saw no need for further 
remedies. 
For further analysis we used a conservative strategy (Hair et al. 1998). I.e. we used replace 
with mean on all the factor analyses, and we employed a list-wise deletion on the regression 
analysis. This strategy provided an analysis with data from 73 cases. 
Finally, multivariate data analysis such as factor analysis and multiple regression analysis 
demand that all the variables are (close to) normally distributed. We used the procedure 
proposed by Hair et al. (1998) and excluded all variables that deviated substantially from a 
normal distribution. We used a cutoff of +/- 1.96 on skewness and kurtosis. This corresponds 
to a significance level of 0.05, and we dropped 11 items from further analysis (eight from 
contract mechanisms, one from contract behavior, and two from the control variables). 
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5.2 Procedure for Scale Construction and Validation 
Having a set of (close to) normal distributed indicators with sufficient variation, the task is 
now to construct reliable and valid scales for the theoretical constructs. We used an iterative 
procedure like the one proposed by Churchill (1979). 
The main purpose is to identify the interrelationships between our indicators and reduce them 
to a smaller set of variables that are suitable to test the hypotheses. The indicators are derived 
from earlier research and theory; hence we have a priori knowledge of the underlying 
structure. Conceptually, we used a confirmatory approach. However, due to our limited 
sample size we could not use a strict confirmatory factor analysis, such as structural equation 
modeling (Hair et al. 1998). Therefore, we used SPSS to run a set of exploratory factor 
analyses in a ‘confirmatory mode’. 
First, we used Principal Component (factor) analysis to verify that all theoretical constructs 
were unidimensional. Hence, we determined a set of one-factor solutions according to the 
procedure proposed by Hair et al. (1998) and Pett et al. (2003). We (mostly) kept items with 
communality larger than 0.5, hence requiring that at least 50% of the variation in the indicator 
is explained by the factor solution. Further, we looked for items with a factor loading of 0.5 or 
higher on the first factor. The squared factor loading is a measure of how much of the item 
variance that is explained by the factor. 0.52 is 0.25, which means that 25% or more of the 
variance will be explained. 
Because the item communality is the sum of these squared factor loadings, one-factor 
solutions will typically show higher factor loadings. However, this threshold value is 
important in the final validation, as it increase the statistical significance in our relatively 
small sample size (Hair et al. 1998).  
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Second, we ran a reliability test with a calculation of Cronbach’s Alpha for each construct. 
We (mostly) deleted items that had a lower item-to-total correlation than 0.5, and thus tried to 
maximize the alpha. According to theory, this test is weaker than the factor analysis, and we 
compared the two solutions before we decided to delete items. The goal was to have scales 
with alpha of 0.7 or higher (Hair et al. 1998; Nunnally and Bernstein 1994). 
Third, to test for convergent and discriminant validity, we combined similar constructs in a 
new set of factor analyses. We took each of the classes of construct in turn: contract behavior, 
contract mechanisms, uncertainty, and the control variables. We used Principal Component 
with Varimax rotation, and we deleted items that cross-loaded on two or more factors, loaded 
on the ‘wrong’ factor, or did not pass the 0.5 threshold based on communality and factor 
loadings.  
However, factor analysis is an ‘artful’ technique, and the aim was to “construct a set of scales 
that are few in number and as short as possible while meeting the requirements of scale 
reliability” (Pett et al. 2003: 167). Therefore, we always used theoretical and conceptual 
‘lenses’ before we decided what to do with individual items.  
As the goal was to seek a simple and robust solution, Varimax rotation normally provides the 
easiest structure. The assumption is that the factors are orthogonal and do not correlate with 
each other. This maximizes the variations, and it is a sound strategy for further use of the 
constructs in hypotheses testing (Hair et al. 1998). However, we anticipate some of our 
constructs to be inter-correlated, and therefore oblique rotations are theoretically more correct. 
Further, principal components analyze the total variations, which includes error variation. 
Hence, we compared the Varimax rotated solution first with oblique rotation, and then with 
principal axis solutions that analyze only the common variance shared between items.  
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The final scales are calculated as a simple mean of the included items. Such use of summated 
scales is less vulnerable of specific variations in our empirical setting, and is thus comparable 
with other studies (Hair et al. 1998). The validation process was concluded by an inspection 
of the inter-construct correlations. 
 
5.3 Unidimensionality and Reliability 
We now comment on each construct in turn, starting with contract behavior (dependent 
variable), continuing with contract mechanisms and uncertainty (independent variables), and 
then the control variables. We denote reversed score by using ‘r’ after the item number (i.e. 
item 4 in the scale for relational focus is reversed, and we denote it Focus_4r). All one-factor 
solutions are found in appendix 4. 
Contract behavior is measured by the manifested contract norms, and first we validated each 
of the seven contract norms individually. 
Relational focus was measured with seven items, and three items (Focus_4r, 6 and 7) were 
dropped because they loaded on a ‘second’ factor. The remaining four items show satisfactory 
loadings and item-to-total correlations, and they have a Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.77 and account 
for 60.61 % of the variance. 
Solidarity was measured with five items, and two items (Solidarity_1r and 5r) were dropped 
because they loaded on a ‘second’ factor. The remaining three items show satisfactory 
loadings and item-to-total correlations, and they have a Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.75 and account 
for 68.56 % of the variance. 
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Mutuality was measured with four items, and one item (Mutuality_3) was dropped because of 
low communality (0.14), and low item-to-total correlation (-0.19). The remaining three items 
show satisfactory loadings and item-to-total correlations, although one item (Mutuality_1r) 
just below 0.5. However, this is the only threshold criterion violated, and we decided to keep 
the item. Mutuality has a Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.74 and account for 67.10 % of the variance. 
Flexibility was measured with five items, and two items (Flexibility_4r and 5r) were dropped 
because they loaded on a ‘second’ factor. The remaining three items did not show satisfactory 
loadings and item-to-total correlations, and we dropped one further item (Flexibility_3) with a 
communality of 0.27 and an item-to-total correlation of 0.18. The remaining two-item scale is 
still weak, with an inter-item correlation of 0.43. 
Role Integrity was measured with seven items, and all items showed satisfactory loadings and 
item-to-total correlations. However, in the final validation process (section 5.4), 
Role_Integr_2r loaded both on its proper Role Integrity (0.573) and the scale for Conflict 
Resolution (0.561). We decided to drop the item, and the remaining items showed satisfactory 
loadings and item-to-total correlations with a Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.91, and the items 
accounted for 69.38 % of the variance. 
Restraint of power was measured with four items, and the first analysis gave us two factors. 
Because the ‘second’ factor had an eigenvalue just merely above one (1.007), we decided to 
force a one-factor solution. This time, one item (Restraint_4) was dropped because of low 
communality (0.20), and the remaining three items show satisfactory loadings and item-to-
total correlations with a Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.88. The items account for 80.55 % of the 
variance. 
Conflict resolution was measured with four items, and one item (Conflict_res_3) was dropped 
because it had a kurtosis of 2.32. Another item (Conflict_res_4) was dropped because of 
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(extremely) low communality (0.04), and low item-to-total correlation (-0.09). The remaining 
two-item scale has an inter-item correlation of 0.82.  
Contract mechanisms were defined as ‘the nuts and bolts’ that are described in the contract 
exhibits, and contract length was measured with two single items combined to a total contract 
length including optional periods. We do not report more validity check for these. 
Requirement specifications were measured with seven items, and two items (Requirement_1 
and requirement_4) were dropped because they exceeded the threshold values for skewness 
and kurtosis. The five remaining items were analyzed and two more items (Requirement_2 
and Requirement_7) were dropped because they loaded on a ‘second’ factor. The remaining 
three items showed satisfactory loadings and item-to-total correlations, and they had a 
Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.81 and account for 72.85 % of the variance. 
Performance specifications were measured with nine items and two items (Performance_4 
and Performance_9) were dropped because they exceeded the threshold values for skewness 
and kurtosis. The remaining seven items were analyzed and two more items (Performance_1 
and Performance_2) were dropped because they loaded on a ‘second’ factor. The five 
remaining items showed satisfactory communalities, although one item (Performance_5) was 
as ‘low’ as 0.485. However, the factor loadings and the item-to-total correlations were 
according to our cutoff thresholds, and we decided to keep all. They had a Cronbach’s Alpha 
of 0.86 and account for 64.11  % of the variance. 
Price specifications were measured with eight items, and four items (price_3, price_4, 
price_7, and price_8) were dropped because they exceeded the threshold values for skewness 
and kurtosis. The four remaining items were inspected and analyzed, and we decided to 
combine two items (price_1 and price_2) into a single item calculated as the difference 
between the two. This combined item denotes the extent of a fixed price versus the extent of 
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time and material. A large score indicates fixed price, and a low score indicates a price based 
on time and materials. In addition we decided to use the single item measuring the use of 
penalty attached to performance (price_6). 
Uncertainty was divided in two constructs. First, environmental uncertainty was defined as 
market dynamism and was measured with four items. One item (dynamism_4) was dropped 
because of low communality (0.206), and low item-to-total correlation (0.31). The remaining 
three items showed satisfactory loadings and item-to-total correlations, and they had a 
Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.89 and accounted for 83.61% of the variance. 
Second, behavioral uncertainty was defined as complexity and was measured with four items. 
One item (complexity_1) was dropped because of low communality (0.424), and low item-to-
total correlation (0.47). The item-to-total correlation was considered acceptable, but we 
decided to delete the item because both conditions were violated. The remaining three items 
showed satisfactory loadings and item-to-total correlations, and they have a Cronbach’s Alpha 
of 0.80 and accounted for 73.13 % of the variance. 
We introduced four control variables. Relation specific investments were measured with nine 
items. We first dropped one item (RSI_6) with low communality (0.341), and then two more 
(RSI_7 and 8) because they loaded on a ‘second’ factor. The remaining six items showed 
satisfactory communalities, factor loadings and item-to-total correlations. The six-item scale 
had a Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.92, and accounted for 72.07 % of the variance. 
Contract importance was measured with four items, and all items showed satisfactory 
communalities, factor loadings and item-to-total correlations. The four-item scale had a 
Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.90, and accounted for 77.57 % of the variance. 
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Availability of alternatives was measured with five items, and one item (alternatives_5r) was 
dropped because it exceeded the threshold values for skewness and kurtosis. The remaining 
four items showed satisfactory communalities, factor loadings and item-to-total correlations. 
The four-item scale had a Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.87, and accounted for 73.14 % of the 
variance. 
We measured contract stability and history with contract age as a proxy. This item was 
calculated based on the commencement date for the contract, and it is an objective measure in 
years.  We do not report more validity check for this construct.  
 
5.4 Convergent and Discriminant Validity 
Construct validity, is showed by “first, testing for a convergence across different measures of 
the same ‘thing’ and, second, testing for a divergence between measures and manipulations of 
related but conceptually distinct ‘things’” (Cook and Campbell 1979: 61). 
Contract behavior is manifested through seven interrelated dimensions that should originate 
from a higher order construct. They should be inter-correlated, but still show satisfactory 
convergent and discriminant validity (Kaufmann and Dant 1992). When we combined all 
remaining items in a Principal Component analysis with Varimax rotation, we had to force the 
solution to have seven factors (flexibility had eigenvalue less than one).   
All seven dimensions were ‘loud and clear’, with eigenvalues ranging from 6.323 to 0.880. 
All communalities were higher than 0.5, and all factor loadings are above 0.5 and on the 
‘right’ factor. The seven factors explain 78.59% of the variance. 
 90 
   
Table 5.1: Contract behavior -Varimax rotated Principal Component solution  
 
Component 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Role_integr_1 ,65 ,02 ,03 ,51 ,19 -,14 ,11 
Role_integr_3 ,86 -,05 -,03 ,31 ,18 ,01 -,08 
Role_integr_4 ,85 ,01 -,03 -,01 -,03 ,05 ,09 
Role_integr_5 ,79 -,03 -,16 ,22 -,14 -,15 ,10 
Role_integr_6 ,84 -,07 -,14 ,05 ,05 -,05 ,04 
Role_integr_7r ,78 ,12 ,10 -,21 -,10 ,07 -,31 
Restraint_1r -,13 ,83 ,19 ,00 ,24 ,19 ,06 
Restraint_2r -,14 ,86 ,19 ,01 ,18 ,25 -,01 
Restraint_3 ,28 ,83 ,05 ,22 ,03 ,04 ,05 
Focus_1 -,05 ,15 ,74 ,08 ,19 -,25 ,39 
Focus_2 ,11 ,09 ,77 -,04 ,07 ,00 ,32 
Focus_3r -,26 ,25 ,60 -,28 ,32 ,40 -,04 
Focus_5r -,21 ,14 ,71 -,18 -,01 ,37 -,14 
Solidarity_2 ,20 ,07 -,10 ,75 -,33 -,07 ,02 
Solidarity_3 ,04 ,16 -,07 ,89 -,06 -,10 -,05 
Solidarity_4 ,39 -,28 -,49 ,54 ,06 -,23 -,02 
Conflict_res_1r ,12 ,23 ,09 -,15 ,87 ,21 -,07 
Conflict_res_2r -,04 ,13 ,14 -,05 ,88 ,11 -,12 
Mutuality_1r -,05 ,06 ,09 ,00 ,02 ,85 ,10 
Mutuality_2r -,06 ,37 ,11 -,15 ,27 ,71 ,01 
Mutuality_4r ,10 ,20 -,07 -,25 ,41 ,58 ,06 
Flexibility_1r -,16 ,33 ,29 -,24 -,04 ,11 ,70 
Flexibility_2 ,10 -,10 ,13 ,09 -,16 ,08 ,79 
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Table 5.1 shows all the included items and the loading on seven factors (components). We 
have marked the loading in bold for the factor that items are assigned to, and we have 
underlined loadings where they exceed 0.5 on other factors.  
All the items load high on their ‘right’ factor, which is a good indication for convergent 
validity. They also load substantially lower on the other factors, except for role_integr_1 and 
solidarity_4. 
Then, we compared the solution with oblique rotation as well as common factor analysis 
(principal axis), and it was not possible to devise a better and simpler structure. Even though 
oblique and varimax rotation put the factors in slightly different orders, all the items loaded 
on the same seven factors. 
However, divergent validity is not ‘perfectly’ established, and we decided to compare the 
correlations between all the seven dimensions.  
Table 5.2: Contract behavior - Correlations 
 
Relational focus 
 
Solidarity
 
Mutuality
 
Flexibility
 
Role 
integrity 
Restraint 
of power 
Conflict 
resolution 
Relational 
focus (0.77)       
Solidarity  -0.45a (0.75)      
Mutuality 0.33a -0.34a (0.74)     
Flexibility 0.40a -0.22 0.16 (0.43)    
Role integrity -0.18 0.46a -0.09 -0.10 (0.91)   
Restraint of 
power 0.38
a -0.10 0.41a 0.22 0.01 (0.88)  
Conflict 
resolution 0.31
a -0.24b 0.43a -0.08 0.10 0.37a (0.82) 
a Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) ,  b Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
The diagonal (in bold) is the internal consistency expressed by Cronbach’s Alpha.    
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Table 5.2 shows that none of the contract norms correlate higher than 0.46 (role integrity and 
solidarity). This indicates that although the dimensions are inter-related, they are different and 
show satisfactory discriminant validity.  
It is also clear that relational focus, mutuality, restraint of power, and conflict resolution all 
are significantly and positively inter-correlated. Further, flexibility only correlates 
significantly with relational focus, and solidarity and role integrity correlates positively. 
However, solidarity correlates negatively with relational focus, mutuality, and conflict 
resolution. This does not indicate that we have one common underlying factor represented in 
our empirical sample.  
This was indeed demonstrated when we treated all seven factors in a ‘second order’ factor 
analysis. First, we got three factors. Mutuality, restraint of power, and conflict resolution 
loaded on the first factor. Solidarity and role integrity loaded on the second, while relational 
focus and flexibility loaded on a third factor. 
We decided to delete flexibility because it was the weakest factor, and then we got two 
distinct factors with eigenvalue 2.403 and 1.370. In total they explained 62.87 % of the 
variance. Relational focus, mutuality, restraint of power, and conflict resolution combined 
into a four-item, one-factor solution. It showed an eigenvalue of 2.119 and accounted for 
52.96 % of the variance. The scale had a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.70, and the inter-item-
correlations were not ideal, but satisfactory, ranging from 0.44 to 0.52.  
We conclude that we have a weak, but still satisfactory scale, and deem it fit for our research 
purpose. We denote the scale as Co-operative relation, and it is the mean value of relational 
focus, mutuality, restraint of power, and conflict resolution. 
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We considered the two remaining dimensions, solidarity and role integrity, as a possible 
second factor. However, since there is no theory supporting such actions, we decided to keep 
just one overall factor for further analysis. 
 
Contract mechanisms, uncertainty and control variables. 
We assessed construct validity for the independent and control variables in several steps. 
First, we ran a combined analysis of requirement and performance specifications. This 
showed satisfactory convergent and discriminant validity with two distinct factors (eigenvalue 
4.279 and 1.199). All items except performance_5 show communalities higher than 0.5, and 
they all load high on the expected factor.   
Then, we combined dynamism and complexity in a principal components analysis, and this 
confirmed two distinct factors (eigenvalue 2.294 and 1.796). All items showed communalities 
higher than 0.5, and they loaded high on the expected factor.  
Then, we combined all the items used to measure the control variables. Relation specific 
investments, contract importance, and availability of alternatives showed satisfactory 
convergent and discriminant validity. We got three distinct factors with all the items loading 
properly on their expected factor. The eigenvalues ranged from 6.15 to 1.539, and they 
explained 75.52% of the variance.  
Finally, we combined all the items in one Principal Component Analysis with Varimax 
rotation: 
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Table 5.3: Contract mechanisms, uncertainty and control variables - Varimax rotated 
Principal Component solution 
  
Component 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
RSI_1 ,91 -,05 ,05 ,12 -,08 ,09 -,05 
RSI_2 ,84 -,16 ,21 ,16 -,17 ,06 ,01 
RSI_3 ,73 -,10 ,18 ,19 ,05 -,14 ,00 
RSI_4 ,86 -,10 ,00 ,16 -,03 -,21 -,10 
RSI_5 ,76 ,01 ,01 ,29 ,04 ,10 -,31 
RSI_9 ,67 -,36 ,10 ,31 -,14 ,19 ,11 
Alternatives_1 -,09 ,89 ,11 ,01 ,25 -,02 ,05 
Alternatives_2 -,09 ,90 ,12 -,05 ,10 -,01 ,07 
Alternatives_3r -,18 ,82 -,03 ,05 ,22 ,06 -,06 
Alternatives_4r -,10 ,66 -,19 -,13 ,04 ,32 ,17 
Performance_3 -,06 ,15 ,70 -,03 ,08 ,42 ,07 
Performance_5 ,26 ,15 ,39 ,03 ,07 ,50 ,13 
Performance_6 ,11 ,02 ,87 ,18 ,09 ,00 ,11 
Performance_7 ,14 -,06 ,76 ,11 ,05 ,39 ,02 
Performance_8 ,31 -,09 ,71 ,19 ,01 ,22 ,05 
Importance_1 ,33 -,05 ,24 ,82 -,09 ,12 ,11 
Importance_2 ,30 ,18 ,35 ,80 ,00 ,00 -,03 
Importance_3 ,26 -,03 ,16 ,83 ,18 ,16 -,01 
Importance_4 ,27 -,26 -,23 ,71 ,15 ,24 -,20 
Dynamism_1 -,02 ,37 ,05 ,06 ,83 ,05 ,02 
Dynamism_2 -,06 ,08 ,14 ,02 ,92 ,13 ,10 
Dynamism_3 -,12 ,21 ,00 ,08 ,84 ,09 ,22 
Requirement_3 ,03 ,00 ,10 ,13 ,19 ,80 -,03 
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Component 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Requirement_5 -,03 ,12 ,39 ,15 ,10 ,74 -,07 
Requirement_6r -,24 ,06 ,36 ,19 -,09 ,61 -,18 
Complexity_2 ,04 -,03 ,03 -,06 ,17 ,11 ,81 
Complexity_3 -,04 ,01 ,10 -,01 ,08 -,09 ,91 
Complexity_4 -,24 ,22 ,06 ,04 ,03 -,14 ,79 
 
Table 5.3 shows that we have seven distinct constructs, and eigenvalues ranged from 6.975 to 
1,133. The seven dimensions explained 77.45% of the variance. 
One of the performance items loaded below the threshold value of 0.5, and showed higher 
loading on requirement specifications than on performance specifications. Further, the oblique 
rotated model showed that requirement and performance specifications could have been 
combined into one construct. However, because these two constructs are vitally important for 
our study, we saw the Varimax solution combined with the two-factor solution, as strong 
enough indication for convergent and discriminant validity.  
This is also supported by an inspection of the inter-construct correlations. Here we also 
included the Co-operative relation, which is the final dependent variable.  
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Table 5.4: Correlations between the theoretical multi-item constructs 
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 Co-operative relation (0.70)        
2 Dynamism -0.44a (0.89)       
3 Complexity 0.00 0.24b (0.80)      
4 Requirement specifications -0.17 0.22 -0.08 (0.81)     
5 Performance specifications -0.42a 0.18 0.10 0.56a (0.86)    
6 Relational Investments -0.06 -0.13 -0.16 0.03 0.28b (0.92)   
7 Contract Importance -0.26b 0.12 -0.10 0.29b 0.37a 0.59a (0.90)  
8 Availability of Alternatives -0.48a 0.44a 0.12 0.19 0.10 -0.25b -0.04 (0.87)
a  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), b  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
The diagonal (in bold) is the internal consistency expressed by Cronbach’s Alpha.    
 
In table 5.4 we see that the highest inter-construct correlation is 0.56 (requirement 
specifications and performance specifications). None of the constructs are nearly perfect 
correlated, which indicate that they are distinct constructs that are both convergent and 
discriminant valid.  
 
5.5 Measurement Summary 
We have established that all theoretical constructs are valid and reliable, and the following 
table represents a summary of the scales used to measure our theoretical constructs: 
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Table 5.5: Scales used for hypotheses testing 
Construct N Items Min - Max 
(b) 
Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis Coefficient alpha 
(a) 
Co-operative relation 74 4 1.58 – 5.46 3.55 0.98 -0.23 -0.81 0.70 
Focus 74 4 1.00 – 6.25 3.24 1.11 0.34 0.49 0.77 
Mutuality 74 3 1 – 7 2.89 1.20 1.20 2.21 0.74 
Restraint of power 74 3 1.00 – 6.33 4.13 1.49 -0.30 -1.18 0.88 
Conflict resolution 74 2 1 – 7 3.95 1.58 0.08 -0.87 0.82 
Solidarity  74 3 1.33 – 7.00 4.85 1.16 -0.73 0.84 0.75 
Flexibility  74 2 1 – 7 4.30 1.21 -0.26 -0.34 0.43 
Role integrity  74 6 1.17 – 6.50 3.45 1.25 0.25 -0.08 0.91 
Contract length  74 1 0.25 – 20.0 7.90 6.42 0.94 -0.51 NA 
Requirement 
specification 
74 3 1 – 7 3.94 1.49 -0.01 -0.82 0.81 
Performance 
specification 
74 5 1 – 7 3.12 1.56 0.62 -0.40 0.86 
Fixed price 74 1 -6 – 6 -1.64 4.04 0.57 -1.03 NA 
Penalty 74 1 1 – 7 2.55 2.25 0.93 -0.91 NA 
Dynamism 73 3 1.00 – 6.33 3.59 1.36 0.06 -0.95 0.89 
Complexity 73 3 1.33 – 5.33 3.15 1.08 0.38 -0.97 0.80 
Relational investments 74 6 1.00 – 6.33 3.12 1.42 0.24 -1.02 0.92 
Contract importance  74 4 1 – 7 4.13 1.38 -0.23 -0.44 0.90 
Alternatives 74 4 1.25 – 7.00 5.03 1.36 -0.39 -0.33 0.87 
Contract age  74 1 0.17 – 8.25 2.45 2.30 1.19 0.11 NA 
(a) Alpha for constructs based on two items is the inter-item correlation  
(b) All scales have a theoretical range from 1 to 7, except for Contract length and Contract age that are measured 
in years (>0), and Fixed price that range from –6 to +6.   
 
Some comments are in order: First, co-operative relation is the only dependent variable. The 
underlying contract norms are only reported to be compatible with the works by Kaufmann 
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and Dant (1992) and Rokkan (1995). Second, all the used scales are sufficiently reliable with 
a coefficient alpha larger than the recommended 0.70 (Nunnally and Bernstein 1994). The 
only exception from this ‘rule of thumb’ is the scale for Contractual Flexibility, but this 
construct is not included in the Co-operative relation. 
Third, the mutuality construct violates the cutoff value for kurtosis, with a value of 2.21. 
Because it otherwise behaves as expected, with good variations and high reliability, we 
decided to keep the construct as one of the four underlying variables in the composite scale 
for co-operative relation. 
With these comments, we regard the scales fit for our research purposes. 
 99 
   
  
 100 
   
6. 
HYPOTHESES TESTING 
In chapter three, we advanced ten correlation hypotheses. They all pertain to anticipated 
changes in contract behavior connected to variations in formal contract mechanisms and 
uncertainty. This chapter presents the main findings in our study, and we start by the testing 
procedures before we test each of the hypotheses in turn.  
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6.1 Testing Procedure 
The parties deliberately choose how they specify requirements and performance measures; 
they deliberately choose the length of the contract and the pricing mechanisms. These contract 
mechanisms are choice variables, and we framed hypotheses for the correlation between each 
contract mechanism and co-operative contract behavior in the IT sourcing relationship. 
We also framed hypotheses for main effects of environmental and behavioral uncertainty, and 
we introduced a set of interaction hypotheses concerning the moderating effect of behavioral 
uncertainty on the effect from three of the contract mechanisms. 
There are several alternative methods for testing correlation hypotheses, and we chose to use 
regression analysis because: we are interested in strength, direction, and the relative 
importance of the variables. We also want to achieve statistical control, and we have 
advanced hypotheses for interaction effects. All this can be treated by multiple regression 
analysis, where we estimate effects (correlations) from all the independent variables 
simultaneously (Hair et al 1998, Lewis-Beck 1980, Skog 1998). 
Since there is no theoretical indication of complex functional relationships, we anticipate a 
linear function, and we specified three incremental regression models. The complete model 
(Model 3) can be expressed like this: 
Contract behavior = a0  + b1 (Contract length) + b2 (Requirement Specifications) + 
 b3 (Performance Specifications) + b4 (Fixed Price) + b5 (Price Penalty) + b6 (Dynamism) + 
b7 (Complexity) + b8 (Contract Length * Complexity) + b9 (Requirement Specifications * 
Complexity) + b10  (Performance Specifications * Complexity) + controls  + e. 
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This function is basically a mathematically representation of one variable dependent on 
several other variables, and multiple regression is a suitable statistical tool. “The objective of 
multiple regression analysis is to predict the changes in the dependent variable in response to 
changes in the independent variables. This objective is most often achieved through the 
statistical rule of least squares” (Hair et al. 1998).  
Hence, we entered all the independent and control variables into three ordinary least square 
regression models in SPSS. I.e. we regressed the co-operative contract behavior in the IT 
sourcing relationship (dependent variable) on all the identified contract mechanisms, 
uncertainty (independent variables) and control variables. The models are incrementally 
specified, so that: 
• Model 1; regress contract behavior on contract mechanisms and uncertainty. 
• Model 2; regress contract behavior on contract mechanisms, uncertainty and control 
variables. 
• Model 3; regress contract behavior on contract mechanisms, uncertainty, control 
variables and interactions (product terms between contract mechanisms and 
complexity). 
In all three models, the calculated regression coefficients are the partial (net) effect of each 
included variable on contract behavior, while all the other variables are held constant. The 
effect of one variable is ‘free of’ influence from any of the others. Thus, we achieve statistical 
control (Lewis-Beck 1980). 
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Table 6.1 Contract behavior regressed on contract mechanisms, uncertainty, control 
variables, and interactions 
3,56 39,94 ,00
-,02 -,13 -1,29 ,20
,15 ,22 1,79 ,08
-,20 -,32 -2,65 ,01
,01 ,04 ,41 ,69
-,15 -,35 -3,27 ,00
-,29 -,40 -4,08 ,00
,13 ,14 1,45 ,15
4,92 8,75 ,00
-,03 -,22 -2,00 ,05
,17 ,25 2,11 ,04
-,23 -,37 -3,01 ,00
-,01 -,06 -,64 ,52
-,10 -,23 -2,02 ,05
-,21 -,29 -2,84 ,01
,15 ,16 1,75 ,09
,03 ,04 ,32 ,75
-,09 -,12 -1,06 ,29
-,26 -,36 -3,09 ,00
,09 ,21 1,95 ,06
4,75 9,03 ,00
-,02 -,16 -1,51 ,14
,17 ,26 2,35 ,02
-,23 -,36 -2,92 ,00
-,01 -,05 -,59 ,56
-,10 -,24 -2,21 ,03
-,21 -,28 -2,98 ,00
,18 ,20 2,33 ,02
,08 ,11 ,95 ,35
-,11 -,15 -1,40 ,17
-,21 -,29 -2,61 ,01
,04 ,08 ,76 ,45
,03 ,23 2,62 ,01
-,10 -,19 -2,07 ,04
(Constant)
Contract Length
Requirement Specifications
Performance Specifications
Fixed Price
Price Penalty
Dynamism
Complexity
(Constant)
Contract Length
Requirement Specifications
Performance Specifications
Fixed Price
Price Penalty
Dynamism
Complexity
RSI
Contract Importance
Availability of Alternatives
Contract age
(Constant)
Contract Length
Requirement Specifications
Performance Specifications
Fixed Price
Price Penalty
Dynamism
Complexity
RSI
Contract Importance
Availability of Alternatives
Contract age
Contract length*Complexity
Performance Specifications*Complexity
Model
M1
M2
M3
B
Unstandardized
Beta
Standardized
t Sig.
 
M1: R² = 0.46, R² adj. = 0.41, F = 8.03, Sig. F = 0.00.         M2: R² = 0.56, R² adj. = 0.48, F = 7.00, Sig. F = 0.00.   
M3: R² = 0.63, R² adj. = 0.55, F = 7.72, Sig. F = 0.00. 
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Table 6.1 includes three regression models: M1 is contract behavior regressed on contract 
mechanism and uncertainty. M2 is contract behavior regressed on contract behavior, 
uncertainty and control variables. M3 is contract behavior regressed on contract behavior, 
uncertainty, control variables and interactions (product terms). 
The table shows the unstandardized (B) and standardized (Beta) regression coefficients for all 
independent variables. It further shows the t-value and significance level for each of the 
coefficients. A summary of all three models is provided below the table. 
Before we tested each of the hypotheses, we verified that the assumptions for regression 
analysis hold. It is a prerequisite for using multiple regression analysis that the independent 
variables do not correlate too much, and therefore we mean centered the contract mechanisms 
and uncertainty according to the procedure proposed by Aiken and West (1991) and Jaccard 
et al. (1990). The VIF indexes ranged from 1.199 to 2.422, which is substantially different 
from the threshold value of 10 (Hair et al. 1998). Thus, multicollinearity is not an issue in this 
study. 
Then we assessed the explanatory power of the three models, and as we can see from the 
table, all three models explain a fair amount of the observed variance in contract behavior. By 
inspecting R2 in all three models, we see that contract mechanisms and uncertainty accounts 
for 46% (model 1), control variables add another 10% (model 2), and the interactions add 7% 
(model 3). 
Although we could have optimized the models by excluding insignificant variables, all three 
models are significant, and we can now go on to test our hypotheses. 
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6.2 Main Effects of Contract Mechanisms on Contract Behavior 
We derived at five hypotheses for the correlation between contract mechanisms and contract 
behavior. 
H1: We anticipated a positive correlation between contract length (agreed contract duration) 
and co-operative contract behavior in IT sourcing relationships. Hence, we expected to find 
higher levels of co-operative (relational) norms in IT sourcing relationships based on long-
term contracts than IT sourcing relationships based on short-term contracts.  
First, we notice that the regression coefficient is not significant in model one (M1), but it 
becomes significant in model two (M2). Now, the standardized regression coefficient is –0.22 
and significant on the 5% level (t = -2.00, p = 0.05). Hence, there is a significantly negative 
correlation between long-term contracts and co-operative contract behavior in the IT sourcing 
relation.  
Our hypothesis was that long-term contracts would correlate positively with co-operative 
contract behavior in the IT sourcing relationship. Thus, we reject H1. 
This indicates that to agree on a long-term contract including optional periods, does not in 
itself promote co-operation. The ‘shadow of the future’ does not continue forever, and very 
long horizons may even create a ‘discount’ effect. The contract length in itself might be useful 
as a safeguard, but it does not necessarily imply real commitment. 
According to transaction cost economics and relational contract theory, a long-term contract 
will inevitably be incomplete. This incompleteness can be mitigated by the development of a 
relationship, but it might also lead to a more narrow and short-term focus. When the parties 
cannot anticipate the future ‘with certainty’, they might secure intended outcome through a 
focus on short-term delivery connected to each individual transaction.  
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However, it is interesting to compare this finding with the effect of actual contract duration 
(contract age). The result in model two (M2) indicates that older relationships are more co-
operative than newer ones (beta = 0.21, t = 1.95). We will discuss this, as well as the 
interaction between contract length and complexity, later in this chapter. 
We conclude that the negotiated contract length (agreed contract duration) primarily serve as 
safeguard, while actual contract duration promote co-operation between the parties. 
H2: We anticipated a positive correlation between detailed requirement specifications and co-
operative contract behavior in IT sourcing relationships. IT sourcing relationships based on 
contracts with complex and detailed requirement specifications should show higher levels of 
co-operative (relational) norms than IT sourcing relationships based on less specified 
contracts. 
In model one (M1), the regression is positive but at a moderate level of significance (t=1.79). 
However, when we add control variables in model two (M2), the regression coefficient for 
requirement specifications is 0.25 and significant at the 5% level (t = 2.11, p < 0.05). This 
provides quite strong support for Hypothesis 2; that contracts based on complex and detailed 
requirement specifications will correlate positively with co-operative contract behavior in IT 
sourcing relationships.  
This indicates that to specify the ‘scope of work’ more closely promotes co-operation. When 
the parties spend time to define and specify the ‘scope of work’ more thoroughly, they 
enhance the understanding and co-operation in the contract relationship.  
To write is to learn, and when the parties specify, they write. Hence, they will extend their 
understanding of the issues involved, they will become more aware of both their own and the 
other parties’ understanding and priorities.  
 107 
   
Writing specifications is a joint task. In systems development projects, this is often done in 
two exhibits. First the customer’s specification, then the supplier’s description of how he will 
accomplish the work. Alternatively, the parties can create a joint requirement specification. 
However, the crux of the matter is that the requirement specification is their best effort to 
express in writing their common understanding of the contracted work.  
For any given level of complexity, uncertainty, and all the other included variables, it 
promotes co-operation to try once more to increase the specificity of ‘scope of work’. 
H3: We anticipated a negative correlation between detailed performance specifications and 
co-operative contract behavior in IT sourcing relationships. IT sourcing relationships based 
on contracts with complex and detailed performance specifications should show lower levels 
of co-operative (relational) norms than IT sourcing relationships based on less specified 
performance measures. 
In all three models, the regression coefficient is significantly negative on the 1% level (t 
values from -2.65 to -3.01). The strength is also substantial with beta values less than –0.30. 
This provides strong support for Hypothesis 3; contracts based on complex and detailed 
performance specifications will correlate negatively with co-operative contract behavior in IT 
sourcing relationships. This indicates that complex and detailed performance specifications 
significantly promote competitive relationships.  
To increase the specificity of performance measures draw attention towards the short-term 
results. Measurements are by nature short-term, and we found that complex and detailed 
performance specifications always introduce a competitive attitude. This confirms the ‘cat and 
mouse game’ that are stimulated when the parties try to fulfill specific measurable 
performance targets.  
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This implies that even if the parties do their best to learn and understand, measurements are so 
powerful and discrete as to draw attention away from co-operation. Instead it eludes the 
parties to hold each other accountable for any deviations to the agreed performance. This is 
quite in accordance with relational contract theory: “Discreteness calls for measurement and 
specificity. Price and quantity must be precisely defined along with detailed specification of 
the product. In contractual relations, however, some aspects that eventually must become very 
specific may have been very nonspecific at the start of the relation. Further, while much either 
starts out or finishes measured and specific, much does not” (adapted from Macneil 
1981:1028). 
H4: We anticipated a positive correlation between risk-sharing price mechanisms and co-
operative contract behavior in IT sourcing relationships. IT sourcing relationships based on 
risk-sharing price mechanisms should show higher levels of co-operative (relational) norms 
than IT sourcing relationships based on price mechanisms with unilateral risk allocation. 
The regression coefficient for fixed price is not significant in any of the three models, and we 
reject hypothesis 4. The sign of the regression coefficient are slightly negative in the two most 
advanced models (M2 and M3), which imply a negative correlation between the use of fixed 
price and a co-operative relationship. A fixed-price contract allocates risk unevenly between 
the client and supplier, with most of the risk on the supplier. Therefore, the sign supports 
Hypothesis 4; that a risk-sharing price mechanism will correlate positively with a co-operative 
contract relationship. However, it is not at all significant, and we will not speculate further.  
H5: We anticipated a negative correlation between penalty mechanisms and co-operative 
contract behavior in IT sourcing relationships. IT sourcing relationships based on contracts 
with penalty clauses should show lower levels of co-operative (relational) norms than IT 
sourcing relationships based on contracts that are ‘silent about’ penalties. 
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The regression coefficient for price penalty is significantly negative in all three models. The 
beta values range from –0.23 to –0.35 at the 1% and at the 5% level.  This gives quite strong 
support for Hypothesis 5; that the use of price penalties will correlate negatively with co-
operative contract relationships.  
Like performance measures, penalty mechanisms attempt at measuring specific obligations 
(items), and then use the fulfillment of these obligations as a ‘proof’ of proper behavior. 
Unconditionally, this mechanism introduces a competition between the two parties. What one 
has to gain, the other has to loose. 
Penalties are probably the most discrete of all mechanisms. The result of a penalty is that one 
party pays directly what the other party gains. A client might look at this potential payment, 
as a way to ‘get more for less’, and the supplier will be forced to look at penalties as a 
potential loss. This is the essence of a ‘zero-sum-competition’, and it can lead to war between 
the parties. 
 
6.3 Main Effects of Uncertainty on Contract Behavior 
We derived at two hypotheses for the effect of uncertainty on contract behavior. 
H6: We treated environmental uncertainty as market dynamism, which includes rapid 
technology shifts, rapid price changes, and other unanticipated changes in the market. We 
anticipated that market dynamism would correlate negatively with co-operative contract 
behavior in IT sourcing relationships. 
The regression coefficient is negative (-0.28 to –0.40) and significant on the 1% level in all 
three models. This gives very strong support for our hypothesis. It seems rather obvious that 
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dynamic market conditions promote competitive contract behavior. This finding is consistent 
and robust in all regression models, and we conclude that dynamic market conditions 
unconditionally foster short-term competitive contract behavior.  
H7: We treated behavioral uncertainty as internal complexity and measurement problems. We 
anticipated that this type of uncertainty could render strategic behavior that is better handled 
in a close and long-term relationship. Hence, we advanced that complexity correlates 
positively with co-operative contract behavior in IT sourcing relationships. 
The regression coefficient is not significant in model one (M1), but it becomes significant on 
the 10% level when we introduce the control variables in model two (M2). When we 
introduce the interaction terms (M3) it is even significant on the 5% level, which gives 
support for our hypothesis 
We conclude that parties in a complex environment are more inclined to co-operate in the 
contract relationship, and that complexity promotes co-operative relationships.  
 
6.4 The Moderating Effect of Complexity (behavioral uncertainty) 
We advanced three hypotheses for the interaction between complexity and contract 
mechanisms.  
H8: First, we advanced that complexity and contract length should combine into closer co-
operation. To cope with complex sourcing, the parties need to allow for mutual learning and 
adaptation, and we anticipated that increasing levels of complexity would enhance the positive 
correlation between contract length (agreed contract duration) and co-operative contract 
behavior in IT sourcing relationships. 
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H9: Second, we advanced that complexity would promote hazard mitigation through mutual 
and complex requirement specifications. Hence, we anticipated that increasing levels of 
complexity would enhance the positive correlation between detailed requirement 
specifications and co-operative contract behavior in IT sourcing relationships. 
H10: Finally, performance specifications cannot be ambiguous. They have to be precise and 
measurable, or else there will be fighting between the parties. Complexity will make this more 
and more impossible, and hence we advanced that increasing levels of complexity would 
enhance the negative correlation between detailed performance specifications and co-
operative contract behavior in IT sourcing relationships. 
We tested these three hypotheses in two steps. First, we introduced one interaction term at a 
time, and tested whether we got significant effects on the total regression (sig. F change). Two 
of the three were significant, but we had to reject the interaction between complexity and 
requirement specifications (H9). 
Then, we entered the two remaining interaction terms in model three (M3), and we found that 
Contract length * Complexity had a regression coefficient of 0.23 at the 1% level (t = 2.62), 
and Performance Specifications * Complexity had –0.19 at the 5% level (t = -2.07).  
The regression model (M3) is significant, and it has added significantly to the explanatory 
power from the regression with only main effects (M2). A closer inspection shows that most 
of the effects from model two remains stable and significant. The exceptions are contract 
length and contract age. 
The regression coefficient for contract length is barely significant, but it remains negative 
with a standardized beta of -0.16 (t=-1.51, sig. 0.14). This implies that for average values of 
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complexity, longer agreed contract lengths does not promote co-operative relationships. It still 
has to be regarded as mainly a safeguard. 
However, the positive interaction between complexity and contract length implies that as 
complexity builds up, longer contract lengths will promote closer and more co-operative 
relationships. At the same time, contract age is no longer significant. This might imply that 
contract age also interact with complexity, which was confirmed in a separate analysis (0.27, 
sig. 0.004). We interpret this as a convergence between agreed contract length and actual 
contract age. More complex supply should be associated with longer contracts, and so it is. 
The next interaction is between performance specifications and complexity, and this is 
significant on the 5% level (beta -0.19, t= -2.07). This implies that as complexity builds up, 
the challenge of specifying measurable performance criteria is prohibitively difficult. If the 
parties still do, either they succeed or fail; it will certainly draw attention towards short-term 
fulfillment of specific outcome. Hence, measurements have proved (without reasonable 
doubt) to be the most powerful discrete mechanism available for the parties.  
This is confirmed by inspection of the main effect, which now is the effect of performance 
specifications for average levels of complexity. This is still significantly negative on the 1% 
level (beta -0.36, t=-2.92). Put differently, only for very low complexity will it be possible to 
promote co-operation through use of performance measures.    
Although the regression coefficient for contract length is barely significant in model three, it 
is illustrative to express the two linear functions for the regression coefficients like this: 
a) Beta for contract length = -0.16 + 0.23*Complexity 
b) Beta for performance specifications = -0.36 – 0.19*Complexity.  
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This implies that the beta for contract length is negative for medium to low levels of 
complexity. However, it turns positive for higher complexity levels. 
The beta for performance specifications will remain negative, unless for very low levels of 
complexity. 
 
6.5 The Effect of Control Variables 
Model two (M2) includes four control variables, and two of them showed significant 
regression coefficients.  Many alternative sources (-0.36, t = 3.09) promote a competitive 
relationship, and contract age (0.21, t = 1.95) promotes a co-operative relationship.  
Even if we do not hypothesize any effects of the control variables, some comments are useful: 
1) availability of alternative sources promotes competition, 2) important contracts are not 
associated with co-operation, 3) lasting contractual relationships foster co-operation or 
become lasting due to co-operation. Finally, 4) relation specific investments show no 
significant effect on co-operative contract behavior in the IT sourcing relationship. 
That dynamic market conditions and available alternatives promote competitive contract 
behavior is quite in accordance with transaction cost economics (Williamson 1996). With 
available alternatives at hand, it will always be possible to change from one source to another. 
Further, the less inter-twined, the easier it is to change. If this also coincides with a dynamic 
environment, the obvious choice would be to keep the supplier at arm’s length.  
Intuitively, we had expected important relationships to be associated with co-operative 
contract behavior. Here, we have to go behind the regression analysis, which showed a 
negative but not significant regression coefficient (-0.12). However, as can be seen from table 
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5.4, the correlation between co-operative contract behavior and importance was negative and 
significant at the 5% level (-0.26). 
A further inspection of the correlation matrix showed that importance also correlated 
significantly with both requirement and performance specifications. Important relationships 
were associated with more complex and detailed specifications than less important ones.  
The two specifications ‘exhibits’ have opposite effect on the co-operative contract behavior, 
while importance indicates a negative effect. Probably, this indicates that performance 
measures are so powerful that they draw attention quite ‘effectively’ towards short-term 
obligations. Further, this might indicate that measurement regimes are heavily involved in the 
fulfillment of important contract relationships.  
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6.6 Summary of Hypotheses Testing 
We can summarize the results with the following table: 
Table 6.2: Results of hypotheses testing 
Hypothesis Reads like: Result 
H1 There is a positive correlation between contract length (agreed contract 
duration) and co-operative contract behavior in IT sourcing relationships 
Not supported 
H2 There is a positive correlation between detailed requirement specifications and 
co-operative contract behavior in IT sourcing relationships 
Supported  
H3 There is a negative correlation between detailed performance specifications 
and co-operative contract behavior in IT sourcing relationships 
Supported  
H4 There is a positive correlation between risk sharing price mechanisms and co-
operative contract behavior in IT sourcing relationships 
Not supported 
H5 There is a negative correlation between penalty mechanisms and co-operative 
contract behavior in IT sourcing relationships 
Supported  
H6 There is a negative correlation between market dynamism and co-operative 
contract behavior in IT sourcing relationships 
Supported  
H7 There is a positive correlation between complexity and co-operative contract 
behavior in IT sourcing relationships 
Supported 
H8 Increasing levels of complexity will enhance the positive correlation between 
contract length (agreed contract duration) and co-operative contract behavior 
in IT sourcing relationships 
Supported  
H9 Increasing levels of complexity will enhance the positive correlation between 
detailed requirement specifications and co-operative contract behavior in IT 
sourcing relationships 
Not supported 
H10 Increasing levels of complexity will enhance the negative correlation between 
detailed performance specifications and co-operative contract behavior in IT 
sourcing relationships 
Supported  
 
Seven out of ten hypotheses were supported, and we will discuss the implications of the 
findings in the next chapter. 
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7. 
IMPLICATIONS AND EXTENSIONS 
“Contracts are fundamentally mechanisms of cooperation, and only mechanisms of conflict when things have 
gone wrong. Thus, law is not what contract is all about; contracts are about getting things done in the real 
world” (adapted from Macneil 1969, 1980). 
 
In this final chapter we first provide a summary of the study, and then we discuss the 
implications of our findings for theory and practice. We round off the dissertation with a 
discussion about limitations and future research opportunities. 
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7.1 Summary of the Study 
This dissertation is positioned to contribute to IT sourcing research in particular, and 
contracting research in general. First, we identified a gap in the current understanding of the 
relationship between contract and contract behavior in IT sourcing relationships, which led to 
the following research question: “what is the impact of contract mechanisms on contract 
behavior in IT sourcing relationships?”  
On a more general level, we are interested in the relationship between formal contract 
governance and relational governance of business relationships. It is a study of ‘the nature of 
contract’, with an emphasis on how elements of the contract influence on co-operation in 
business relationships (IT sourcing relationships).   
We used contracting theories and IT sourcing literature, and we developed a model of the 
anticipated effect of contract mechanisms and uncertainty on contract behavior in IT sourcing 
relationships (figure 3.1). Then we framed ten hypotheses, which we tested in three 
incremental regression models (table 6.1). The first model (M1) regressed co-operative 
contract behavior on contract mechanisms and uncertainty, the second model (M2) added 
control variables, and the third model (M3) added interactions between behavioral uncertainty 
(complexity) and three contract mechanisms. 
The first result to recapitulate is that all our three regression models were significant. Model 
one (M1) explains 46%, model two (M2) explains 56%, and model three (M3) explains 63% 
of the observed variance in contract behavior (R2 between 0.46 and 0.63). Although model 
three (M3) explains more than the other two, we could still have optimized our model by 
excluding insignificant variables. However, all the variables were included for theoretical 
reasons, and they all function as control variables.  
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Now, we turn to the individual effect associated with each of the variables. First, long-term 
contracts expressed through the contract length (agreed contract duration) do not seem to be 
associated with co-operative contract behavior. However, there is a notable exception for 
sourcing situations where complexity (behavioral uncertainty) is high. For average and low 
levels of complexity, contract length seems to function primarily as a safeguard, while older 
relationships seem to be associated with co-operative contract behavior. This indicates that 
behavior is adaptable and that co-operation is either a pre-requisite for, or a result of, durable 
contracts. 
Second, contracts with complex and detailed requirement specifications do seem to be 
associated with co-operative contract behavior in IT sourcing relationships. This indicates that 
co-operation depends on a fairly common understanding of the contracted scope, which 
should be enhanced by efforts and time spent at writing complex and detailed requirement 
specifications.  
Third, contracts with complex and detailed performance specifications do not seem to be 
associated with co-operation. On the contrary, there is a significantly and strong correlation 
between detailed performance specifications and competitive contract behavior in IT sourcing 
relationships. This indicates that measurements and specificity together, are really powerful 
discrete contract mechanisms. This negative effect is further enhanced when complexity 
(behavioral uncertainty) increases. 
Fourth, the pricing mechanism does not seem to be all that important in the IT sourcing 
context. However, penalty mechanisms do seem to be associated with competitive contract 
behavior. This coincides with the result above, because penalties and measurements are ‘two 
sides of the coin’.  
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And, finally, we found that environmental uncertainty (market dynamism) are significantly 
associated with competitive contract behavior, while behavioral uncertainty (complexity) 
seems to motivate for co-operative contract behavior. 
  
7.2 Theoretical Implications 
Extant IT sourcing literature has argued that the contract is a foundation for development of 
the relationship; any appropriate approach to understand business relationships would have to 
include the contract, yet the ‘contracting perspective’ has been downplayed (Kern and 
Willcocks 2000, 2001, 2002). We need to understand the dimensions or the Gestalt of the 
relationship: “The Gestalt consists of two key parts: the contract and its operationalization.  
The relationship operates within the ‘spirit of the contract’. The relationship consists of 
exchange episodes, and it depends largely on the initial contractual stage, since it greatly 
influences the quality of the relationship” (Kern 1997). 
We respond to this by an explicit treatment of the formal contract as a starting point, from 
where the contract relationship develops. On a conceptual level, we followed the process 
models of IT sourcing that include contract as artifact and relationship as behavior (Hui and 
Beath 2001; Kern and Willcocks 2001; Lacity and Willcocks 2001; Hirschheim and Dibbern 
2002; Alborz et al 2004; Cullen and Seddon 2004; Cullen et al. 2005).  
We view IT sourcing as a contract process, and therefore we also add to contracting research 
in general. We respond to calls like: “we regard contracts as providing the framework for a 
complex set of interactions between the parties to economic relationships” (Deakin and 
Michie 1997:19).   
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More specifically, we used a micro-analytic approach, where we analyzed the influence of 
several contract mechanisms on contract behavior. Formal contracts are taken as written 
documents that are combined from a discrete menu of available contract mechanisms. The 
parties can agree on contracts of short or long duration, with or without optional contract 
periods. They can specify the requirements (scope of work) thoroughly and detailed, or they 
can focus on overall and loose specifications. They can specify performance measures and 
metrics through complex and detailed performance specifications, or they can focus on overall 
performance.  
Our main premise is that contract mechanisms are choice variables, to be decided when the 
parties enter the contracts. These should be decided deliberately to promote proper contract 
behavior.  
 
7.2.1 The Nature and Impact of Contract 
Although there are some warnings about the effect of a control agenda in the IT sourcing 
literature (Kern and Willcocks 1999), the most common advice has been to use short-term, 
detailed and measurable contracts (Lacity and Willcocks 2001). 
This seems to be quite far from the essence of relational contract theory, which to a large 
extent has centered on the limits of formal contract and the importance of the relation (see 
chapter two, and Macneil and Campbell 2001). Further, there has been a growing interest in 
the interrelationship between formal and informal governance in the contracting 
(interorganizational) literature (Zenger et al. 2002, Poppo and Zenger 2002). 
However, there are important gaps in the understanding of the effect associated with specific 
parts of the contracts. I.e. one of the questions is: do detailed requirement specifications 
 121 
   
promote or prohibit co-operative contract behavior in the business (IT sourcing) relation. With 
our empirical study, we hope to partly fill this gap, and we will point at three specific 
findings: 
1. Complex and detailed requirement specifications seem to promote co-operative contract 
behavior, i.e. formal specifications may function as a complement to the informal co-
operative contract norms. (Support of hypothesis 2). 
2. Complex and detailed performance specifications seem to promote competitive contract 
behavior, and this is especially salient for complex sourcing. I.e. formal specifications 
may function as a substitute to informal co-operative contract norms. (Support of 
hypotheses 3 and 10). 
3. Penalty clauses are, together with specific performance measures, the most powerful 
discrete contract mechanisms. Penalties promote competitive behavior. (Support of 
hypothesis 5). 
One of the most significant findings in our study is that complex and detailed performance 
specifications are associated with competition between the two parties, especially for 
complex sourcing. The regression coefficients are significantly negative on the 1% level, and 
beta values are in the range of -.30, in all three models.  
Penalties have a similar effect, with beta values in the range of -.20, and significant on the 
level from 1% to 5%. It seems that this mechanism (unconditionally) introduces a zero-sum 
competition between the two parties. What one party stands to gain, the other stands to lose. 
Specific and detailed performance specifications and penalty clauses seem to strongly 
promote competitive contract behavior. 
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Detailed Service Level Agreements with requirements for specific measured performance 
introduce and promote a focus on achieving these measurable outcomes. The parties will tend 
to focus on short-term compliance with the contract instead of adaptable behavior for long-
term value. They will efficiently turn the attention towards short-term fulfillment of 
measurable outcomes, and they will compete in a zero-sum-game. It may even turn into a 
‘warlike’ fight. 
This result confirms that “specificity and measurement together promote discrete norms” 
(Macneil 1981), and that “monitoring and the imposition of penalties according to the strict 
letter of the contract is likely to undermine trust and co-operation, to the overall detriment of 
the service” (Vincent-Jones 1997:157). Vincent-Jones further argues that: ”Extremely detailed 
specifications may actually tend to discourage the development of relations, and may provide 
hostages to fortune by creating the potential for excessively literal or pedantic contract 
interpretation” (Vincent-Jones 2001:80). 
Hence, our empirical findings provide statistical support for important elements of the 
relational contract theory. 
This result also seems to be quite in line with the spirit of transaction cost economics, or 
economic institutions seen through ‘the lens of contract’ (Williamson 2002). There are limits 
to our cognitive capacity, and complex contracts will never be completely specified. If we act 
as if there are specific performance measures over and above reasons, then co-operation will 
‘break down’. This may in turn lead to less adaptability and higher transaction costs due to 
mal-adaptations and ‘fighting’ over the proper actions. According to transaction cost 
economics (Williamson 1985, 1996, 2002) this is not efficient governance. 
Interestingly, the effect of requirement specifications proved to be different. We found that 
detailed requirement specifications had a significantly positive effect on co-operative contract 
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behavior in the two most advanced models (in the range of .20 and on the 5% level). This 
implies that detailed requirement specifications in fact can be used to build a foundation for 
co-operative relationships. By describing carefully what the content and functionality of the 
deliverables should be, and how this could be achieved, the parties enhance the mutual 
understanding.  
”The written instrument does not always contain the entire agreement”, “A contract does not a 
contract make” Palay (1985b: 561). To deal with this problem, Palay and other proponents of 
the relational contract theory, argue for the need to study and understand the contractual 
relation. 
Our findings add another dimension to this statement. In fact, we found that different parts of 
the contracts have conflicting effect on contract behavior. Requirement specifications had a 
positive effect, i.e. it might function as a complement to the relation. Performance 
specifications had a negative effect on co-operative behavior, i.e. it might function as a 
substitute for the relation.  
Hence, the interrelation between formal and informal governance mechanisms are indeed 
complex, and we must look beyond the contract. Formal contracts are made of smaller parts. 
Contract mechanisms do have a merit. It does not suffice to measure the specificity of the 
contract as such. 
Therefore, one important result of our study is that specifications have to be distinguished. 
Specifications serve different purposes, and we have found that requirement and performance 
specifications have opposite impacts on contract behavior. Complex and detailed requirement 
specifications seem to promote co-operative behavior, while complex and detailed 
performance specifications seem to promote competition between the parties. 
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7.2.2 The Impact of Contract Duration and Uncertainty 
We also found interesting ‘dualities’ in the impact of contract duration and uncertainty. First, 
long-term contracts as such do not seem to be associated with co-operation, while actual 
contract duration does seem to enhance co-operative contract behavior. Although slightly less 
significant than the accepted 5% threshold (beta = 0.21 on the 6% level in model two), we 
find it interesting to note a positive association between contract age and co-operative 
behavior.  
This is a contrast to the agreed contract length, which had a negative impact unless for high 
complexity. Long-term contracts are more often associated with competitive behavior. It 
seems that these contracts most often function as safeguards, while our findings suggest that 
the parties actually tend to have a short-term and day-to-day (discrete) focus on the 
deliverables. 
Again, our findings seem to give statistical support for relational contract theory. Co-
operation is a result of lasting relations. When we combine this finding with the positive 
effect of detailed requirement specifications, we might conclude that co-operative behavior is 
a result of learning and working together. This learning process is initiated while the parties 
negotiate, continue through combined efforts in writing requirement specifications, and is 
enhanced as the relationship enfolds. 
Now, we turn to the conflicting effects of uncertainty. First, we modeled environmental 
uncertainty as market dynamism. We also specified one control variable that measured the 
extent of alternative sources for the supply at hand. Both of these refer to the external 
environment, and both show significantly negative effect on co-operative behavior 
(consistently on the 1% level and between -.20 and -.40). Environmental uncertainty seems to 
be strongly associated with short-term appliance and competitive contract behavior. 
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This result is in line with earlier IT sourcing literature, which argues for the use of short-term 
contracts and market governance for uncertain situations (Lacity and Willcocks 2001). Our 
findings also support Paswan et al. (1998). Environmental uncertainty seems to reduce 
motivations for relational governance. Finally, this also seems to be in line with TCE. 
Uncertainty will force contracts to flee to one of the extremes (Williamson 1996). In this case, 
it has ‘fled to’ the discrete market exchange. 
However, behavioral uncertainty (complexity) showed the opposite effect. We found a 
significantly positive effect on co-operative behavior in the two most advanced models (in the 
range of .20 and significant on the level of 10% and 5%). Complexity also had a significantly 
moderating effect on contract length, so that contract length had a positive association with 
co-operative behavior for higher levels of complexity. On the other hand, complexity had a 
negative effect on performance specifications, turning detailed performance measures into a 
prohibitively (impossible) difficult task when complexity builds up. 
It has been argued that if detailed contracts are used in situations with high uncertainty, 
performance will deteriorate without the support of co-operative norms (Cannon et al. 2000). 
Our findings add and suggest that it will be extremely difficult to develop such norms under 
those conditions. 
Our findings further suggest that it is necessary to treat uncertainty as originating from 
different sources. This is in line with Cannon et al. (2000), and Cannon and Perrault (1999). 
The parties will have to treat complex supplies different from dynamic supplies. 
Environmental and behavioral uncertainty has to be treated differently. 
It might be possible to avoid contractual problems for dynamic supplies, just by keeping 
arms-length and be prepared for ‘exit’. However, this will not necessarily be an option for 
complex IT products and services. It will not be possible to negotiate complexity away, 
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complex products and services have to be handled by learning. Short-term arms-length 
contracts might seriously restrict necessary ‘time to learn’.  
If the parties understand that complexity has to be mitigated by development of a common 
understanding, they may be more inclined to agree on a long-term journey together. This is in 
line with expectations from relational contract theory and transaction cost reasoning. 
 
7.2.3 Measurement of Contract Norms 
Now, we turn to some side effects of more methodological interest. First, we acknowledge 
that there is no clear understanding in the literature for how to measure contract norms (see 
Blois 2002; Ivens and Blois 2002; and note 3 in Cannon et al. 2000).  Most empirical work 
starts with Macneil, and his ten contract norms (1980, 1981), but no studies have used all ten 
norms. More worrying is it that replicated studies seldom use the same list of norms. 
Some prefer to aggregate the norms ‘directly’, and these studies most often use a list of items 
tapping various aspects of the relational syndrome into one construct. Others prefer to 
measure some of the proposed norms as separate constructs, and then treat them as originating 
from a common second-order factor.  
Although we (in this study) are primarily interested in the aggregated ‘relational syndrome’, 
we decided to use the rather extensive list of seven norms suggested by Kaufmann and Dant 
(1992). This allowed us to test some of the implications of the extensive work by Macneil. 
With our treatment of co-operative contract behavior through the manifestation of contract 
norms, we thus contribute to a better understanding of behavior within an exchange (Blois 
2002). 
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We found the instrument applicable for the IT sourcing context, and our empirical data 
confirmed a seven-dimension construct. However, two of the original dimensions (solidarity 
and role-integrity) were in conflict with the other dimensions, and the flexibility dimension 
did not prove to be properly reliable. Hence, our study does not completely support that 
contract norms should originate from a single underlying factor. 
Our findings are more in accordance with Macneil’s original work (1974, 1978, 1980, 1981). 
He argues that the common contract norms are many faceted, and there is ‘competition in and 
between some of the norms’. We found two underlying factors in our empirical material, and 
the two correlate negatively with each other. Hence, we provide some empirical support for 
Macneil’s ‘competing’ norms. 
It is also important that we have treated all contract relationships as being both co-operative 
(relational) and competitive (discrete). There will only be a relative difference in degree, from 
relatively competitive (discrete) to relatively co-operative (relational).  
Throughout the dissertation, we have used co-operative contract relationships as our 
interpretation of relational, complex and intertwined contractual relations as described by 
Macneil (1980, 1981, 1985, 2000, 2001). We do not intend to clarify the original work, but 
we found substantive evidence that the contract norms in fact can be used to measure co-
operative contract behavior. This seems to be totally in line with Macneil’s own work 
(Campbell 2001), and most importantly, it gives an intuitive meaning to people involved in 
contract relationships. 
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7.2.4 Theoretical Summary. 
We found that detailed specifications have different effects on co-operation in the 
relationship. Requirement specifications may function as a complement while performance 
specifications most certainly will function as a supplement to relational governance. If the 
parties seek co-operation, then there are limits to using formal contract as a mechanism to 
ensure that expectations are realized.  
We found, that measurements and penalties are the most discrete mechanisms and there is a 
real danger in over-specifying performance measures and penalty clauses. This might 
seriously hamper necessary co-operation. 
We also found that co-operation probably is a result of ‘learned behavior’, and that lasting 
contractual relations lead to better co-operation between the parties. 
We further found that environmental uncertainty will render the exchange to ‘flee’ to the 
short-term market transaction, and that behavioral uncertainty is better treated and mitigated 
in close learning relationships. 
 
7.3 Managerial Implications  
The conventional ‘wisdom’, common ‘folklore’ and managerial advice found in the IT 
sourcing literature prior to this study, is to use complex and detailed contracts with specific 
measurements tied back to penalties for non-performance (Lacity and Willcocks 2001). Never 
sign an incomplete contract, use detailed service level agreements, and use penalties for non-
performance.  
 129 
   
This study is primarily descriptive, and we cannot give any causal explanations. Our findings 
are only possible, not necessary effects. However, it seems proper to counter this advice.  
First, it will be advantageous to specify requirements as thorough as possible.  The parties 
should invest much time and resources to negotiate and specify complex and detailed 
requirements for the ‘scope of work’. This will enable both parties to gain an understanding of 
the required services and start the process of ‘gap filling’. This might enhance the co-
operative contract behavior in the IT sourcing relationship, which in turn might increase the 
size of the pie. Hence, we support the advice: “the negotiations should be oriented to learning 
about one another and encouraging one another to spell out one’s assumptions and 
expectations more fully” (Cannon et al. 2000: 192). 
Second, and most importantly, measurement and specificity combined with penalties for non-
performance are very powerful discrete contract mechanisms. In fact, they are so powerful 
that they effectively promote competition between the parties in IT sourcing relationships. No 
wonder these mechanisms are so popular, they actually work!  
Detailed and specific measurement regimes with economic consequences will draw attention 
towards fulfilling performance measures and avoiding economic loss incurred by penalties. 
Such contract regimes might seriously hamper development of mutual co-operation. The 
client gets exactly what he has specified – nothing more, and (hopefully) nothing less. The 
parties will tend to focus on these actions with a short-term attention on fulfilling obligations 
and dividing burdens according to the contract. They will treat the whole sourcing venture as 
a zero-sum-competition where the objective is to get more for yourself than your ‘partner’.  
At best this will limit necessary co-operation, restrain adaptable efforts to increase the pie, 
and might lead to less value. At worst it is directly counter-productive and will erode value 
through endless warlike fighting. These contract mechanisms should be used with utterly 
 130 
   
caution, and they should be kept for work in (the rare) situations where the parties are capable 
of specifying exactly what to be done and how to achieve this.  Hence, we agree with Cannon 
et al. (2000): “detailed contracts seem to be effective in more certain transactional 
environments”.  
Third, we found that both durable contract relationships and complexity promote co-operative 
contract behavior. When these are combined, the parties need to invest time and efforts to 
learn. So, our advice is that the parties deliberately plan and signal for long-term contracts as 
complexity builds up. This might invite the parties to invest in the relationship for the benefit 
of both. 
We do not argue for harmless and ‘flimsy’ relationships without any purpose, we only advice 
the parties to be farsighted. The essence of TCE is that governance should be tailored to fit the 
sourcing situation at hand, and relational contract theory adds with a detailed description of 
contract behavior. If the parties learn this lesson (Poppo and Lacity 2002), then they might 
add value through effective contract relationships based on proper contract behavior. 
We suggest that the parties in the initial phase of a relationship do their utmost to develop a 
common understanding of the required services. At first, there should be a focus on critical 
and important deliverables, the ‘bare minimum’. Measurement regimes and price mechanisms 
should be easy to understand and accepted by both parties. As long as co-operation enfolds, 
trust will build up, and the parties might seek to introduce more detailed service level 
agreements and measurement regimes. These should still be developed in close co-operation 
so that none are held accountable unless the reason and effect are agreed and accepted.  
If we allow ourselves to sum up, we would suggest that companies: Never sign a detailed 
contract with someone they do not trust! 
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7.4 Limitations and Future Research 
The results of our study must be interpreted in view of certain limitations, and in this section 
we address some of these together with suggestions for future research. 
First, the study is an investigation of IT sourcing and contracting, and we have used earlier 
literature accordingly. Due to the overwhelming literature that deals with contract, we chose 
to focus on two streams only: Transaction cost economics based on Williamson (1975, 1985, 
1996) and relational contract theory based on Macneil (1974, 1978, 1980). This combination 
is rather common, and we have explicitly used literature that comments on, and apply the 
work of Macneil. By doing so, we are humbly aware of the volume as well as the richness of 
the original work by Macneil. This richness is part of the reason for the extensive use of 
citations in section 2.3. We chose this approach for our theory development, because we 
(reluctantly) had to admit our own limitations. We were not able to sum up Macneil’s work 
better than his own ‘selected works’ edited by David Campbell (Macneil and Campbell 2001).  
We also acknowledge that the extensive TCE literature deserves more attention. Hence, our 
attempt at combining ‘Macneil and Williamson’, will probably only function as a (hopefully) 
promising beginning. We acknowledge the need to continue this work for years to come.  
Second, we framed a research question that is causal in nature. We are interested in actions 
and decisions that will lead to certain behavior. However, it was not possible to manipulate 
the possible causes, the contract mechanisms. Therefore we framed hypotheses as correlations 
that were tested with a cross-sectional design. 
Third, we have build on process models and treated IT sourcing as a contracting process.  The 
cross-sectional (correlation) design is static, and the time dimension is (almost) not present. 
The study would have benefited from a longitudinal or a time-series design, where we could 
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have given fuller attention to the time dimension. This would also increased our ability to 
discuss causality.   
Fourth, due to a rather limited sample size (N = 74), we could not use more powerful analytic 
techniques such as structural equation modeling. Therefore, we had to rely on a set of 
(exploratory) factor analyses for validation of the measures. On the other hand, multiple 
regression analysis with product terms is suitable for testing combined hypotheses with 
interaction effects (Jaccard et al. 1990). 
Further, we decided to test our hypotheses in one particular (and homogeneous) context, 
namely IT sourcing with a focus on one industrial purchaser of IT products and services. This 
deliberately improves internal validity due to control of extraneous sources of variation, and it 
is further combined with statistical control through inclusion of theoretical driven control 
variables. Since our study (in principle) is theory testing, internal validity should hold 
preference (Cook and Campbell 1979). 
However, internal validity is normally increased on the expense of external validity. It 
becomes difficult to generalize to different contexts. We tried to take care of this threat by 
deliberate sampling for heterogeneity within our context (Cook and Campbell 1979). Even 
though we are mostly interested in complex IT sourcing, we deliberately designed a study 
where we included a variety of IT contracts and contract relationships. This should increase 
our ability to generalize to other IT sourcing contexts. 
We are slightly more cautious to generalize outside this context, i.e. we are cautious about 
generalizing across (Cook and Campbell 1979). But as a general theory test, we feel confident 
to conclude its validity. Our constructs are generally applicable, and all the items used to 
measure these are held in a generally acceptable ‘contract language’.  
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Because “any general theory that holds for a large context, will equally hold for a subset of 
this context” (Cook and Campbell 1979), we feel quite confident to conclude that our findings 
may hold for any IT sourcing context. However, it is necessary with replicated studies in other 
settings before we can generalize to (across) other sourcing settings, or business relationships 
in general.  
As a final comment on internal and external validity, it is worth noting that we did not find 
evidence of advanced pricing models. According to relational theory (Macneil 1980), an 
important element of relational governance is to share risk and rewards, and we expected to 
find more sophisticated pricing models in use. The choice of one industrial buyer as a focal 
point, may explain this rather limited use of pricing models. It may be a result of contract 
strategy, and as such, we may even think of it as a control variable. The results on the use of 
specifications may be interpreted more clearly, because we hold the contract strategy 
constant, while including pricing in our analysis. Even if we should not exclude that more 
elaborate pricing mechanisms could be used to promote co-operative relationships, the 
inclusion of the rather limited models in our analysis, strengthen the internal validity of our 
findings.     
There are certain limitations associated with measurements and statistical analysis as well. 
First, we notice that the regression explains close to 50% of the variance in the dependent 
variable. Given the fact that there are numerous factors that might explain variance in social 
constructs, this is a rather impressive result. We should be slightly cautious. 
We measured all the constructs as perceptions held by one informant for each IT sourcing 
relationship. Understanding that “norms are shared expectations, there is a need to measure 
both sides of a dyad” (Ivens and Blois 2004: 253). However, the use of one key informant is 
rather common (Heide and John 1995). 
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It can further be questioned whether we measure actual or intended (wanted) contract 
behavior. Nor can we rule out the possibility of a ‘positive learning’, where the informants 
have interpreted co-operative norms as a measure of ‘how the contract is working’ and the 
contract mechanisms as ‘how the contract is specified’. Hence, even contract mechanisms 
might not measure actual but rather intended mechanisms. However, perceptions are in the 
‘eye of the beholder’ (Heide and John 1995), and we anticipate that behavior is more a result 
of perception than (objective) truth. 
Some of these problems could have been limited by the use of several informants from both 
sides of the dyad, possibly measuring different constructs. 
Another measurement problem is the items used to measure contract mechanisms. All the 
other constructs and measurements are adapted from earlier studies of marketing 
relationships, and they are comparable and valid. However, we did not identify any earlier 
application of a similar ‘micro-analytic’ approach to contract mechanisms. 
It was never our intention to invent new constructs, and therefore we did our utmost to use 
standard contracting language. It is difficult to tell whether we have succeeded with this 
approach or not. We believe that the difference between our study and for instance Poppo and 
Zenger (2002), is probably more of a ‘degree’ issue than a conceptual one. We have added a 
micro analytic dimension with our treatment of contract mechanisms, while the general 
investigation of the interrelationship between formal and informal governance remains the 
same. Hence, it could be a promising avenue for further research to investigate the 
applicability of this approach in other settings.  
Therefore, the story does not have to end here. We could have treated Service Level 
Agreements (SLA) much more thoroughly (Sturm et al. 2000; Goo et al. 2004). It is 
reasonable to think of such agreements as a contract in itself. Hence, we could have treated 
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SLAs as being made of smaller mechanisms that might have different effects on behavior. 
This could also be an interesting extension of our study.  
Further, in complex infrastructure technology like IT, there are several stakeholders. IT 
departments, purchasing specialists, managers, and users might hold different opinions about 
the importance and quality of any given sourcing situation. It is important to understand how 
these differ across the organizations, and it is important to go further into which competence 
(capability) the different organizational units should have (Lacity and Willcocks 2001).  
Finally, it would be interesting to look further into the role of Key Account Managers and the 
supplier organization at large. This would also open up for work on negotiation and supplier 
development. 
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APPENDIX 1  
ITEMS USED FOR CONSTRUCT MEASUREMENT 
This appendix gives a full description of items used to measure the theoretical constructs. 
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Contract behavior (contract norms): 
Relational focus (Response scale from (1) very bad description to (7) very good description)  
Focus_1  The contract relationship itself is more important than the individual 
transactions (the individual buy and sell operations) 
Focus_2  The outcome of individual transactions is less important than the contract 
relationship itself 
Focus_3  The outcome of individual transactions is more important than the contract 
relationship itself (Reverse scored) 
Focus_4  The contract relationship is only important to the extent that it facilitates the 
individual transactions (Reverse scored) 
Focus_5  The contract relationship is only important as long as each individual 
transaction produces a positive outcome for our organization (Reverse 
scored) 
Focus_6  Each new transaction is merely another event in an ongoing contract 
relationship 
Focus_7 The individual transactions are merely how the two organizations carry out 
this contract relationship 
 
Solidarity (Response scale from (1) very bad description to (7) very good description) 
Solidarity_1 This contract relationship could better be described as a series of one-shot 
deals, entered into one at a time, rather than a long-term co-operation 
(Reverse scored)  
Solidarity_2  Expectations of behavior reflect the strong spirit of fairness that exists in 
this contract relationship 
Solidarity_3  An important feature of this contract relationship is that neither party would 
do something damaging to the other party. 
Solidarity_4  It is expected that, if one party has information that would help the other 
organization in its business, such information will be provided. 
Solidarity_5  The other party is just another supplier/customer (Reverse scored, specific 
version) 
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Mutuality (Response scale from (1) very bad description to (7) very good description) 
Mutuality_1 Each transaction is expected to be reconciled completely and individually 
(Reverse scored) 
Mutuality_2 Our organization assures itself that the other party is acting as we expect by 
precisely monitoring its performance on a transaction-by-transaction basis 
(Reverse scored) 
Mutuality_3 We can accept unfavorable distribution of costs and benefits regarding 
isolated activities, as long as the distribution of costs and benefits for the 
total contract relationship is perceived as being fair. 
Mutuality_4 It is expected that all discrepancies in performance or payment, no matter 
how small, should be investigated (Reverse scored) 
 
Flexibility (Response scale from (1) very bad description to (7) very good description) 
Flexibility_1 The terms of an ongoing transaction are not renegotiable under any 
circumstances (Reverse scored) 
Flexibility_2 It is expected that changes in the terms of ongoing transactions would be 
allowed, if unanticipated events occur. 
Flexibility_3 The ability to react to a changing environment is provided by a flexible 
contract relationship that recognizes the importance of change within the 
confines of the relationship itself. 
Flexibility_4 It is expected that each party will live with the terms of each transaction, no 
matter what happens, until after its completion, when they can negotiate 
new terms for the next transaction (Reverse scored) 
Flexibility_5 The ability to react to a changing environment is provided by relatively 
short-term transaction agreements that do not bind the organizations 
together for a long time (Reverse scored) 
 
Role integrity (Response scale from (1) very bad description to (7) very good description) 
Role_integr_1 There are many expectations in this contract relationship that goes beyond 
the mere buying and selling of products. 
Role_integr_2 This contract relationship is a simple buy-and-sell arrangement and the roles 
the parties play are only those of individual buyer and seller (Reverse 
scored) 
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Role_integr_3 This contract relationship creates a complex web of expectations between us 
over all kinds of issues 
Role_integr_4 This contract relationship is extremely complicated, comprising many 
diverse expectations about each other's behavior. 
Role_integr_5 Both parties expect a great deal of each other in this contract relationship. 
Role_integr_6 This contract relationship involves expectations about many different areas 
of commercial activity beyond the buying and selling of products. 
Role_integr_7 The expectations about the behavior of both parties could be explained 
quickly to a third party (Reverse scored) 
 
Restraint of power (Response scale from (1) very bad description to (7) very good 
description) 
Restraint_1 It is expected that the more powerful party in this contract relationship 
should use whatever means necessary to get its own way (Reverse scored) 
Restraint_2 It is expected that each party, if necessary, should use what power they have 
over the other party (Reverse scored) 
Restraint_3 It is expected that each party in this contract relationship should limit the 
use of power they have over the other party. 
Restraint_4 Both parties would avoid putting maximum pressure on the other party in 
cases of conflicting interests, in order to preserve the overall atmosphere of 
the contract relationship. 
 
Conflict resolution (Response scale from (1) very bad description to (7) very good 
description) 
Conflict_res_1 Our organization's procedures for dealing with disputes with the 
supplier/customer are formalized, and it is expected that they should be 
followed rigidly (Reverse scored, specific) 
Conflict_res_2 The supplier’s/customer’s procedures for dealing with disputes with us are 
formalized, and it is expected that they should be followed rigidly (Reverse 
scored, specific) 
Conflict_res_3 Both parties expect conflicts to be solved in a cooperative manner without 
the use of third parties or the judicial system.  
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Conflict_res_4 In this contract relationship both parties contribute to solve conflicts in a 
constructive manner 
 
Contract mechanisms: 
Contract length and Contract options were measured in years.   
Requirement specifications (Response scale from (1) very bad description to (7) very good 
description) 
Requirement_1 The contract specifies ‘what’ to be delivered   
Requirement_2 The contract specifies ‘how’ the deliveries are to be conducted 
Requirement_3 The contract specifies functional requirements, with a focus on which 
results the customer wants to achieve by the delivery  
Requirement_4 The contract specifies technical requirements, with a focus on how the 
product is to function or the service is to be delivered 
Requirement_5 The contract specifies requirements for the products and services to be 
delivered, in great details  
Requirement_6 The contract specifies only general requirements for the products and 
services to be delivered (Reverse scored) 
Requirement_7 The contract specifies how changes of requirements for the delivery are to 
be handled  
 
Performance specifications (Response scale from (1) very bad description to (7) very good 
description) 
Performance_1 The contract specifies ‘hard’ performance measures (date, volume, 
availability etc.) 
Performance_2 The contract specifies ‘soft’ subjective measures (user satisfaction, business 
impact) 
Performance_3 The contract specifies performance measures in great details, through a 
Service Level Agreement (SLA) 
Performance_4 The contract specifies general requirements that are measured with key 
performance indicators, such as a Balanced Scorecard 
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Performance_5 The contract specifies how changes of performance measures are to be 
handled  
Performance_6 The contract specifies reporting procedures and procedures for monitoring 
of the contract 
Performance_7 The contract specifies meeting structures and arenas to discuss performance 
measures and possible deviations 
Performance_8 The contract specifies routines and procedures for escalation of critical 
events 
Performance_9 The contract specifies that performance shall be compared with other 
relevant contracts (’benchmarking’) 
 
Pricing (Response scale from (1) very bad description to (7) very good description) 
Price_1 The contract specifies that the products and services are to be delivered 
according to a fixed price, independent of actual time and materials 
Price_2 The contract specifies that the products and services are to be delivered 
according to fixed unit prices, so that the total price for the contract depends 
on actual time and materials
Price_3 The contract specifies that the products and services are to be delivered 
according to a price that covers the supplier’s documented costs plus a fixed 
percentage (cost plus, open book)  
Price_4 The contract specifies an estimated target price for the products and 
services, and deviations will be shared between the parties according to an 
agreed key. 
Price_5 The contract specifies how changes of pricing are to be handled  
Price_6 If the performance falls below the agreed levels for one period, the contract 
specifies a penalty to be paid by the supplier 
Price_7 If the performance is above the agreed levels for one period, the contract 
specifies a bonus to be paid by the customer 
Price_8 If the performance deviates from the agreed levels for one period, the 
contract specifies credit points saved for later determination of penalty or 
bonus 
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Environmental and Behavioral Uncertainty (Antecedents): 
Market Dynamics and Complexity  (Response scale from (1) very bad description to (7) 
very good description) 
Dynamism_1 Market prices for this type of IT products and services changes rapidly  
Dynamism_2 The underlying technology for this type of IT products and services evolves 
rapidly 
Dynamism_3 The underlying skills associated with this type of IT products and services 
changes rapidly 
Dynamism_4 It is very difficult to specify the exact demand (volume) for these IT 
products and services 
Complexity_1 It is very difficult to understand how this type of IT products and services 
functions  
Complexity_2 It is very difficult to specify exact requirements for this type of IT products 
and services  
Complexity_3 It is very difficult to evaluate the performance of this type of IT products 
and services 
Complexity_4 It is very difficult to evaluate the performance of the supplier in this contract 
objectively 
 
Control Variables: 
Relation specific investments (Response scale from (1) very bad description to (7) very good 
description) 
RSI_1 If we end this contract relationship, we would lose a lot of the investments 
we have made specifically for this contract. 
RSI_2 It would be difficult for us to recoup investments made specifically for this 
contract, if we end this contract relationship. 
RSI_3 If we end this contract relationship, we would have a lot of trouble 
redeploying personnel and equipment specifically allocated to this contract. 
RSI_4 If we end this contract relationship, we would be wasting a lot of knowledge 
that is specifically tailored to this contract 
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RSI_5 We have committed a lot of time and resources to the training and 
development of our personnel specifically for this contract 
RSI_6 We have committed a lot of time and resources to the training and 
development of the supplier’s personnel specifically for this contract 
RSI_7 We provide extensive user training in the products and services included in 
this contract 
RSI_8 We have committed a lot of time and resources to develop a satisfactory 
quality control system specifically for this contract 
RSI_9 It would be very costly to change to another supplier  
 
Contract importance (Response scale from (1) very bad description to (7) very good 
description) 
Importance_1 This is a very important IT contract for our company.   
Importance_2 We give this IT contract very high priority 
Importance_3 This IT contract contributes very much to the value creation in our business 
unit. 
Importance_4 This IT contract contributes very much to our company’s overall value 
creation 
 
Availability of alternatives (Response scale from (1) very bad description to (7) very good 
description) 
Alternatives_1 The supply market for this type of IT products and services is very 
competitive 
Alternatives_2 There are several other suppliers that could deliver this type of IT products 
and services  
Alternatives_3 This supplier is one of a few available suppliers for this type of IT products 
and services  
Alternatives_4 No other supplier of this type of IT products and services has similar 
capacity and capability as us  
Alternatives_5 This is the only supplier that could be used for this type of IT product and 
services 
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Contract age was calculated in years, as the time difference between contract commencement 
and the time for data collection. This was a proxy measure for stability and history. 
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APPENDIX 2  
QUESTIONNAIRE (IN NORWEGIAN) 
The questionnaire was used to collect data from informants in a large Norwegian company, 
and the complete questionnaire is provided in the original Norwegian version.  
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KONFIDENSIELT 
 
 
Spørreskjema 
 
Kjøp (”sourcing”) av IT-produkter og tjenester: En undersøkelse 
av kontrakter og samarbeid mellom kunde og leverandør 
 
Inngår i dr. gradsarbeid ved NHH. 
utført av Bjarte Ravndal, Høgskolen i Stavanger 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FYLLES UT AV KUNDE (IT ANS) 
 162 
   
Formål og gjennomføring av undersøkelsen 
Formelle kontrakter er sentrale når en organisasjon kjøper varer og tjenester fra en leverandør. 
De har en åpenbar juridisk side som skal beskytte partenes interesser i tilfelle konflikt. Men 
kontraktene er også sentrale planleggingsdokumenter som skal regulere og forklare hva 
kunden skal få levert fra sin leverandør, og til hvilken pris. 
 Når partene gjennomfører leveransene knyttet til kontrakten, vil det etter hvert avtegne seg et 
mønster for hvordan samarbeidet i kontraktsforholdet arter seg. Selve kontrakten kan ha 
avgjørende betydning for dette, og formålet i denne undersøkelsen er å belyse hvordan 
sentrale deler av kontrakten påvirker samarbeidet i kontraktsforholdet mellom kjøper 
og leverandør. 
Undersøkelsen tar utgangspunkt i en stor kjøper (Statoil) av IT-relaterte varer og tjenester, og 
hvert spørreskjema skal dekke en kontrakt som danner grunnlag for ett kontraktsforhold.   
Vi vil kartlegge både kjøpers og selgers oppfatning av kontrakten og samarbeidet i 
kontraktsforholdet, og de fleste spørsmålene er utformet som påstander som gir en god eller 
dårlig beskrivelse av denne kontrakten og dette kontraktsforholdet.  
Resultatene av undersøkelsen vil stå og falle på oppriktige og ærlige svar, og vi ber deg derfor 
ta stilling til det som passer best med din oppfatning av spørsmålene og påstandene.  
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Generell informasjon om denne kontrakten og dette 
kontraktsforholdet
 
Kundens (Statoil) kontraktsnummer:     Dato:  
 
Leverandør: 
Adresse: 
 
Kontaktperson hos leverandør som er best i stand til å svare på spørsmål angående denne 
kontrakten og dette kontraktsforholdet: 
Navn på person som svarer (informant):  
Beskriv din rolle i dette kontraktsforholdet: 
 
Hvor lenge har du hatt denne rollen? 
Beskriv kortfattet de IT produkter og tjenester som leveres under denne kontrakten: 
 
 
Hvem er ansvarlig eier av kontrakten i Statoil sitt forretningsområde (IT)? 
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Eksterne forhold knyttet til marked og teknologi   
Det er mange forhold som påvirker inngåelse og gjennomføring av IT-kontrakter. 
Teknologien kan være enkel eller kompleks, det kan være varierende grad av endringer i 
teknologi og markedspriser i kontraktsperioden. Slike forhold vil ha stor betydning for hvilke 
mekanismer som velges av partene, og det vil påvirke risiko og usikkerhet knyttet til 
kontrakten. 
 I hvilken grad mener du følgende utsagn gir en god eller dårlig beskrivelse av dynamikk og 
kompleksitet knyttet til marked og teknologi for denne IT-kontrakten?  
 
1. 
 
Dynamikk og kompleksitet 
Svært                      Svært 
Dårlig                         God  
Beskrivelse       Beskrivelse
 
1 
 
Prisene for disse IT-produktene og tjenestene 
endres svært ofte  
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
2 
 
Den underliggende teknologien knyttet til disse 
IT-produktene og tjenestene endres svært ofte 
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
3 
 
Den underliggende ferdigheten/kompetansen 
knyttet til disse IT-produktene og tjenestene 
endres svært ofte 
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
4 
 
Det er svært vanskelig å spesifisere det 
eksakte behovet (volumet) for disse IT-
produktene og tjenestene 
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
5 
 
Det er svært vanskelig å forstå hvordan disse 
IT-produktene og tjenestene fungerer  
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
6 
 
Det er svært vanskelig å spesifisere eksakte 
krav til disse IT-produktene og tjenestene   
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
7 
 
Det er svært vanskelig å evaluere ytelsen til 
disse IT-produktene og tjenestene 
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
8 
 
Det er svært vanskelig å evaluere 
leverandørens ytelse i denne kontrakten 
objektivt 
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
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Kontraktsmekanismer   
Alle kontrakter består av et sentralt dokument med generelle juridiske forhold, samt et sett av 
bilag som beskriver ulike forhold ved kontrakten. I denne undersøkelsen betegner  
kontraktsmekanismer det som er skrevet i kontrakten og kontraktens bilag.  
I denne undersøkelsen er vi opptatt av kontrakt som planleggingsdokument og grunnlag for 
samarbeidet om leveransen. Derfor fokuserer vi kun på noen få og sentrale forhold, og vi vil 
kartlegge hvordan disse beskrives i kontrakten.  
 
2. Kontraktslengde 
(1) Denne kontrakten har en varighet på  _____ år/mnd, fra og med  ________(dato)  
(2) Denne kontrakten inkluderer _______ (antall) opsjonsperioder, hver på __________ 
(år/mnd) 
(3a) Denne kontrakten inneholder klausuler for tidlig terminering: (Ja/Nei).  
(3b) Hvis ja, hvem kan utøve denne rettigheten (kunden, leverandøren, begge)?  
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Kontraktens spesifikasjon av krav, ytelsesmåling og pris. 
I tillegg til kontraktslengde, må partene beskrive hva som skal leveres under kontrakten, 
hvordan leveransen skal måles og verifiseres, og til hvilken pris for kunden. Disse forholdene 
beskrives vanligvis i forskjellige bilag, og vi ber deg ta stilling til et sett av utsagn som 
beskriver mulige måter å gjøre dette på. 
 
I hvilken grad mener du følgende utsagn gir en god eller dårlig beskrivelse av hvordan disse 
forhold er spesifisert i denne IT-kontrakten?  
 
3. 
 
Spesifikasjon av krav  
 
Svært                        Svært 
Dårlig                         God 
Beskrivelse       Beskrivelse
 
1 
 
Kontrakten spesifiserer ‘hva’ som skal leveres 
  
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
2 
 
Kontrakten spesifiserer ‘hvordan’ leveransen 
skal foregå  
 
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
3 
 
Kontrakten spesifiserer funksjonelle krav, med 
vekt på hvilke resultater kjøper ønsker å oppnå 
med leveransen 
  
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
4 
 
Kontrakten spesifiserer tekniske krav, med vekt 
på hvordan varen skal fungere eller tjenesten 
skal utføres 
 
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
5 
 
Kontrakten spesifiserer detaljerte og utfyllende 
krav til de produktene og tjenestene som skal 
leveres   
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
6 
 
Kontrakten spesifiserer kun generelle krav til 
produktene og tjenestene som skal leveres  
 
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
7 
 
Kontrakten spesifiserer hvordan endringer av 
krav til leveransen skal håndteres 
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
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4. 
 
Spesifikasjon av ytelsesmåling  
 
Svært                       Svært 
Dårlig                         God  
Beskrivelse       Beskrivelse
 
1 
 
Kontrakten spesifiserer at leveransen skal 
måles i forhold til eksakte ‘harde’ ytelsesmål 
(dato, mengde, tilgjengelighet etc.)  
 
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
2 
 
Kontrakten spesifiserer at leveransen skal 
måles i forhold til subjektive ‘myke’ mål (bruker 
tilfredshet, betydning for organisasjonen etc.)  
 
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
3 
 
Kontrakten spesifiserer svært detaljerte og 
utfyllende  ytelsesmål gjennom en avtale om 
tjenestekvalitet (Servisenivåavtale/SLA)  
 
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
4 
 
Kontrakten spesifiserer generelle krav som 
måles gjennom et fåtall nøkkelindikatorer 
(KPI), for eksempel bruk av balansert målekort 
  
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
5 
 
Kontrakten spesifiserer hvordan endringer av 
ytelsesmål skal håndteres  
 
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
6 
 
Kontrakten spesifiserer rapporteringsrutiner og 
prosedyrer for oppfølging av kontrakten  
 
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
7 
 
Kontrakten spesifiserer  møtestrukturer og 
arenaer for å diskutere gjennomføringen og 
eventuelle avvik fra spesifisert ytelse  
 
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
8 
 
Kontrakten spesifiserer rutiner og prosedyrer 
for eskalering av kritiske hendelser 
 
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
9 
 
Kontrakten spesifiserer at ytelsen skal 
sammenlignes med relevante andre bedrifter 
(’benchmarking’)  
 
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
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5. 
 
Spesifikasjon av pris 
 
Svært                      Svært 
Dårlig                         God  
Beskrivelse       Beskrivelse
 
1 
 
Kontrakten spesifiserer at produktene og 
tjenestene skal leveres til fast avtalt pris, 
uavhengig av faktisk mengde av timer og 
materialer  
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
2 
 
Kontrakten spesifiserer at produktene og 
tjenestene skal leveres til fast avtalte 
enhetspriser, slik at total pris for kontrakten 
avhenger av faktisk mengde av timer og 
materialer (time-and-materials)  
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
3 
 
Kontrakten spesifiserer at produktene og 
tjenestene skal leveres til en pris som dekker 
leverandørens dokumenterte kostnader, og 
som gir et fast avtalt påslag (kost-pluss, åpen 
bok)  
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
5 
 
Kontrakten spesifiserer et måltall (estimert) 
som prisen er basert på, og eventuelle avvik 
fordeles mellom partene etter en avtalt nøkkel  
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
5 
 
Kontrakten spesifiserer hvordan endringer av 
pris skal håndteres  
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
6 
 
Hvis ytelsen faller under det avtalte nivået for 
en periode, så spesifiserer kontrakten en straff 
som skal betales av leverandør (avkortet 
betaling)  
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
7 
 
Hvis ytelsen er bedre enn det avtalte nivået for 
en periode, så spesifiserer kontrakten en 
bonus som skal betales av kunden (utvidet 
betaling) 
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
8 
 
Hvis ytelsen avviker fra det avtalte nivået for en 
periode, så spesifiserer kontrakten at disse 
avvikene kan samles opp som ’poeng’ til en 
seinere vurdering av straff eller bonus 
(akkumulert) 
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
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Samarbeidet i kontraktsforholdet 
Kontrakter gjennomføres i et samarbeid mellom kunde og leverandør, og i de fleste tilfeller 
vil et kontraktsforhold bestå av mange enkeltleveranser. Disse avsluttes ved at leverandøren 
utfører tjenesten eller leverer produktet, og kunden betaler for dette. I sum vil disse avsluttede 
enkeltleveransene utgjøre kontraktsforholdet. For å kartlegge hvordan samarbeidet i dette 
kontraktsforholdet utfolder seg, har vi laget et sett av beskrivende påstander som du skal ta 
stilling til. 
 
I hvilken grad mener du følgende utsagn gir en god eller dårlig beskrivelse av samarbeidet i 
dette kontraktsforholdet? 
 
6. 
 
Fokus i kontraktsforholdet 
Svært                       Svært 
Dårlig                         God 
Beskrivelse       Beskrivelse
 
1 
 
Selve kontraktsforholdet er viktigere enn de 
individuelle enkeltleveransene (den enkelte 
kjøp-salg-transaksjonen)  
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
2 
 
Utfallet av enkeltleveransene er mindre viktige 
enn selve kontraktsforholdet    
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
3 
 
Utfallet av enkeltleveransene er viktigere enn 
selve  kontraktsforholdet  
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
4 
 
Kontraktsforholdet er viktig kun fordi det 
underbygger de individuelle enkeltleveransene  
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
5 
 
Kontraktsforholdet er kun viktig så lenge hver 
individuell enkeltleveranse gir et positivt 
resultat for vår organisasjon  
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
6 
 
Hver enkeltleveranse er bare ’nok en hendelse’ 
i et pågående kontraktsforhold  
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
7 
 
Hver enkeltleveranse er kun et uttrykk for 
hvordan de to organisasjonene gjennomfører 
dette kontraktsforholdet  
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
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7. 
 
Solidaritet i kontraktsforholdet 
Svært                       Svært 
Dårlig                         God  
Beskrivelse       Beskrivelse
 
1 
 
Dette kontraktsforholdet kan beskrives som en 
serie enkeltleveranser , mer enn et langvarig 
samarbeidsforhold  
 
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
2 
 
Forventninger om oppførsel gjenspeiler en 
sterk sans for rettferdighet i kontraktsforholdet 
 
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
3 
 
Et kjennetegn ved dette  kontraktsforholdet er 
at ingen av partene ville gjøre noe som kan 
skade motparten 
 
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
4 
 
Det er en forventning hos partene at dersom 
den ene har informasjon som kan hjelpe 
motparten i sin forretningsmessige virksomhet, 
så vil slik informasjon bli overført  
 
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
5 
 
Vi ser på leverandøren som kun en av mange 
leverandører  
 
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
8. 
 
Fellesskap i kontraktsforholdet 
Svært                       Svært 
Dårlig                         God 
Beskrivelse       Beskrivelse
 
1 
 
Det forventes at hver enkeltleveranse blir 
gjennomført fullt ut og uavhengig av andre 
leveranser   
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
2 
 
Vi forsikrer oss om at motparten opptrer som 
forventet ved nøye overvåkning av hva som blir 
gjort for hver enkeltleveranse 
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
3 
 
Når det gjelder fordeling av kostnader og 
inntekter, aksepterer vi forskjeller for 
enkeltleveranser, så lenge fordelingen for 
kontraktsforholdet totalt sett oppleves som 
rettferdig 
 
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
4 
 
Det er underforstått at alle avvik i ytelse eller 
økonomisk oppgjør, uansett størrelse, bør 
undersøkes for å få klarhet i forholdet 
 
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
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9. 
 
Fleksibilitet i kontraktsforholdet 
Svært                       Svært 
Dårlig                         God 
Beskrivelse       Beskrivelse
 
1 
 
Betingelsene for pågående enkeltleveranser er 
ikke gjenstand for forhandlinger under noen 
omstendigheter   
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
2 
 
Det forventes at betingelsene for pågående 
enkeltleveranser kan endres dersom 
utenforliggende forhold tilsier dette 
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
3 
 
Behovet for å tilpasse seg endrede 
utenforliggende forhold er tilfredstilt gjennom et 
fleksibelt kontraktsforhold, som vektlegger 
betydningen av forandringer innenfor rammen 
av dette  
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
4 
 
Begge parter forventer at en må forholde seg til 
de fastsatte vilkår for enkeltleveranser, uansett 
hva som måtte skje, til etter at leveransen er 
fullført og en eventuelt kan forhandle nye 
betingelser for neste leveranse 
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
5 
 
Behovet for å kunne tilpasse seg endrede 
utenforliggende forhold er ivaretatt ved korte 
kontraktsperioder, som ikke binder partene i for 
lang tid av gangen  
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
10. 
 
Roller i kontraktsforholdet 
Svært                       Svært 
Dårlig                         God 
Beskrivelse       Beskrivelse
 
1 
 
Det eksisterer mange forventninger i dette 
kontraktsforholdet som går utover det å kjøpe 
og selge produkter  
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
2 
 
Dette kontraktsforholdet er et rent kjøper- og 
selger forhold, og som sådan har de to 
organisasjonene ingen funksjon for motparten 
utover rollen som kjøper og selger  
 
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
3 
 
Dette kontraktsforholdet er forbundet med 
mange forventninger som går utover levering 
av og oppgjør for produktene  
 
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
4 
 
Dette kontraktsforholdet er svært komplisert, 
og sammensatt av ulike forventninger om 
hverandres atferd  
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
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5 
 
Begge parter har mange og sammensatte 
forventninger til motparten  
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
6 
 
I dette kontraktsforholdet er det forventninger 
knyttet til mange andre kommersielle aktiviteter 
enn kun kjøp og salg  
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
7 
 
De forventninger som partene har til hverandre 
kan forklares fort og enkelt til en 
utenforstående tredjepart  
 
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
11. 
 
Bruk av makt i kontraktsforholdet 
Svært                       Svært 
Dårlig                         God 
Beskrivelse       Beskrivelse
 
1 
 
Det forventes at den sterkeste parten i dette 
kontraktsforholdet om nødvendig vil bruke sin 
sterke stilling for alt hva den er verdt for å få 
det som den vil   
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
2 
 
Det forventes at hver av partene i dette 
kontraktsforholdet om nødvendig vil bruke all 
den makten de har vis a vis motparten  
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
3 
 
Det forventes at hver av partene i dette 
kontraktsforholdet vil avstå fra å bruke all den 
makt en måtte ha vis a vis motparten  
   
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
4 
 
Av hensyn til den generelle atmosfæren i 
kontraktsforholdet, vil både vi og motparten 
unnlate å legge maksimalt press på motparten 
i enkeltsaker hvor det oppstår uenighet  
 
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
12. 
 
Håndtering av konflikt i kontraktsforholdet 
Svært                       Svært 
Dårlig                         God 
Beskrivelse       Beskrivelse
 
1 
 
De prosedyrer vi har for å håndtere eventuelle 
konflikter med leverandøren er svært formelle, 
og vi forventer at vi stort sett vil følge dem til 
punkt og prikke dersom slike situasjoner skulle 
oppstå  
 
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
2 
 
De prosedyrer leverandøren har for å håndtere 
eventuelle konflikter med oss er svært formelle, 
og vi forventer at de stort sett vil følge dem til 
punkt og prikke dersom slike situasjoner skulle 
oppstå 
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
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3 
 
Begge parter er innstilt på at konflikter skal 
løses i fellesskap og ikke ved bruk av megler 
eller rettsapparatet  
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
4 
 
I dette kontraktsforholdet løses konflikter ved at 
begge parter bidrar på en konstruktiv måte  
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
 
Resultater og utfall av kontraktsforholdet 
Kontrakter inngås for at begge parter skal skape resultater, hver for seg og sammen. Disse kan 
være tilfredstillende for en eller begge parter, og det antas at det er av avgjørende betydning 
for forholdet hvordan dette oppleves. I denne delen er vi derfor opptatt av en vurdering 
knyttet til opplevde kostnader forbundet med gjennomføring av kontrakten og i hvor stor grad 
partene er fornøyd med utfallet. 
I hvilken grad mener du følgende utsagn gir en god eller dårlig beskrivelse av slike forhold 
knyttet til denne IT-kontrakten og dette kontraktsforholdet?    
 
13. 
 
Transaksjonskostnader  
Svært                       Svært 
Dårlig                         God 
Beskrivelse       Beskrivelse
 
1 
 
Det var svært tidkrevende og vanskelig å 
forhandle om inngåelsen av denne kontrakten 
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
2 
 
Vårt firma bruker svært mye tid og ressurser på 
å koordinere og kontrollere leveransene knyttet 
til denne kontrakten  
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
3 
 
Det er svært tidkrevende og vanskelig å bli 
enige med motparten om hva som faktisk er 
inkludert i denne kontrakten (hvilke ytelser til 
hvilke priser)  
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
4 
 
Det er svært tidkrevende og vanskelig å justere 
denne kontrakten (reforhandle spesifikasjoner 
eller priser og betalingsbetingelser) 
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
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14. 
 
Tilfredshet med dette kontraktsforholdet 
Svært                       Svært 
Dårlig                         God 
Beskrivelse       Beskrivelse
 
1 
 
Alt i alt så er vi svært godt fornøyd med dette 
kontraktsforholdet 
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
2 
 
Vi er svært godt fornøyd med hva motparten 
gjør for oss i dette kontraktsforholdet 
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
3 
 
Vi er svært godt fornøyd med motpartens 
behandling av problemer og spørsmål knyttet 
til denne kontrakten   
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
4 
 
Vi er svært godt fornøyd med vårt 
kommersielle resultat (kostnad, pris) fra denne 
kontrakten  
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
5 
 
Hvis vi skulle gjøre dette om igjen, så ville vi 
fortsatt inngått denne kontrakten  
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
Andre forhold 
Det er også andre forhold som kan påvirke valg av kontraktsmekanismer, og som kan spille 
avgjørende betydning for hvordan samarbeidet knyttet til kontrakten utvikler seg. I denne 
avsluttende delen vil vi kartlegge noen av disse forholdene. 
I hvilken grad mener du følgende utsagn gir en god eller dårlig beskrivelse av forhold knyttet 
til denne IT-kontrakten og dette kontraktsforholdet? 
 
 
15. 
 
Spesifikke investeringer i 
kontraktsforholdet 
Svært                       Svært 
Dårlig                         God 
Beskrivelse       Beskrivelse
 
1 
 
Hvis vi avslutter dette kontraktsforholdet, så vil 
vi miste mye av de investeringene som er gjort 
spesifikt for kontrakten  
 
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
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2 
 
Det vil være vanskelig å tjene inn de 
investeringene som er gjort spesifikt for denne 
kontrakten dersom vi avslutter dette 
kontraktsforholdet  
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
3 
 
Hvis vi avslutter dette kontraktsforholdet, så vil 
det være vanskelig å omdisponere personell 
og utstyr som er knyttet spesifikt til kontrakten  
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
4 
 
Hvis vi avslutter dette kontraktsforholdet, så vil 
vi kaste bort mye kunnskap som er knyttet 
spesifikt til denne kontrakten 
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
5 
 
Vi har brukt mye tid og ressurser på å utvikle 
eget personell knyttet spesifikt til denne 
kontrakten 
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
6 
 
Vi har brukt mye tid og ressurser på å utvikle 
personell hos vår leverandør som er spesifikt 
knyttet til denne kontrakten  
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
7 
 
Vi gir utstrakt brukeropplæring i de produkter 
og tjenester som er knyttet til denne kontrakten
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
8 
 
Vi har brukt mye tid og ressurser på å utvikle et 
oppfølgings- og rapporteringssystem spesifikt 
for denne kontrakten  
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
9 
 
Det vil bli svært kostbart for oss å skifte til en 
annen leverandør 
 
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
16. 
 
Stabilitet og historikk i kontraktsforholdet 
Svært                       Svært 
Dårlig                         God  
Beskrivelse       Beskrivelse
 
1 
 
Leverandørens nøkkelpersonell har vært 
tilknyttet kontrakten i lang tid  
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
2 
 
Kundens nøkkelpersonell har vært tilknyttet 
kontrakten i lang tid  
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
3 
 
Det har vært store endringer i leverandørens 
nøkkelpersonell  
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
4 
 
Det har vært store endringer i kundens 
nøkkelpersonell  
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
5 
 
Denne kontrakten er en av flere pågående 
kontrakter mellom våre to organisasjoner  
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
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6 
 
Før vi inngikk denne kontrakten, hadde vi en 
lang historie av kontrakter mellom våre to 
organisasjoner  
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
17. 
 
Kontraktens betydning for partene 
Svært                       Svært 
Dårlig                         God  
Beskrivelse       Beskrivelse
 
1 
 
Dette er en svært viktig IT-kontrakt for vår 
bedrift   
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
2 
 
Denne IT-kontrakten har svært høy prioritet 
hos oss  
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
3 
 
Denne IT-kontrakten bidrar mye til vårt bidrag 
til bedriftens verdiskapning 
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
4 
 
Denne IT-kontrakten bidrar mye til vår bedrifts 
verdiskapning  
 
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
18. 
 
Partenes vurdering av alternativer 
Svært                       Svært 
Dårlig                         God  
Beskrivelse       Beskrivelse
 
1 
 
Det er svært stor konkurranse i markedet for 
disse IT-produktene og tjenestene  
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
2 
 
Det er flere andre leverandører som kan levere 
tilsvarende IT-produkter og tjenester  
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
3 
 
Denne leverandøren er en blant svært få 
aktuelle leverandører av tilsvarende IT-
produkter og tjenester  
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
4 
 
Det er ikke noen andre leverandører av slike 
IT-produkter og tjenester med tilsvarende 
kapasitet og kompetanse  
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
 
5 
 
Denne leverandøren er den eneste vi kan 
bruke for disse IT-produktene og tjenestene 
 
 
   1    2    3    4    5    6    7  
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Avsluttende spørsmål  
19. Hvor mange leverandører ble invitert til å gi tilbud på denne kontrakten? 
Vi inviterte _______  (antall) leverandører til å gi tilbud 
20. Endelig kontrakt ble inngått etter 
a) Åpen konkurranse basert på auksjonsprinsipper 
b) Lukket anbud uten forhandlinger 
c) Lukket anbud med forhandlinger 
d) Direkte forhandlinger uten forutgående anbud 
21. Hvor mange leverandører bruker dere for denne type IT-produkter og tjenester? 
Vi bruker ________ (antall) leverandører 
22. Hvilken fase av kontraktsforholdet er denne kontrakten i akkurat nå? 
a) Kontrakten er fortsatt i en relativt tidlig oppstartsfase 
b) Kontrakten er i ordinær driftsfase 
c) Kontrakten er i avslutningsfasen 
d) Vi forhandler med motparten om en forlengelse av kontrakten 
23. Hvilken type aktør er denne leverandøren? 
a) Internasjonal, nasjonal, eller lokal aktør? 
b) Nisjepreget eller generell? 
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Takk for hjelpen!! 
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APPENDIX 3  
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
This appendix provides descriptive statistics for all items used to measure the theoretical 
constructs used in our study. Note that the questionnaire provides a richer set of data. 
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Descriptive Statistics: Contract behavior (Contract norms)
74 1,00 7,00 3,32 1,59 ,54 -,11
74 1,00 5,00 2,72 1,21 ,33 -,80
74 1,00 7,00 3,20 1,31 ,81 ,91
74 1,00 6,00 2,95 1,25 ,28 -,33
74 1,00 7,00 3,70 1,59 ,44 -,49
74 1,00 7,00 4,43 1,44 -,30 -,48
74 1,00 7,00 4,38 1,37 -,26 -,29
73 1,00 7,00 4,25 1,67 -,40 -,91
74 1,00 7,00 4,92 1,29 -1,06 1,79
74 2,00 7,00 5,14 1,23 -,81 ,53
74 1,00 7,00 4,50 1,69 -,55 -,50
74 1,00 6,00 3,39 1,52 -,10 -1,21
74 1,00 7,00 2,66 1,52 1,03 ,35
71 1,00 7,00 3,15 1,39 ,83 ,96
71 1,00 7,00 3,37 1,63 ,13 -1,03
74 1,00 7,00 2,88 1,53 1,19 1,23
74 1,00 7,00 4,14 1,56 -,21 -1,07
74 1,00 7,00 4,46 1,31 -,54 -,10
74 1,00 7,00 4,12 1,55 -,50 -,37
74 1,00 7,00 3,28 1,31 ,13 -,09
74 2,00 7,00 5,03 1,60 -,45 -1,01
74 1,00 7,00 3,80 1,67 -,01 -1,03
74 1,00 7,00 3,88 1,78 ,01 -1,36
74 1,00 7,00 3,66 1,77 ,04 -1,19
74 1,00 7,00 3,27 1,41 ,14 -,41
74 1,00 6,00 3,54 1,39 -,04 -,63
74 1,00 6,00 3,19 1,36 ,28 -,49
74 1,00 7,00 3,23 1,38 ,63 ,32
74 1,00 7,00 4,11 1,72 ,01 -1,20
74 1,00 7,00 4,30 1,71 -,29 -1,16
74 1,00 6,00 3,99 1,57 -,33 -1,09
74 1,00 6,00 4,20 1,41 -,49 -,71
74 1,00 7,00 3,81 1,72 ,20 -,98
74 1,00 7,00 4,09 1,59 -,10 -,88
74 3,00 7,00 5,91 ,81 -1,23 2,32
74 3,00 7,00 5,78 ,98 -1,33 1,47
67
Focus_1
Focus_2
Focus_3r
Focus_4r
Focus_5r
Focus_6
Focus_7
Solidarity_1r
Solidarity_2
Solidarity_3
Solidarity_4
Solidarity_5r
Mutuality_1r
Mutuality_2r
Mutuality_3
Mutuality_4r
Flexibility_1r
Flexibility_2
Flexibility_3
Flexibility_4r
Flexibility_5r
Role_integr_1
Role_integr_2r
Role_integr_3
Role_integr_4
Role_integr_5
Role_integr_6
Role_integr_7r
Restraint_1r
Restraint_2r
Restraint_3
Restraint_4
Conflict_res_1r
Conflict_res_2r
Conflict_res_3
Conflict_res_4
Valid N
(listwise)
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std.
i i
Skewness Kurtosis
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Descriptive Statistics: Contract Mechanisms and Uncertainty (Antecedents)
74 ,25 10,00 3,98 3,14 1,02 -,22
74 ,00 10,00 3,91 4,05 ,70 -1,24
74 1,00 7,00 5,65 1,20 -1,69 3,95
74 2,00 7,00 5,45 1,09 -1,04 1,56
74 1,00 7,00 4,19 1,80 -,48 -,94
74 1,00 33,00 4,39 3,80 5,94 45,00
74 1,00 7,00 3,76 1,73 ,03 -,86
74 1,00 7,00 3,88 1,71 ,28 -,94
74 1,00 7,00 4,20 1,72 -,59 -,68
74 1,00 7,00 3,72 1,99 -,07 -1,38
74 1,00 7,00 2,34 1,39 1,17 1,22
74 1,00 7,00 2,61 1,97 ,94 -,51
74 1,00 5,00 1,47 ,85 2,51 7,39
74 1,00 7,00 2,39 1,73 1,15 ,20
74 1,00 7,00 3,78 1,93 -,02 -1,34
74 1,00 7,00 3,47 2,04 ,16 -1,44
74 1,00 7,00 3,36 2,05 ,30 -1,37
74 1,00 7,00 1,51 1,21 3,04 9,54
74 1,00 7,00 3,11 2,26 ,59 -1,33
74 1,00 7,00 4,74 2,16 -,60 -1,20
74 1,00 6,00 1,28 ,85 4,05 17,79
74 1,00 6,00 1,32 ,85 3,37 13,46
74 1,00 7,00 5,03 1,99 -1,18 ,06
74 1,00 7,00 2,55 2,25 ,93 -,91
74 1,00 7,00 1,47 1,48 3,10 8,34
74 1,00 6,00 1,11 ,61 7,40 58,72
74 -6,00 6,00 -1,64 4,04 ,57 -1,02
73 1,00 7,00 3,73 1,73 ,17 -1,20
73 1,00 6,00 3,62 1,40 ,00 -1,00
73 1,00 6,00 3,42 1,33 ,15 -,86
73 1,00 7,00 3,48 1,47 ,24 -,61
73 1,00 6,00 2,73 1,35 ,62 -,42
73 1,00 6,00 3,26 1,46 ,41 -1,14
73 1,00 6,00 3,22 1,25 ,54 -,78
73 1,00 6,00 2,96 1,09 ,55 -,17
73
Contract_length
Options
Requirement_1
Requirement_2
Requirement_3
Requirement_4
Requirement_5
Requirement_6r
Requirement_7
Performance_1
Performance_2
Performance_3
Performance_4
Performance_5
Performance_6
Performance_7
Performance_8
Performance_9
Price_1_fixed
Price_2_TM
Price_3
Price_4
Price_5
Price_6_penalty
Price_7
Price_8
Degree of fixed price
Dynamism_1
Dynamism_2
Dynamism_3
Dynamism_4
Complexity_1
Complexity_2
Complexity_3
Complexity_4
Valid N (listwise)
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std.
D i i
Skewnes Kurtosis
 
 
 
 
 
 183 
   
 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics: Control Variables
74 1,00 7,00 3,41 1,77 ,25 -1,32
74 1,00 6,00 3,07 1,75 ,42 -1,22
74 1,00 5,00 2,34 1,11 ,70 -,31
74 1,00 7,00 3,09 1,68 ,45 -,95
73 1,00 7,00 3,51 1,78 ,07 -1,18
74 1,00 7,00 3,05 1,77 ,40 -1,00
73 1,00 7,00 3,56 1,90 ,03 -1,41
68 1,00 6,00 2,51 1,47 ,72 -,62
73 1,00 7,00 3,40 1,83 ,25 -1,24
74 1,00 7,00 4,43 1,54 -,23 -,54
74 1,00 7,00 4,32 1,54 -,29 -,69
74 1,00 7,00 4,24 1,50 -,46 -,61
74 1,00 7,00 3,51 1,75 -,01 -1,07
74 1,00 7,00 4,81 1,50 -,37 -,37
74 2,00 7,00 5,11 1,48 -,43 -,61
74 1,00 7,00 4,62 1,75 -,26 -1,07
73 1,00 7,00 5,60 1,62 -1,09 ,23
73 1,00 7,00 5,96 1,43 -1,75 2,84
74 ,17 8,25 2,45 2,30 1,19 ,11
68
RSI_1
RSI_2
RSI_3
RSI_4
RSI_5
RSI_6
RSI_7
RSI_8
RSI_9
Importance_1
Importance_2
Importance_3
Importance_4
Alternatives_1
Alternatives_2
Alternatives_3r
Alternatives_4r
Alternatives_5r
Contract age
Valid N (listwise)
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std.
D i i
Skewnes Kurtosis
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APPENDIX 4  
MEASUREMENT MODEL: PRINCIPAL COMPONENT 
ANALYSIS 
This appendix provides detailed description of the principal component analysis that we used 
to assess the validity of our measures. We report single factor solutions and Varimax rotated 
solutions to assess convergent and discriminant validity.  
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Contract behavior: Relational focus 
 
Communalities
1,000 ,570
1,000 ,625
1,000 ,650
1,000 ,579
Focus_1
Focus_2
Focus_3r
Focus_5r
Initial Extraction
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
 
 
Total Variance Explained
2,424 60,610 60,610 2,424 60,610 60,610
,954 23,838 84,448
,323 8,075 92,523
,299 7,477 100,000
Component
1
2
3
4
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative %
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
 
Component Matrixa
,755
,791
,806
,761
Focus_1
Focus_2
Focus_3r
Focus_5r
1
Component
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
1 components extracted.a. 
 
 
 
 186 
   
Contract behavior: Solidarity 
 
Communalities
1,000 ,722
1,000 ,725
1,000 ,610
Solidarity_2
Solidarity_3
Solidarity_4
Initial Extraction
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
 
Total Variance Explained
2,057 68,558 68,558 2,057 68,558 68,558
,554 18,465 87,024
,389 12,976 100,000
Component
1
2
3
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative %
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
 
Component Matrixa
,850
,851
,781
Solidarity_2
Solidarity_3
Solidarity_4
1
Component
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
1 components extracted.a. 
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Contract behavior: Mutuality 
 
 
Communalities
1,000 ,554
1,000 ,817
1,000 ,642
Mutuality_1r
Mutuality_2r
Mutuality_4r
Initial Extraction
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
 
Total Variance Explained
2,013 67,104 67,104 2,013 67,104 67,104
,682 22,738 89,842
,305 10,158 100,000
Component
1
2
3
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative %
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
 
Component Matrixa
,744
,904
,802
Mutuality_1r
Mutuality_2r
Mutuality_4r
1
Component
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
1 components extracted.a. 
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Contract behavior: Flexibility 
 
Communalities
1,000 ,509
1,000 ,751
1,000 ,273
Flexibility_1r
Flexibility_2
Flexibility_3
Initial Extraction
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
 
Total Variance Explained
1,533 51,089 51,089 1,533 51,089 51,089
,980 32,661 83,749
,488 16,251 100,000
Component
1
2
3
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative %
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
 
Component Matrixa
,713
,867
,522
Flexibility_1r
Flexibility_2
Flexibility_3
1
Component
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
1 components extracted.a. 
 
 
Note that we excluded Flexibility_3 based on assessment of communality. 
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Contract behavior: Role Integrity 
 
Communalities
1,000 ,618
1,000 ,846
1,000 ,686
1,000 ,697
1,000 ,762
1,000 ,554
Role_integr_1
Role_integr_3
Role_integr_4
Role_integr_5
Role_integr_6
Role_integr_7r
Initial Extraction
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
 
Total Variance Explained
4,163 69,378 69,378 4,163 69,378 69,378
,614 10,237 79,615
,465 7,757 87,372
,349 5,822 93,194
,259 4,314 97,509
,149 2,491 100,000
Component
1
2
3
4
5
6
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative %
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
 
Component Matrixa
,786
,920
,828
,835
,873
,744
Role_integr_1
Role_integr_3
Role_integr_4
Role_integr_5
Role_integr_6
Role_integr_7r
1
Component
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
1 components extracted.a. 
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Contract behavior: Restraint of power 
 
Communalities
1,000 ,841
1,000 ,899
1,000 ,677
Restraint_1r
Restraint_2r
Restraint_3
Initial Extraction
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
 
Total Variance Explained
2,417 80,554 80,554 2,417 80,554 80,554
,458 15,268 95,822
,125 4,178 100,000
Component
1
2
3
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative %
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
 
Component Matrixa
,917
,948
,823
Restraint_1r
Restraint_2r
Restraint_3
1
Component
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
1 components extracted.a. 
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Contract behavior: Conflict resolution 
 
Communalities
1,000 ,917
1,000 ,887
1,000 ,040
Conflict_res_1r
Conflict_res_2r
Conflict_res_4
Initial Extraction
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
 
Total Variance Explained
1,843 61,442 61,442 1,843 61,442 61,442
,992 33,071 94,513
,165 5,487 100,000
Component
1
2
3
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative %
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
 
Component Matrixa
,957
,942
-,200
Conflict_res_1r
Conflict_res_2r
Conflict_res_4
1
Component
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
1 components extracted.a. 
 
 
Note that we excluded Conflict_res_4 based on low communality. 
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Contract behavior: All seven dimensions (contract norms) 
 
This is the result of the validation process.  
Communalities
1,00 ,75
1,00 ,87
1,00 ,74
1,00 ,75
1,00 ,74
1,00 ,78
1,00 ,84
1,00 ,89
1,00 ,83
1,00 ,82
1,00 ,71
1,00 ,83
1,00 ,76
1,00 ,73
1,00 ,83
1,00 ,81
1,00 ,90
1,00 ,85
1,00 ,75
1,00 ,75
1,00 ,63
1,00 ,79
1,00 ,70
Role_integr_1
Role_integr_3
Role_integr_4
Role_integr_5
Role_integr_6
Role_integr_7r
Restraint_1r
Restraint_2r
Restraint_3
Focus_1
Focus_2
Focus_3r
Focus_5r
Solidarity_2
Solidarity_3
Solidarity_4
Conflict_res_1r
Conflict_res_2r
Mutuality_1r
Mutuality_2r
Mutuality_4r
Flexibility_1r
Flexibility_2
Initial Extraction
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
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Total Variance Explained
6,32 27,49 27,49 4,31 18,76 18,76
4,10 17,82 45,31 2,75 11,95 30,71
2,36 10,27 55,58 2,53 11,00 41,71
1,96 8,50 64,08 2,43 10,56 52,27
1,39 6,05 70,13 2,27 9,85 62,12
1,06 4,63 74,76 2,21 9,63 71,75
,88 3,82 78,59 1,57 6,84 78,59
,84 3,64 82,23
,05 ,24 100,00
Component
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
23
Total
% of
Variance Cumulative % Total
% of
Variance Cumulative %
Initial Eigenvalues Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
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Rotated Component Matrixa
,65 ,02 ,03 ,51 ,19 -,14 ,11
,86 -,05 -,03 ,31 ,18 ,01 -,08
,85 ,01 -,03 -,01 -,03 ,05 ,09
,79 -,03 -,16 ,22 -,14 -,15 ,10
,84 -,07 -,14 ,05 ,05 -,05 ,04
,78 ,12 ,10 -,21 -,10 ,07 -,31
-,13 ,83 ,19 ,00 ,24 ,19 ,06
-,14 ,86 ,19 ,01 ,18 ,25 -,01
,28 ,83 ,05 ,22 ,03 ,04 ,05
-,05 ,15 ,74 ,08 ,19 -,25 ,39
,11 ,09 ,77 -,04 ,07 ,00 ,32
-,26 ,25 ,60 -,28 ,32 ,40 -,04
-,21 ,14 ,71 -,18 -,01 ,37 -,14
,20 ,07 -,10 ,75 -,33 -,07 ,02
,04 ,16 -,07 ,89 -,06 -,10 -,05
,39 -,28 -,49 ,54 ,06 -,23 -,02
,12 ,23 ,09 -,15 ,87 ,21 -,07
-,04 ,13 ,14 -,05 ,88 ,11 -,12
-,05 ,06 ,09 ,00 ,02 ,85 ,10
-,06 ,37 ,11 -,15 ,27 ,71 ,01
,10 ,20 -,07 -,25 ,41 ,58 ,06
-,16 ,33 ,29 -,24 -,04 ,11 ,70
,10 -,10 ,13 ,09 -,16 ,08 ,79
Role_integr_1
Role_integr_3
Role_integr_4
Role_integr_5
Role_integr_6
Role_integr_7r
Restraint_1r
Restraint_2r
Restraint_3
Focus_1
Focus_2
Focus_3r
Focus_5r
Solidarity_2
Solidarity_3
Solidarity_4
Conflict_res_1r
Conflict_res_2r
Mutuality_1r
Mutuality_2r
Mutuality_4r
Flexibility_1r
Flexibility_2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Component
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
Rotation converged in 11 iterations.a. 
 
 
 
Second order factor analysis 
Contract behavior is supposed to originate from a common source, and we ran a second order 
principal component analysis to verify this. 
We report three steps of the validation process: first all seven dimensions, then a two-factor 
solution without flexibility, and finally a single factor solution with four dimensions.  
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Contract behavior (all dimensions) 
 
Communalities
1,000 ,648
1,000 ,763
1,000 ,590
1,000 ,854
1,000 ,751
1,000 ,618
1,000 ,761
Relational focus
Solidarity
Mutuality
Flexibility
Role Integrity
Restraint of power
Conflict resolution
Initial Extraction
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
 
Total Variance Explained
2,529 36,129 36,129 2,529 36,129 36,129
1,404 20,052 56,182 1,404 20,052 56,182
1,051 15,018 71,200 1,051 15,018 71,200
,660 9,433 80,633
,588 8,403 89,037
,404 5,776 94,813
,363 5,187 100,000
Component
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative %
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
 
Rotated Component Matrixa
,456 -,327 ,577
-,298 ,807 -,151
,727 -,205 ,140
-,047 -,081 ,919
,130 ,856 -,044
,656 ,143 ,408
,855 -,013 -,171
Relational focus
Solidarity
Mutuality
Flexibility
Role Integrity
Restraint of power
Conflict resolution
1 2 3
Component
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
Rotation converged in 4 iterations.a. 
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Contract behavior (without flexibility) 
 
Communalities
1,000 ,547
1,000 ,740
1,000 ,570
1,000 ,750
1,000 ,569
1,000 ,597
Relational focus
Solidarity
Mutuality
Role Integrity
Restraint of power
Conflict resolution
Initial Extraction
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
 
Total Variance Explained
2,403 40,045 40,045 2,403 40,045 40,045
1,370 22,827 62,872 1,370 22,827 62,872
,705 11,748 74,620
,648 10,794 85,414
,509 8,487 93,901
,366 6,099 100,000
Component
1
2
3
4
5
6
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative %
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
 
Rotated Component Matrixa
,580 -,460
-,279 ,814
,722 -,219
,162 ,851
,753 ,034
,772 ,039
Relational focus
Solidarity
Mutuality
Role Integrity
Restraint of power
Conflict resolution
1 2
Component
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
Rotation converged in 3 iterations.a. 
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Contract behavior (one factor solution with four dimensions) 
 
Communalities
1,000 ,464
1,000 ,569
1,000 ,561
1,000 ,525
Relational focus
Mutuality
Restraint of power
Conflict resolution
Initial Extraction
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
 
Total Variance Explained
2,119 52,964 52,964 2,119 52,964 52,964
,715 17,875 70,839
,606 15,155 85,993
,560 14,007 100,000
Component
1
2
3
4
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative %
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
 
Component Matrixa
,681
,754
,749
,725
Relational focus
Mutuality
Restraint of power
Conflict resolution
1
Component
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
1 components extracted.a. 
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Contract mechanisms: Requirement specifications 
 
Communalities
1,000 ,654
1,000 ,835
1,000 ,697
Requirement_3
Requirement_5
Requirement_6r
Initial Extraction
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
 
Total Variance Explained
2,185 72,847 72,847 2,185 72,847 72,847
,549 18,296 91,143
,266 8,857 100,000
Component
1
2
3
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative %
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
 
Component Matrixa
,809
,914
,835
Requirement_3
Requirement_5
Requirement_6r
1
Component
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
1 components extracted.a. 
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Contract mechanisms: Performance specifications 
 
 
 
Communalities
1,000 ,667
1,000 ,485
1,000 ,653
1,000 ,722
1,000 ,679
Performance_3
Performance_5
Performance_6
Performance_7
Performance_8
Initial Extraction
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
 
Total Variance Explained
3,205 64,106 64,106 3,205 64,106 64,106
,775 15,494 79,601
,410 8,193 87,793
,355 7,107 94,900
,255 5,100 100,000
Component
1
2
3
4
5
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative %
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
 
Component Matrixa
,817
,696
,808
,850
,824
Performance_3
Performance_5
Performance_6
Performance_7
Performance_8
1
Componen
t
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
1 components extracted.a. 
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Contract mechanisms:  Requirement and performance specs. 
 
Communalities
1,000 ,698
1,000 ,809
1,000 ,673
1,000 ,656
1,000 ,454
1,000 ,742
1,000 ,739
1,000 ,707
Requirement_3
Requirement_5
Requirement_6r
Performance_3
Performance_5
Performance_6
Performance_7
Performance_8
Initial Extraction
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
 
Total Variance Explained
4,279 53,489 53,489 4,279 53,489 53,489
1,199 14,983 68,472 1,199 14,983 68,472
,828 10,352 78,824
,583 7,284 86,108
,377 4,713 90,821
,318 3,970 94,790
,259 3,242 98,032
,157 1,968 100,000
Component
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative %
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
 
Rotated Component Matrixa
,156 ,821
,371 ,819
,179 ,800
,710 ,389
,609 ,289
,860 ,056
,767 ,389
,827 ,156
Requirement_3
Requirement_5
Requirement_6r
Performance_3
Performance_5
Performance_6
Performance_7
Performance_8
1 2
Component
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
Rotation converged in 3 iterations.a. 
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Antecedents: Environmental Uncertainty (Dynamism) 
 
 
Communalities
1,000 ,794
1,000 ,880
1,000 ,835
Dynamism_1
Dynamism_2
Dynamism_3
Initial Extraction
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
 
Total Variance Explained
2,508 83,614 83,614 2,508 83,614 83,614
,313 10,431 94,046
,179 5,954 100,000
Component
1
2
3
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative %
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
 
Component Matrixa
,891
,938
,914
Dynamism_1
Dynamism_2
Dynamism_3
1
Component
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
1 components extracted.a. 
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Antecedents: Behavioral Uncertainty (Complexity) 
 
Communalities
1,000 ,624
1,000 ,865
1,000 ,705
Complexity_2
Complexity_3
Complexity_4
Initial Extraction
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
 
Total Variance Explained
2,194 73,130 73,130 2,194 73,130 73,130
,587 19,582 92,712
,219 7,288 100,000
Component
1
2
3
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative %
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
 
Component Matrixa
,790
,930
,840
Complexity_2
Complexity_3
Complexity_4
1
Component
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
1 components extracted.a. 
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Antecedents: Both uncertainty dimensions 
 
Communalities
1,000 ,625
1,000 ,866
1,000 ,713
1,000 ,797
1,000 ,879
1,000 ,840
Complexity_2
Complexity_3
Complexity_4
Dynamism_1
Dynamism_2
Dynamism_3
Initial Extraction
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
 
Total Variance Explained
2,924 48,729 48,729 2,924 48,729 48,729
1,796 29,933 78,662 1,796 29,933 78,662
,585 9,744 88,406
,308 5,139 93,545
,257 4,288 97,833
,130 2,167 100,000
Component
1
2
3
4
5
6
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative %
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
 
Rotated Component Matrixa
,178 ,770
,056 ,929
,067 ,842
,891 ,060
,934 ,081
,897 ,189
Complexity_2
Complexity_3
Complexity_4
Dynamism_1
Dynamism_2
Dynamism_3
1 2
Component
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
Rotation converged in 3 iterations.a. 
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Control variables: Relation specific investments 
 
Communalities
1,000 ,842
1,000 ,812
1,000 ,629
1,000 ,757
1,000 ,661
1,000 ,623
RSI_1
RSI_2
RSI_3
RSI_4
RSI_5
RSI_9
Initial Extraction
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
 
Total Variance Explained
4,324 72,070 72,070 4,324 72,070 72,070
,520 8,663 80,734
,396 6,595 87,329
,389 6,480 93,809
,291 4,852 98,662
,080 1,338 100,000
Component
1
2
3
4
5
6
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative %
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
 
Component Matrixa
,918
,901
,793
,870
,813
,789
RSI_1
RSI_2
RSI_3
RSI_4
RSI_5
RSI_9
1
Component
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
1 components extracted.a. 
 
 
 205 
   
Control variables: Contract importance 
 
Communalities
1,000 ,856
1,000 ,786
1,000 ,832
1,000 ,628
Importance_1
Importance_2
Importance_3
Importance_4
Initial Extraction
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
 
Total Variance Explained
3,103 77,567 77,567 3,103 77,567 77,567
,537 13,413 90,980
,223 5,577 96,557
,138 3,443 100,000
Component
1
2
3
4
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative %
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
 
Component Matrixa
,925
,887
,912
,792
Importance_1
Importance_2
Importance_3
Importance_4
1
Component
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
1 components extracted.a. 
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Control variables: Availability of alternatives 
 
Communalities
1,000 ,839
1,000 ,840
1,000 ,753
1,000 ,494
Alternatives_1
Alternatives_2
Alternatives_3r
Alternatives_4r
Initial Extraction
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
 
Total Variance Explained
2,926 73,140 73,140 2,926 73,140 73,140
,622 15,539 88,679
,318 7,947 96,626
,135 3,374 100,000
Component
1
2
3
4
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative %
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
 
Component Matrixa
,916
,916
,868
,703
Alternatives_1
Alternatives_2
Alternatives_3r
Alternatives_4r
1
Component
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
1 components extracted.a. 
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Control variables: All three dimensions 
We ran a combined Varimax rotated solution with all three dimensions, and the dimensions 
were assessed to show acceptable convergent and discriminant validity. 
 
Communalities
1,000 ,859
1,000 ,816
1,000 ,651
1,000 ,787
1,000 ,678
1,000 ,694
1,000 ,834
1,000 ,804
1,000 ,833
1,000 ,691
1,000 ,874
1,000 ,841
1,000 ,755
1,000 ,457
RSI_1
RSI_2
RSI_3
RSI_4
RSI_5
RSI_9
Importance_1
Importance_2
Importance_3
Importance_4
Alternatives_1
Alternatives_2
Alternatives_3r
Alternatives_4r
Initial Extraction
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
 
 
Total Variance Explained
6,150 43,926 43,926 4,173 29,810 29,810
2,884 20,602 64,528 3,235 23,106 52,916
1,539 10,992 75,520 3,165 22,605 75,520
,775 5,535 81,056
,046 ,329 100,000
Component
1
2
3
4
14
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative %
Initial Eigenvalues Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
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Rotated Component Matrixa
,906 ,181 -,073
,853 ,232 -,184
,773 ,214 -,087
,866 ,135 -,137
,730 ,381 -,016
,632 ,391 -,377
,314 ,856 -,052
,344 ,809 ,178
,203 ,890 ,020
,170 ,773 -,254
-,049 ,002 ,933
-,073 -,035 ,914
-,191 ,038 ,847
-,119 -,095 ,659
RSI_1
RSI_2
RSI_3
RSI_4
RSI_5
RSI_9
Importance_1
Importance_2
Importance_3
Importance_4
Alternatives_1
Alternatives_2
Alternatives_3r
Alternatives_4r
1 2 3
Component
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
Rotation converged in 5 iterations.a. 
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Contract mechanisms, uncertainty and control variables (all 
independent variables)  
As a final step, we ran a combined Varimax rotated solution with all dimensions that would 
be treated as independent variables in the regression analysis.  
 
Communalities
1,000 ,857
1,000 ,835
1,000 ,637
1,000 ,830
1,000 ,766
1,000 ,743
1,000 ,874
1,000 ,855
1,000 ,771
1,000 ,625
1,000 ,707
1,000 ,509
1,000 ,818
1,000 ,766
1,000 ,703
1,000 ,881
1,000 ,885
1,000 ,831
1,000 ,826
1,000 ,832
1,000 ,903
1,000 ,831
1,000 ,703
1,000 ,756
1,000 ,635
1,000 ,705
1,000 ,856
1,000 ,749
RSI_1
RSI_2
RSI_3
RSI_4
RSI_5
RSI_9
Alternatives_1
Alternatives_2
Alternatives_3r
Alternatives_4r
Performance_3
Performance_5
Performance_6
Performance_7
Performance_8
Importance_1
Importance_2
Importance_3
Importance_4
Dynamism_1
Dynamism_2
Dynamism_3
Requirement_3
Requirement_5
Requirement_6r
Complexity_2
Complexity_3
Complexity_4
Initial Extraction
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
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Total Variance Explained
6,975 24,911 24,911 4,564 16,302 16,302
5,289 18,889 43,800 3,300 11,785 28,086
2,620 9,359 53,158 3,222 11,506 39,592
2,428 8,671 61,830 2,976 10,630 50,223
1,829 6,532 68,362 2,600 9,286 59,509
1,412 5,041 73,403 2,574 9,193 68,702
1,133 4,048 77,451 2,450 8,749 77,451
,927 3,310 80,761
,043 ,152 100,000
Component
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
28
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative %
Initial Eigenvalues Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
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Rotated Component Matrixa
,91 -,05 ,05 ,12 -,08 ,09 -,05
,84 -,16 ,21 ,16 -,17 ,06 ,01
,73 -,10 ,18 ,19 ,05 -,14 ,00
,86 -,10 ,00 ,16 -,03 -,21 -,10
,76 ,01 ,01 ,29 ,04 ,10 -,31
,67 -,36 ,10 ,31 -,14 ,19 ,11
-,09 ,89 ,11 ,01 ,25 -,02 ,05
-,09 ,90 ,12 -,05 ,10 -,01 ,07
-,18 ,82 -,03 ,05 ,22 ,06 -,06
-,10 ,66 -,19 -,13 ,04 ,32 ,17
-,06 ,15 ,70 -,03 ,08 ,42 ,07
,26 ,15 ,39 ,03 ,07 ,50 ,13
,11 ,02 ,87 ,18 ,09 ,00 ,11
,14 -,06 ,76 ,11 ,05 ,39 ,02
,31 -,09 ,71 ,19 ,01 ,22 ,05
,33 -,05 ,24 ,82 -,09 ,12 ,11
,30 ,18 ,35 ,80 ,00 ,00 -,03
,26 -,03 ,16 ,83 ,18 ,16 -,01
,27 -,26 -,23 ,71 ,15 ,24 -,20
-,02 ,37 ,05 ,06 ,83 ,05 ,02
-,06 ,08 ,14 ,02 ,92 ,13 ,10
-,12 ,21 ,00 ,08 ,84 ,09 ,22
,03 ,00 ,10 ,13 ,19 ,80 -,03
-,03 ,12 ,39 ,15 ,10 ,74 -,07
-,24 ,06 ,36 ,19 -,09 ,61 -,18
,04 -,03 ,03 -,06 ,17 ,11 ,81
-,04 ,01 ,10 -,01 ,08 -,09 ,91
-,24 ,22 ,06 ,04 ,03 -,14 ,79
RSI_1
RSI_2
RSI_3
RSI_4
RSI_5
RSI_9
Alternatives_1
Alternatives_2
Alternatives_3r
Alternatives_4r
Performance_3
Performance_5
Performance_6
Performance_7
Performance_8
Importance_1
Importance_2
Importance_3
Importance_4
Dynamism_1
Dynamism_2
Dynamism_3
Requirement_3
Requirement_5
Requirement_6r
Complexity_2
Complexity_3
Complexity_4
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Component
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
Rotation converged in 7 iterations.a. 
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APPENDIX 5  
MEASUREMENT MODEL: RELIABILITY AND SCALES 
We ran a reliability analysis, and here we report Cronbach’s alpha and item-to-total 
correlations for all the summated scales.  
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Contract behavior (dependent variable) 
Scale Item-to-total 
correlations 
Coefficient alpha 
Co-operative relation (4 of 7 dimensions)
Relational focus 
Mutuality 
Restraint of power 
Conflict resolution 
 
0.4387 
0.5424 
0.5211 
0.4758 
0.6959 
Relational focus (4 of 7 items) 
Focus_1 
Focus_2 
Focus_3r 
Focus_5r 
 
0.5368 
0.6145 
0.6378 
0.5524 
0.7737 
Mutuality (3 of 4 items) 
Mutuality_1r 
Mutuality_2r 
Mutuality_4r 
 
0.4750 
0.7264 
0.5333 
0.7447 
Restraint of power (3 of 4 items) 
Restraint_1r 
Restraint_2r 
Restraint_3 
 
0.7997 
0.8668 
0.6460 
0.8790 
Conflict resolution (2 of 4 items) 
Conflict_res_1r 
Conflict_res_2r 
 
0.8247 
0.8247 
0.8247 
Solidarity (3 of 5 items) 
Solidarity_2 
Solidarity_3 
Solidarity_4 
 
0.6204 
0.6257 
0.5409 
0.7525 
Role Integrity (6 of 7 items) 
Role_integr_1 
Role_integr_3 
Role_integr_4 
Role_integr_5 
Role_integr_6 
Role_integr_7r 
 
0.6971 
0.8754 
0.7441 
0.7500 
0.8036 
0.6440 
0.9090 
Flexibility (2 of 5 items) 
Flexibility_1r 
Flexibility_2 
 
0.4254 
0.4254 
0.4254 
Relational focus, mutuality, restraint of power, and conflict resolution were included in the 
dependent variable denoted as Co-operative relation. The other dimensions were excluded as 
a result of the validation process.  
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Contract mechanisms, antecedents (uncertainty) and control 
variables 
Scale Item-to-total 
correlations 
Coefficient alpha 
Requirement specifications (3 of 7 items)
Requirement_3 
Requirement_5 
Requirement_6r 
 
0.5941 
0.7718 
0.6255 
0.8112 
Performance specifications (5 of 9 items)
Performance_3 
Performance_5 
Performance_6 
Performance_7 
Performance_8 
 
0.6984 
0.5556 
0.6848 
0.7423 
0.7062 
0.8599 
Dynamisms (3 of 4 items) 
Dynamism_1 
Dynamism_2 
Dynamism_3 
 
0.7633 
0.8461 
0.7955 
0.8925 
Complexity (3 of 4 items) 
Complexity_2 
Complexity_3 
Complexity_4 
 
0.5762 
0.7964 
0.6169 
0.8027 
Relational investments (6 of 9 items) 
RSI_1 
RSI_2 
RSI_3 
RSI_4 
RSI_5 
RSI_9 
 
0.8715 
0.8461 
0.7044 
0.7972 
0.7340 
0.7061 
0.9178 
Contract importance (4 items) 
Importance_1 
Importance_2 
Importance_3 
Importance_4 
 
0.8466 
0.7754 
0.8364 
0.6586 
0.8982 
Available alternatives (4 of 5 items) 
Alternatives_1 
Alternatives_2 
Alternatives_3r 
Alternatives_4r 
 
0.8133 
0.8204 
0.7415 
0.5442 
0.8688 
Contract length, degree of fixed price, price penalty, and contract age were used as single 
item constructs. 
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APPENDIX 6  
REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
We used three incremental Ordinary Least Square regression models in SPSS to test the ten 
hypotheses. We first regressed contract behavior on contract mechanisms and uncertainty, 
then we added the control variables, and finally we added the interaction terms.  
We mean centered all the independent variables to avoid multicollinearity, and the VIF 
indexes ranged from 1.199 to 2.422.  
The complete result is reported in this appendix. 
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Contract behavior regressed on contract mechanisms, 
uncertainty, control variables and interactions 
Model Summary
,681a ,464 ,406 ,76119
,747b ,558 ,478 ,71336
,794c ,630 ,548 ,66400
Model
1
2
3
R R Square
Adjusted
R Square
Std. Error of
the Estimate
Predictors: (Constant), Complexity centered, Contract
length centered, Penalty centered, Fixed price
centered, Dynamism centered, Performance centered,
Requirement centered
a. 
Predictors: (Constant), Complexity centered, Contract
length centered, Penalty centered, Fixed price
centered, Dynamism centered, Performance centered,
Requirement centered, Importance, Contract age,
Alternatives, RSI
b. 
Predictors: (Constant), Complexity centered, Contract
length centered, Penalty centered, Fixed price
centered, Dynamism centered, Performance centered,
Requirement centered, Importance, Contract age,
Alternatives, RSI, Contract length*Complexity,
Performance*Complexity
c. 
 
ANOVAd
32,586 7 4,655 8,034 ,000a
37,662 65 ,579
70,248 72
39,205 11 3,564 7,004 ,000b
31,042 61 ,509
70,248 72
44,235 13 3,403 7,718 ,000c
26,013 59 ,441
70,248 72
Regression
Residual
Total
Regression
Residual
Total
Regression
Residual
Total
Model
1
2
3
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), Complexity centered, Contract length centered, Penalty
centered, Fixed price centered, Dynamism centered, Performance centered,
Requirement centered
a. 
Predictors: (Constant), Complexity centered, Contract length centered, Penalty
centered, Fixed price centered, Dynamism centered, Performance centered,
Requirement centered, Importance, Contract age, Alternatives, RSI
b. 
Predictors: (Constant), Complexity centered, Contract length centered, Penalty
centered, Fixed price centered, Dynamism centered, Performance centered,
Requirement centered, Importance, Contract age, Alternatives, RSI, Contract
length*Complexity, Performance*Complexity
c. 
Dependent Variable: Co-operative relationd. 
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Coefficientsa
3,560 ,089 39,942 ,000
-,020 ,015 -,126 -1,286 ,203
,148 ,083 ,223 1,787 ,079
-,201 ,076 -,319 -2,650 ,010
,009 ,023 ,038 ,407 ,686
-,154 ,047 -,352 -3,269 ,002
-,287 ,070 -,396 -4,081 ,000
,127 ,088 ,139 1,445 ,153
4,918 ,562 8,754 ,000
-,034 ,017 -,217 -2,003 ,050
,167 ,079 ,251 2,108 ,039
-,232 ,077 -,368 -3,014 ,004
-,015 ,023 -,060 -,645 ,522
-,102 ,050 -,233 -2,023 ,048
-,211 ,074 -,290 -2,844 ,006
,147 ,084 ,161 1,746 ,086
,027 ,084 ,038 ,324 ,747
-,089 ,084 -,123 -1,063 ,292
-,258 ,084 -,358 -3,090 ,003
,092 ,047 ,209 1,952 ,056
4,747 ,526 9,031 ,000
-,025 ,016 -,157 -1,506 ,137
,174 ,074 ,262 2,354 ,022
-,227 ,078 -,360 -2,921 ,005
-,012 ,021 -,051 -,591 ,556
-,104 ,047 -,237 -2,208 ,031
-,206 ,069 -,284 -2,978 ,004
,185 ,079 ,202 2,326 ,023
,076 ,080 ,107 ,949 ,346
-,110 ,079 -,152 -1,404 ,166
-,207 ,079 -,287 -2,606 ,012
,036 ,047 ,081 ,755 ,453
,033 ,013 ,232 2,619 ,011
-,102 ,049 -,189 -2,069 ,043
(Constant)
Contract length centered
Requirement centered
Performance centered
Fixed price centered
Penalty centered
Dynamism centered
Complexity centered
(Constant)
Contract length centered
Requirement centered
Performance centered
Fixed price centered
Penalty centered
Dynamism centered
Complexity centered
RSI
Importance
Alternatives
Contract age
(Constant)
Contract length centered
Requirement centered
Performance centered
Fixed price centered
Penalty centered
Dynamism centered
Complexity centered
RSI
Importance
Alternatives
Contract age
Contract
length*Complexity
Performance*Complexity
Model
1
2
3
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Beta
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: Co-operative relationa. 
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